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REASSESSING CONSTRAINTS
I. INTRODUCTION
A reassessment of United States' constitutional constraints on
state-level foreign policy is sorely needed. State engagement in for-
eign policy was rarely significant until the 1960s.' Since that time,
state involvement has rapidly expanded in both sheer magnitude and
2
the types of activities undertaken. The most prominent and proble-
matic among these state and local activities in the past fifty-plus years
has been three waves of state and local sanction initiatives targeting
countries ruled by regimes with repugnant human rights policies. In
the mid-1980s, over half of the states and at least 100 localities
adopted sanctions legislation against South Africa, most often in the
form of divestment requirements for state or city pension funds, pro-
curement restrictions applicable to companies active in South Africa,
or both. In the late 1990s, many states and localities targeted Burma
(officially known as the Union of Myanmar), a country ruled by an
undemocratic military regime with a repugnant human rights record
that has included the killing of as many as several thousand pro-
democracy demonstrators. More recently, states and localities have
targeted the Sudanese government for its participation in the geno-
cide in the Darfur region of the country. Divestment requirements
and procurement sanctions continue to be tools of choice for states
and localities seeking to use their substantial market leverage to
change the behavior of these foreign governments. Unless halted
through the faithful application of constitutional constraints by state
and local officials, globalization and technological developments that
increase access to and the exchange of information concerning con-
' See, e.g., Ivo D. Duchacek, Perforated Sovereignties: Towards a Typology of New Actors
in International Relations, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE ROLE OF
SUBNATIONAL UNITS 5, 5 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990); Earl
Fry, The United States of America, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE
ROLE OF SUBNATIONAL UNITS 283, 283 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds.,
1990).
2 See generally John M. Kline, Managing Intergovernmental Tensions: Shaping a State
and Local Role in US Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 105,
105 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993) (noting that not since the Republic's earliest decades
had states attempted to engage directly and actively in foreign affairs in order to ad-
vance individual policy positions).
' Id.at1ll.
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ditions and policies in foreign countries will likely facilitate the trend
of increased state and local involvement in foreign affairs.
Constraints on state-level foreign policy flow from the Suprema-
cy Clause (in the form of the preemption doctrine), the Foreign
Commerce Clause (in the form of the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause), and the amalgam of clauses allocating foreign affairs powers
to federal actors and denying them to the states (in the form of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine). In 1968, the Supreme Court in
Zschernig v. Miller for the first time relied upon the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine to invalidate a state law in an as-applied challenge.5
This doctrine prohibits certain state foreign policy actions even in in-
stances in which such state actions are not preempted by affirmative
acts of the federal government (i.e., where the foreign policy powers
of the federal government lie dormant or unutilized). The dormant
foreign affairs doctrine is rooted in an exclusive federal government
foreign affairs power.6 By definition, if a power is exclusive to the
federal government, then states are denied such power irrespective of
whether the federal government has utilized its power. The Court
has declared the foreign relations power to be exclusive to the federal
government since the early 1800s, and a multi-modal interpretation
of the Constitution supports a significant degree of federal exclusivity
over foreign affairs.
All three major waves of state and local sanction efforts-those
involving South Africa in the 1980s, Burma in the 1990s, and Sudan
in the 2000s-led to litigation challenging the constitutionality of the
state and local legislation. The litigation involved challenges to state
and local laws under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, as well as
preemption and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Additional
See Matthew Schaefer, The "Grey Areas" and "Yellow Zones" of Split Sovereignty Ex-
posed by Globalization: Choosing Among Strategies of Avoidance, Cooperation and Intrusion to
Escape an Era of Misguided "New Federalism, "24 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 35 (1998).
389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968). Some commentators have used slightly different la-
bels. See, e.g., Kevin Lewis, Dealing with South Africa: The Constitutionality of State and Lo-
cal Divestment Legislation, 61 TUL. L. REV. 469, 471 (1987) (referring to the "dormant
foreign affairs power"); Johanna Medelson, Foreign Policy by Federalism: The Reagan
Years, 21 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 81, 89 (1989) (referring to a "dormant foreign
affairs clause"). I believe that use of the term "dormant foreign affairs clause" is in-
appropriate because the doctrine does not derive from a single clause nor does the
Constitution grant a general foreign affairs power to the federal government in any
single clause.
6 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 436.
See, e.g., Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 550 (1840) ("From the very nature
and organization of the general or national government, it is vested with the sole ju-
risdiction over all matters of a national character, and of external concern.").
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state measures outside of these major sanction initiatives have also
been challenged in the courts since Zschernig. Lower federal and
state courts, however, have struggled to apply Zschernig's test, which
asks whether a state action has "more than 'some incidental or indi-
rect effect"' on foreign relations,9 given the test is not particularly
well-suited for courts to independently analyze. In the past decade,
the Supreme Court accepted certiorari in two cases, Crosby v. National
Foreign Trade Councile and American Insurance Association v. Garamen-
di,11 involving state level foreign policy sanctions, but the Court's opi-
nions have not provided the clarity needed by lower courts, state ac-
tors, local actors, or federal actors. These Supreme Court rulings
followed closely on the heels of significant academic criticism of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine-writings that challenged the or-
thodoxy of federal government exclusivity in foreign affairs."
In the first case, Crosby, the Court struck down a Massachusetts
law that provided a negative ten percent procurement preference
against companies active in Burma.1 3 In its opinion, the Court relied
solely on "obstacles conflict" 4 preemption and did not rule on two
additional grounds that the First Circuit had relied upon to strike the
law down: the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the dormant For-
eign Commerce Clause. The choice to rely solely on preemption in-
correctly fueled speculation by some that the academic assault on
Zschernig succeeded. Additionally, some incorrectly characterized
the ruling as narrow and read it as only providing preemption of state
8 See infra Part VIII.E.2 (chart).
' Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
' 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
539 U.S. 396 (2003).
* See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONsTrrUTIoN 436 n.64
(2d ed. 1996); Jack Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L.
REv. 1617, 1618-20 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L.
REV. 1223, 1225 (1999) [hereinafter Spiro, Foreign Relations] ("The purpose of this
essay is to present a coherent explanation of why the doctrine was once appropriate,
even imperative, but fast becoming obsolete."); PeterJ. Spiro, The States and Immigra-
tion in an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 123 (1994) [hereinafter Spi-
ro, States and Immigration] (arguing for a lack of federal exclusivity over immigration
matters since the foreign affairs underpinning of such exclusivity is no longer valid).
* Crosby v. NFTC, 530 U.S. 363, 388 (2000).
Id. at 384--85.
' Cf Carlos Manual Vazquez, W(h)ither Zschernig?, 46 ViLL. L. REv. 1259, 1261
(2001) (arguing that "a declaration of victory by the critics of the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine would be premature" in response to the Court's opinion in Crosby).
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law where a federal sanctions law specifically targeted the same coun-
try as the state law or as only impacting procurement sanctions.
In the second case, Garamendi, the Court invalidated a California
law requiring insurers operating in the state to disclose pre-
Holocaust-era insurance policies sold in Europe in order to continue
operating in the state." But the Court provided a rather muddled
analysis. The majority approvingly cited Zschernig, breathing life back
into the doctrine for those that incorrectly believed Crosby left it criti-
cally wounded. The Garamendi opinion, however, arguably mischa-
racterized Zschernig as a field preemption case and ultimately
seemed to rely more on Crosby-styled obstacles conflict preemption as
the grounds for its decision.o
For their part, state and local governments read the opinions as
continuing to allow state-level foreign policy sanctions (or at a mini-
mum used the doctrinal confusion as an opportunity to pass such
measures) as evidenced by the recent enactment of laws targeting
Sudan. While a lower federal court partially invalidated Sudan-
sanctions legislation enacted by Illinois in 2007, a new issue was
raised when Congress subsequently purported to authorize state and
local divestment measures targeting Sudan in response to the litiga-
tion. The Congressional authorization occurred in spite of the Pres-
ident questioning the constitutionality of such authorization in his
23
signing statement of the legislation. In sum, the academic criticism
of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, the Supreme Court's hesit-
ance to rely clearly upon it, and Congress's purported attempt to au-
thorize state actions otherwise running afoul of the doctrine, have left
16 See Daniel M. Price,John P. Hannah & Marinn F. Carlson, Crosby v. NFTC and
the Future of State and Local Sanctions, 32 LAw & POL'Y INr'L Bus. 37, 40 (2001).
The omission of [dormant foreign affairs doctrine and dormant For-
eign Commerce Clause] holdings, however, at least theoretically leaves
open the possibility [state sanctions] could pass constitutional muster,
provided no federal statute addressed the same issue. This conceptual
space is what advocates of local foreign policy initiatives may seek to
exploit.
Id. The authors think this reading by state and local officials is incorrect.
Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003).
Id. at 417-18.
' Id. at 419.
' Id. at 421.
" NFTC v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
22 Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121
Stat. 2516.
" Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007,
43 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1645 (Dec. 31, 2007).
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confusion and questions surrounding the doctrine. Further, because
states and localities continue primarily to utilize procurement restric-
tions and divestment requirements in major sanctions initiatives, the
failure of the Supreme Court to rule on the availability of a market
participant exception to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine in the
face of conflicting lower court opinions has created further uncer-
tainty. Thus, the lack of clarity for state, local and federal officials,
lower courts, and businesses, first created by the Zschernig opinion,
has arguably worsened considerably in the past decade.
This reassessment of U.S. constitutional constraints on state level
foreign policy will focus on (re)justifying, refining, and distinguishing
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The (re)justification for the
doctrine is twofold. First, all major policy considerations argue
against state involvement in foreign affairs absent federal approval.
Ultimately, even those policy goals that at first glance appear to sup-
port state involvement in foreign affairs do not require state involve-
ment in order to be achieved. These policy arguments do not
mandate a dormant foreign affairs doctrine. As critics of the doctrine
point out, the federal government can always preempt harmful state
24
activities. Preemption by the federal government, however, is an
imperfect device in eliminating state engagement in foreign affairs
and gives less clear guidance to state and local actors. Further, rely-
ing on preemption is arguably less intellectually honest given unclear
congressional intent regarding preemption of state and local sanc-
tions measures in many instances. Most importantly, the various
modes of constitutional interpretation, although providing somewhat
conflicting signals, nevertheless support an exclusive foreign affairs
power in the federal government and its corollary, the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine.
The refinement of the doctrine is necessary because both courts
and scholars have struggled to establish a doctrinal test for analyzing
state actions that pays fealty to the Court's Zschernig opinion, suits the
competence of courts, and allows for independent application by
state and local officials. In establishing the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine in the Zschernig case, the Supreme Court appeared to create
a threshold-effects test asking whether the state action has "more
than 'some incidental or indirect effect"' on U.S. foreign relations or
a foreign nation.2 5 The origins of the test, however, are somewhat ac-
24 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1679.
22 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 434 (1968) (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S.
503, 517 (1947)).
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cidental.2 Moreover, such a standard is not particularly well-suited
for independent determinations by the courts, nor is it particularly
well-suited for independent application by state and local officials.
Many commentators analyzing the doctrine have failed to support
their chosen standard of review and have strayed from any standard
arguably articulated by the courts. For instance, many commentators
have mistakenly called for a balancing test relying on an analogy to
the dormant Commerce Clause. But courts struggle enough to in-
dependently determine the effect a state law has on foreign affairs
without being called upon to balance that effect against the achieve-
ment of a legitimate local purpose. Fortunately, there is also lan-
guage in Zschernig that indicates that the Court was concerned with
the purpose of the state action. Indeed, many lower courts have
turned to purpose review as an additional test or sub-test in their ap-
29plication of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Purpose review,
while admittedly not unproblematic, is the most appropriate doctrin-
al test. Specifically, the test for reviewing the legality of state actions
should be phrased as follows:
The dormant foreign affairs doctrine prohibits states from engag-
ing in foreign policy. States engage in foreign policy when they
take measures having a foreign-policy purpose. A foreign-policy
30purpose is evident when the primary purpose of the state action is to
change or criticize 3 a policy ofa foreign government, or governments.
26 See infta Part IV.B-C.
21 See, e.g., Glenn S. McRoberts, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Towards a Dormant
Foreign Affairs Doctrine, 11 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 639, 652 (1989); John Nor-
ton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 DUKE L.J. 248, 306 (1965).
21 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 437.
2' See discussion infra Parts III.D.3, VII.E.
3 See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 652 (initially examining state actions for such
a primary purpose but then engaging in balancing analysis). In the context of the
dormant Commerce Clause, Don Regan has supported a motive-review standard that
would only ask whether a protectionist purpose "substantially contributed" to enact-
ment of the state law. See Don Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Mak-
ing Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1091, 1148-49 (1986).
While I have no great concerns about adopting this lesser standard, I do not think
the choice between these two standards will matter very often under the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine. In other words, I think the choice between a "primary pur-
pose" and "purpose that substantially contributed" standard is probably more impor-
tant under the dormant Commerce Clause because state laws often mix a protection-
ist purpose with a legitimate local purpose. I also think the standard can be higher
under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine since the policing problems of state activ-
ities faced by the federal government are less significant. See also discussion infra Part
IV.D-E.
" Some readers may wonder why state actions "supporting or encouraging" a
foreign government's behavior or policies are also not captured by the doctrinal
208 [Vol. 41:201
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Such a test, it should be noted, will not prevent many activities
states currently engage in that some broader definitions may define
as foreign policy or foreign affairs. In sum, the adoption of purpose
review is not intended to be revolutionary, but rather, it is appro-
priately adapted to respond to a multi-modal interpretation of the
Constitution. Additionally, and importantly, no market participant
exception should be available under the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine. The justifications for the doctrine under the dormant Com-
merce Clause simply do not apply in the context of the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine.
Third, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine must be distin-
guished from preemption analysis and the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause. Commentators often use the term preemption or
preempt in the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. This
unduly confuses the two doctrines. Preemption doctrine has always
been understood to flow from the Supremacy Clause plus an affirma-
tive federal act. Similarly, the relationship between the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
is not well-understood. A complete understanding of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine requires distinguishing it from these other
doctrines.
It is important to realize that the tasks of justifying, refining, and
distinguishing the dormant foreign affairs doctrine are not exogen-
ous to one another. For instance, justifying the existence of the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine on policy grounds requires distinguish-
ing the doctrine from preemption. As another example, refining the
test under the doctrine to preclude balancing by courts requires dis-
tinguishing the doctrine from the dormant Commerce Clause. It is
for this reason that this Article cannot be neatly divided up into ad-
dressing these three undertakings of justification, refinement, and
distinction in succession. Although this Article follows this order as
much as possible, some intermixing of these three undertakings is
necessary.
Throughout this Article it is also important to bear in mind that
the relevant question is not whether pariah states or rogue govern-
ments deserve condemnation or sanctions, but rather, the question is
tests. But adding these to the doctrinal test is probably unnecessary for several rea-
sons. First, it is my sense that states are relatively less engaged in this manner towards
foreign governments. Second, foreign governments will not take offense, and thus
they will not retaliate or threaten retaliation against such actions. Third, the Fra-
mer's were particularly concerned with state actions that would affront foreign gov-
ernments and lead to potential retaliation.
2 See Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 236 (1947).
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which level of government is to decide upon the timing, manner,
form, and degree of the condemnation and sanction. The efficient
working of democracy and government, the predictability needed by
corporations and their workers in an interdependent world, and our
nation's ability to influence foreign nations all demand a clearer un-
derstanding of the Constitution's limits on state and local govern-
ment engagement in foreign policy. Indeed, a reassessment is neces-
sary from the point of view of state government officials, federal
government officials, and the courts.
First, there is evidence that some state legislators and governors
have abandoned their role in constitutional interpretation, particu-
larly as it relates to constraints on their powers in foreign affairs. One
only need look towards the statements of Massachusetts state assem-
blyman Byron Rushing regarding Massachusetts' Burma law in which
he declared, "Our Constitution is older than the country's. We can
do these things."3 3 A serious effort to faithfully interpret the U.S.
Constitution must be undertaken by all state officials, but unfortu-
nately it is not. Self-imposed constraints by state officials are neces-
sary because state and lower federal courts rarely have cases pre-
sented to them. The lack of cases results from collective action
problems faced by businesses injured by state foreign policy, even
though these collective action problems have been overcome more
34frequently in the past decade, and the political reluctance of the ex-
ecutive branch. Second, the federal political branches need a clearer
understanding of constitutional limits on state foreign policy so that
they know whether addressing preemption of state legislation in fed-
eral foreign affairs legislation is necessary, and alternatively, whether
and in what instances they can authorize state and local foreign poli-
cy sanctions measures. Third, the Supreme Court could greatly assist
federal, state, and local government officials and lower federal and
state courts by confirming the continued existence of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine. More importantly, the Court should clarify
the doctrinal test under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and the
distinctions between it and other doctrines. Even without such Su-
preme Court clarification, lower courts in large numbers continue to
apply the dormant foreign affairs doctrine (with a significant empha-
sis on purpose review), and thus state and local officials must rely on
" A State's Foreign Policy: The Mass that Roared, EcONOMIst, Feb. 8, 1997, at 32.
*' See Richard Bilder, The Role of States and Cities in Foreign Relations, 83 AM.J. INT'L
L. 821, 831 (1989); Howard Fenton, The Fallacy of Federalism in Foreign Affairs: State and
Local Foreign Policy Trade Restrictions, 13 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 563, 590-91 (1993).
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these lower court opinions to aid in the independent examination of
their own actions.
Part II of this Article examines the policy arguments both for
and against state-level foreign policies. These prudential arguments
fall into five general categories: fairness/retaliation, efficien-
cy/expertise, democratization, effectiveness, and the new post-Cold
War geopolitical environment. The ends desired in allowing active
state-level foreign policies can be achieved even in an environment in
which states face severe restrictions on establishing their own foreign
policies. In short, state-level foreign policies are not sound as a pru-
dential matter.
Part III engages in a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitu-
tion's provisions on foreign affairs. The text of the Constitution ex-
plicitly prohibits the states from engaging in foreign relations in cer-
tain ways. The real question, however, is whether limits exist beyond
these explicit textual prohibitions. The multi-modal interpretation of
the Constitution undertaken in this Part admits that there are con-
flicting indications in the text and drafting history of the Constitution
but still finds plenty of support for the existence of a dormant foreign
affairs doctrine.
Part IV focuses on an analysis of the Supreme Court's opinion in
the Zschernig case. This Part of the Article examines the three possi-
ble doctrinal tests under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine: thre-
shold effects, balancing, and purpose review. This Article expresses a
strong preference for purpose review because courts are best able to
engage in this type of review independent of the views of the execu-
tive branch and foreign governments. Purpose review will lead to
more consistent results among lower courts, it better respects tradi-
tional areas of state regulation and federal political branch views on
whether certain international obligations should be self-executing,
and, most importantly, it provides the best guidance to state and local
officials assessing the constitutionality of their own actions.
Part V continues the discussion of the test that should be
adopted under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine by examining a
potential market participant exception to the doctrine. A market-
participant exception should be rejected under the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine because justifications for the exception under the
dormant Commerce Clause are inapplicable in the context of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Part VI distinguishes the dormant foreign affairs doctrine from
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. In particular, the discussion
reduces the additional prongs of analysis undertaken in dormant
2011]1 211
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Foreign Commerce Clause cases to their bare bones and draws les-
sons for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Part VII explores whether federal actors can authorize actions by
the states that would otherwise run afoul of the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine. It is well-established that Congress can authorize ac-
tions by the states that otherwise violate the dormant Commerce
Clause, but authorizations of state actions otherwise violating the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine will often require approval by both
Congress and the President. But some actions, specifically those in
areas of federal power that are not only exclusive but non-delegable,
could never be authorized.
Part VIII critically examines the Supreme Court's rulings in Cros-
by and Garamendi that have created confusion and a lack of clarity. It
also looks at post-Garamendi lower court cases. These cases reveal a
degree of confusion regarding the doctrine among some lower courts
but also indicate that a majority of lower courts continue to apply the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine (with heavy emphasis on purpose
review).
Part IX discusses the relative importance of courts vis-A-vis state
officials in applying the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The reality
is that courts do not have the opportunity to constrain the states in
many instances. Many businesses are simply not anxious to risk a
public backlash by challenging state-level foreign policy measures in
court. While the National Foreign Trade Council, a coalition of over
300 businesses engaged in international trade, has overcome the fear
of being a plaintiff in a couple of instances, faithful application of
constitutional constraints by state officials and representatives is ulti-
mately required. Such faithfulness could be enhanced through Su-
preme Court clarification as lower courts' opinions have jurisdiction-
al limits.
Part X examines whether the Supreme Court's own rules of
judicial restraint would prevent the Court from providing further
clarity in a future case. A review of the cases suggests the Court could
properly base a ruling on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine even
when preemption grounds are also present.
Part XI concludes that the Supreme Court's reliance on, and
clarification of, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-
review test would allow state and local officials to discharge their re-
sponsibilities to act in accordance with the U.S. Constitution.
"' See Fenton, supra note 34, at 590-91.
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II. FUNCTIONAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
STATE-LEVEL FOREIGN POLICY
A. Retaliation and Unfairness
The most readily apparent policy argument against states engag-
ing in foreign policy is found in The Federalist Papers. It is a con-
cern related to fairness and retaliation. Is it fair to the forty-nine
other states if a foreign nation crafts sanctions against the United
States as a whole in response to one state's foreign policy legislation?
Clearly the answer is no. Is it actually the case that retaliation will fall
upon the United States as a whole rather than the state engaging in
foreign affairs in such instances? Critics of the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine note that there are examples in recent trade disputes where
retaliation has been targeted against a particular sub-national entity.
Indeed, it has been argued elsewhere that at least the important na-
tions of the world know the "difference between Washington and
Sacramento."7 In other words, foreign countries will not hold the rest
of the United States responsible for the actions of California. The ex-
istence of multi-jurisdictional enterprises, however, leads to possible
avoidance of such targeted retaliation, subsequently making targeted
retaliation less attractive to aggrieved states.3 8 Additionally, it is often
tough to target sanctions against a particular sub-federal jurisdiction
39
with no spill-over effects. Indeed, there are a host of strategic con-
siderations a foreign state will consider in deciding whether to target
sanctions against the state enacting foreign policy legislation or to do
so more broadly against the United States. Moreover, even if sanc-
tions are targeted against a particular sub-federal jurisdiction, it is
possible relations between the United States and the foreign nation
will be spoiled on other matters or that the foreign nation will use the
dispute as leverage in other negotiations. Retaliation occurs in sub-
tle as well as overt forms. For example, with regard to these more
subtle forms, is it fair to the other forty-nine states if a foreign nation
is less forthcoming in some international negotiations (or, in coope-
rating on the war on terror) as a result of one state's engagement of
foreign policy?
3 See Moore, supra note 27, at 251.
3 Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 169.
' See Matthew Schaefer, Federal States in the Broader World, 27 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 35, 37-
39 (2001); see also David Golove, The Implications of Crosby for Federal Exclusivity in For-
eign Affairs, 21 BERKELEYJ. INT'L L. 152, 156-58 (2003).
' See Schaefer, supra note 38, at 37-39; see also Golove, supra note 38, at 156-158.
4 See id.
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Rebuttals that will flow to the arguments above are easy to im-
agine but ultimately are not compelling. First, one may argue that re-
taliation against the United States as a whole or retaliation against a
particular state are remote possibilities. Foreign countries are simply
not anxious to retaliate against the United States, even for interna-
tional law violations, due to the economic, political, and military
power of the United States. For smaller foreign nations, such retali-
ation is almost surely to be ineffective. Such an argument, however,
presumes a narrow definition of retaliation. Retaliation may come in
subtle forms and be manifest in a souring of cooperation rather than
explicit sanctions. In other words, the power of the United States is a
large, but still a limited and fungible commodity. If some of that
power is "spent" preventing retaliation that might otherwise occur in
response to a state-level foreign policy, then less of that power is
available to be utilized for the interests of the nation as a whole.
Second, one can question the unfairness of retaliation against
the nation as a whole in a situation in which a majority of states, say
twenty-six, have enacted the foreign policy legislation (e.g., Massa-
chusetts-styled Burma laws) or, to take even a more extreme example,
forty-nine states have enacted such legislation. Is it unfair to the oth-
er twenty-four states that have not, or in the extreme example the
single state that has not, enacted such legislation if retaliation falls
upon the nation as a whole? The answer is that it is still unfair, al-
though one might find the extreme situation somewhat less unfair. It
seems that if a majority of states could enact a particular type of sanc-
tions legislation against a particular foreign country, such legislation
could be enacted at the federal level (or at least legislation authoriz-
ing the state legislation could be passed by Congress). But history has
shown that this need not always be the case. In the mid-1980s, state
sanctions against South Africa were widespread despite the inability
of the federal government to initially enact comprehensive sanctions
due to executive branch opposition. The real question in these hy-
potheticals should be whether it is unfair to the twenty-four states or
the one state abstaining from foreign policy action when the federal
government has not authorized action by the states? It remains un-
fair because it circumvents the officials within the level of govern-
4 See, e.g., William Davey, Dispute Settlement in the GA7T, 11 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 51,
103 (1987) (noting the lack of power behind sanctions imposed by smaller coun-
tries).
42 See Fenton, supra note 34, at 564.
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ment that should be responsible for making such decisions, and it
also circumvents the separation of power constraints in the Constitu-
tion for the making of U.S. foreign policy. This statement, however,
necessitates support from other modes of constitutional interpreta-
tion. While currently focusing on the prudential mode of interpreta-
tion, the various modes that are utilized are clearly linked together in
some respects. For example, the whole question of unfairness can be
considered in the procedural sense of notice. If our other modes of
constitutional interpretation, including text, structure, original in-
tent, and doctrinal, tend to support the conclusion that the Constitu-
tion allows states to enact such legislation and this was the compact
created among the states or the people (a question, which I will not
delve into), then one can argue there is no unfairness. This is, how-
ever, not the case. Part III of this Article will demonstrate that nearly
all modes of constitutional interpretation ultimately support the con-
clusion that states are prohibited from engaging in foreign affairs.
Thus, even these "tougher" cases remain unfair to the abstaining
states.
B. Efficiency and Expertise
State-level foreign policy arguments based on efficiency and ex-
pertise are similar to economic arguments concerning the division of
labor. In short, it may make more sense for one level of government
to focus on certain matters and leave other levels of government to
focus on entirely separate matters. Indeed, two types of federalism
are frequently distinguished: coordinate and cooperative. Coordi-
nate federalism, similar to dual federalism, divides power between
two levels of government by topic matter. Coordinate federalism
consists of a static allocation of responsibility between the two levels
46
of government. In contrast, cooperative federalism emphasizes
concurrent jurisdiction and shared responsibility over all matters in
the federal and sub-federal governments.4 As a simple matter of effi-
ciency, it seems as though some subject matters should be left to one
level of government. Specialization and expertise can be developed
at that level of government. Indeed, expertise in foreign policy clear-
ly resides much more in the federal government than in state gov-
43 See Bilder, supra note 34, at 827 (noting state officials are not elected to con-
duct foreign policy).
44 See infra Part III.
4 See WILUAM STEWART, CONCEPTS OF FEDERALISM 55, 65-68 (1984).
46 Id.
4 See id. at 51-54.
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ernments. Federal government representatives have access to more
complete and timely information and analysis, particularly that which
is confidential. While this federal advantage over the states has been
reduced somewhat by technological developments, an information
and "institutional know-how" gap remains.4 9 This is not to say that
states have no expertise at all in foreign affairs and that this expertise
has not grown in recent years, particularly in trade matters such as
export promotion. Proponents of regulatory competition may also
offer a rebuttal to efficiency-based arguments, specifically that com-
petition between jurisdictions can create efficient results by creating
the optimal regulatory environment. Foreign policy, however, is a
poor choice for regulatory competition between the states since a
state-level experiment will be influenced by the foreign policy choices
of other states, the federal government, and other nations. Because
it will be impossible to eliminate the effects of these other influences
through regression analysis, there will be no basis for judging the
state experiment a success. Moreover, the costs of experimentation
in foreign affairs are likely to fall upon other states as discussed
above.
C. Democratization
Proponents of state engagement of foreign policy most frequent-
ly rely on the argument that it "democratizes" foreign policy. Instead
of having foreign policy decided in secret by elite bureaucrats, the ar-
gument proceeds, state-level foreign policy increases citizen aware-
48 See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828 (noting a contrary argument can be made that
many issues do not require special expertise or information). I, however, question
Professor Bilder's contrary argument. States can gain access to human rights condi-
tions in various countries and know that such treatment is wrong or morally inde-
fensible; however, selecting a policy to change those conditions and the policies of
governments in those countries is a more complex matter.
49 Cf id. ("[S]tate and local governments lack the expertise, information and re-
sources . .. about complex international relations issues.").
" As an aside, by engaging in export and investment promotion activities, a state
does not run afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine as will be discussed below.
See infra Part VI.
See Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The Original Un-
derstanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 341, 373 (1999); Schae-
fer, supra note 4, at 52. But seeJohn Kincaid, Constituent Diplomacy in Federal Politics
and the Nation-State: Conflict and Cooperation, in FEDERALISM AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 56 (Hans Michelmann & Panayotis Soldatos eds., 1990) (arguing that pre-
venting competition in foreign affairs is anti-democratic) [hereinafter Kincaid, Con-
stituent].
5 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 373; Schaefer, supra note 4 at 52.
* See infra Part II.A.
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ness, access, and influence in the foreign policy process. This effect
may be enhanced because citizens, it is argued, have greater access to
local government structures vis-a-vis federal government structures.
Such an argument is problematic in several respects. First, one
might question whether foreign policy is truly made in secret any-
more. In an information-technology era, only the most sensitive na-
tional security secrets typically escape the public's eyes and ears, and
even then only for a limited period of time. Even if one believes that
foreign policy is still too secretive, the "democratic" solution lies in an
activist Congress.
Second, is it truly the case that state government involvement in
foreign affairs will help democratize foreign policy? State govern-
ment officials are unlikely to properly weigh the potential effects of
their actions on other states in the nation. Does Massachusetts care
if European retaliation (even subtle forms like interference with oth-
er negotiations) in response to the Burma law falls on other states?
State government representatives are likely to weigh (or at least have
greater competence to weigh) the costs and benefits to their state on-
ly, and this is why states are denied a priori certain powers in the Con-
stitution. Citizens in these other states have no say in the decision-
making process, although states may have an ultimate recourse in
persuading the federal government to set aside other matters under
consideration and preempt the state measure. Additionally, state-
level foreign policy can lead to a lack of accountability. Indeed, this
is a frequent criticism of cooperative federalism in which federal and
state governments simultaneously regulate in the same field." If the
60policy fails, citizens do not know who to hold responsible.
Third, one might also question as an empirical matter whether
state foreign policies are the result of democracy at work or rather
the result of the imperfections within the democratic system. Indeed,
polling data indicates that the general public does not believe that
sub-national government involvement in foreign affairs is appropri-
5" See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828-29; John Kincaid, Consumership Versus Citizen-
ship: Is There Wiggle Room for Local Regulation in the Global Economy ? in FOREIGN
RELATIONS AND FEDERAL STATES 27, 27-28 (Brian Hocking ed., 1993); Kincaid, Consti-
tuent, supra note 51, at 73.
1 See Bilder, supra note 34, at 828-29.
56 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 372.
5 See id. at 372.
5 See id. at 372-74.
" SeeJessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE
L.J. 1256, 1289 (2009).
6 Id.
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ate.6 ' Therefore, many assume that foreign affairs issues are a federal
government responsibility, and are less likely to pay attention to for-
eign affairs when voting in state elections. Public choice theory may
have a measure of descriptive force in the enactment of state and lo-
cal foreign policy sanctions. Public choice theory posits that politi-
cians act in the interests of reelection and that concentrated interest
groups will have great influence on politicians because of the smaller
transaction costs of organizing (and hence contributing to reelection
campaigns) vis-a-vis the general public." Although anecdotal, there is
some support for the relevance of public choice theory in explaining
the passage of the Massachusetts Burma law, which appears to have
been passed in response to the calls of one particular lobbyist.
Lastly, because state governments may maintain First Amend-
64
ment rights and individual politicians certainly do, commentators
argue that state engagement in foreign policy serves some of the
same purposes as the First Amendment. But states need not engage
in foreign policy to express their views on federal foreign policies.
Other avenues for the expression of a state's opposition to federal
foreign policy or recommendations for future policies exist: state res-
olutions transmitted to the federal government, resolutions of state
government organizations, and statements of individual politicians.
D. Effectiveness
The effectiveness of foreign policy is a difficult assessment to
make. Is U.S. foreign policy more effective with state involvement?
Proponents of state involvement argue that state sanctions were criti-
cal to changing the apartheid policies of South Africa. Significant
61 See Kline, supra note 2, at 114 n.19.
62 See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Injury in Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Du-
ty Cases, 16 INT'L REv. L. & EcoN. 5, 18-21 (1996).
6 Robert S. Greenberger, States, Cities Increase Use of Trade Sanctions, Troubling
Business Groups and US. Partners, WALL ST.J., Apr. 1, 1998, at A20.
64 See David Fagundes, State Actors as First Amendment Speakers, 100 Nw. U. L. REv.
1637, 1638 (2006).
*' Bilder, supra note 34, at 829 (arguing that some state foreign policy activities
"implicate significant freedom of speech and petition values"); Andrea McCardle, In
Defense of State and Local Government Anti-Apartheid Measures: Infusing Democratic Values
into Foreign Policy Making, 62 TEMP. L. REv. 813, 840 (1989) (arguing that "state and
local government measures intended specifically to communicate foreign policy posi-
tions to the national government and influence the direction of that policy, imple-
ment the expressive and associational interests of the citizenry and should be pre-
sumptively protected under the 1st Amendment"); Matthew Potterfield, State and
Local Foreign Policy Initiatives & Free Speech: The First Amendment as an Instrument of Fede-
ralism, 35 STAN.J. INT'L L. 1, 33 (1999).
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change in the policies of South Africa, however, did not occur until
comprehensive federal sanctions were enacted and other nations in
the international community joined in imposing sanctions. At best,
one can claim the states placed pressure on the first domino (i.e., the
federal government), which in turn provided the pressure to knock
down the other dominos (i.e., other nations) in the sanctions chain.
Such pressure, however, could have come in other forms and
through other means. In fact, state engagement in foreign policy
may deflect interest group pressure away from the federal govern-
ment and thus impede the pace at which comprehensive and effec-
tive federal and multilateral sanctions can be imposed. This could
allow foreign states to continue engaging in reprehensible behavior
longer than they would otherwise.
Other arguments might also be put forth claiming positive bene-
fits for U.S. foreign policy through state involvement. For example,
one argument for state involvement is analogous to a "good cop/bad
cop" situation. The federal government plays "good cop" and follows
a policy of "engagement" with a particular foreign nation, while the
states play "bad cop" and pass sanction legislation. The problem with
such a scenario is that the "bad cop" may turn the foreign nation off
from any talks with the federal government. Second, one might also
argue that state sanctions provide extra punch to federal foreign pol-
icy measures when both seek to accomplish the same goal. The exis-
tence of state measures, however, interferes with the manner, form,
and degree of federal sanctions and reduces flexibility to respond to
changing conditions. Unless it preempts all such action or if the
Constitution prevents such action, the federal government cannot
predict or depend upon what level of state sanctions will be in place
at any one time. If it takes federal action to control the level of state
sanctions, then only one "cop" is involved. If the policy adopted is to
use less force as progress is made by the foreign country, it will be
hard to achieve because both the state and federal government will
need to act. State legislatures may not be in session every year, they
may have very short legislative sessions, and/or they may have other
pressing business. Moreover, state governments may make different
judgments about when progress is achieved on the issue and refuse to
scale back sanctions even though the federal government has done
6 See Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 173-74 (indicating that this is
actually beneficial in the immigration context that poor immigration policies are on-
ly adopted in a few states rather than the nation as a whole because state involvement
can act as a safety valve).
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so. Again, such problems can be avoided by preemptive federal ac-
tion, but at that point only one "cop" is working.
Lastly, recent studies indicate that even unilateral sanctions by
67
the United States as a whole are largely ineffective. If sanctions by
the U.S. federal government are largely ineffective, sanctions by vari-
ous states are unlikely to achieve results. It would be more effective if
the federal government imposed sanctions and authorized state and
local sanctions" targeting the identical conduct in a manner that
would allow the federal government to also enlist other countries in
the sanction regime.
E. Geopolitical Changes: End of the Cold War
Some scholars suggest that Zschernig is a Cold War relic6 and that
the end of the Cold War is grounds for eliminating the dormant for-
70
eign affairs doctrine. In the view of these scholars, there is now
room for state level foreign policies because there is no longer a dra-
conian penalty-complete destruction in response to a state-level for-
eign policy. One can argue, however, that the risks of severe retalia-
tion in response to a state-level foreign policy are greater today than
they were during the Cold War. Clearly, the Soviets were not going
to respond to minor irritants like insults by state court judges, the ac-
tions at issue in Zschernig, with a draconian penalty such as nuclear
war.72 Today, there are horizontal proliferation concerns, and the ra-
tionality of rogue state leaders differs from the ex-Soviet leaders un-
der a regime of Mutually Assured Destruction. In an era of asymme-
tric warfare, retaliation takes many forms, especially hard-to-detect
forms, such as cyber warfare, the spreading of false rumors to injure
financial markets and economies, or even low-cost measures used to
jam or interfere with satellite communications. Thus, a dormant
foreign affairs doctrine makes even more sense in a post-Cold War
geopolitical environment than during the Cold War.
6 See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED 128
(1994).
6 See discussion infra Part IX.
6 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1671.
* See Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 12, at 1259; Spiro, States and Immigration,
supra note 12, at 175.
" Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1312; see Schaefer, supra note 4, at 35-37. Vazquez
does not say risks are greater today than during the Cold War; rather, he says that he
"does not share Spiro's belief that the stakes are significantly lower today." Vazquez,
supra note 15, at 1312.
72 See Schaefer, supra note 4, at 35-37.
7 See id.
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III. JUSTIFYING THE EXISTENCE OF A DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DOCTRINE THROUGH A MULTI-MODAL INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
If state and local sanctions are unwise as a policy matter, one ef-
fective legal constraint is the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, which
recognizes the federal government's foreign affairs powers as exclu-
sive. Of course, critics of the doctrine assert that the federal govern-
ment can always preempt harmful or disruptive state laws (i.e., feder-
al government policing of harmful state and local foreign policies is
sufficient) . This debate raises the question of whether the foreign
affairs powers of the federal government are indeed exclusive or ra-
ther only plenary but to some large degree, shared or concurrent. A
multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution, utilizing text, struc-
ture, Framer's intent, and doctrinal modes of interpretation, despite
some conflicting signals, still strongly suggests federal exclusivity.
A. Constitutional Text & Structure
The text of the Constitution does not contain the terms foreign
affairs or foreign policy. Nor does it grant a general foreign affairs
power. Instead, the Constitution assigns the federal government cer-
tain enumerated powers relating to foreign affairs. Additionally, the
states are specifically prohibited under the Constitution from engag-
ing in some of these same activities by Article I, Section 10.7  Some
scholars have criticized the existence of the dormant foreign affairs
14 Nick Robinson, Citizens Not Subjects: U.S. Foreign Relations Law and the Decentrali-
zation ofForeign Policy, 40 AKRON L. REv. 647 (2007); see also Goldsmith, supra note 12,
at 1681-87. But see Spiro, Foreign Relations, supra note 12, at 1253 ("[T]he politics of
particular controversies will too often cut against disciplining a state . . . .").
' See generally PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991) (analyz-
ing forms of constitutional power).
76 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1619-20.
The Constitution establishes plenary federal power by four means. Ar-
ticle I, Section 10 bars states from performing certain foreign affairs
functions, such as treaty-making. Article I, Section 8 and Article II
broadly authorize the federal political branches to conduct foreign re-
lations through the enactment of federal statutes, treaties, and execu-
tive agreements. Article VI establishes that these federal enactments
are supreme over state law. And Article III extends the federal judicial
power to cases involving these federal enactments and to other transna-
tional controversies. Taken together, these provisions give the federal
political branches comprehensive power to conduct foreign relations
without interference or limitation by the states.
Id.
" See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10.
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doctrine as not having a textual basis in the Constitution. The ar-
gument is two-fold. First, the Constitution did not grant the federal
government a general affairs power, but instead, it granted only a li-
79
mited number of enumerated powers to the federal government.
Second, the textualist critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
argue that there would be no need to prohibit a limited number of
state activities in Article I, Section 10 if the federal government's for-
eign affairs powers were exclusive.o
However, no one seriously questions that the federal govern-
ment's foreign affairs powers are plenary; thus, any alleged gaps in
the textual allocations of powers to federal actors are not considered
gaps in substance. Instead, the textual gaps probably arose simply
because the Framers wanted to divide foreign affairs powers between
the executive and legislative branches, thus preventing the allocation
of a general foreign affairs power to either and necessitating specific
grants of power to each."' This leaves, however, the question of why
the Framers found it necessary to deny certain powers to the States in
Article I, Section 10 if they understood the foreign affairs powers to
be exclusive. Critics of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine point out
that Eighteenth Century drafting did not favor such repetition.8 2 Ar-
ticle I, Section 10 reads as follows:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confedera-
tion; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills
of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in
Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of
Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts
or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce
of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports,
shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all
such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Control of the
Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any duty of
Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter in-
to any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a for-
78 See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 342 ("[N]o one has clearly identified the part of
the Constitution producing these results.").
71 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1619.
" See id. at 1642.
' See id. at 1619.
See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 386-87.
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eign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such
imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
It is well accepted, as shown below, that the Framers were con-
cerned with state intrusions in foreign affairs, and one way the Fra-
mer's emphasized federal exclusivity was by granting a power to the
federal government and denying it to the states. 84 If the allocation of
powers to the federal government is plenary and many of the prohibi-
tions on the states exercising certain powers parallel those same fed-
eral powers, then this text and structure support at least a degree of
federal exclusivity. In other words, if the supposed gaps in federal
powers do not prevent those powers from being plenary, then any al-
leged gaps in state denials of power should also not be read in such a
narrow fashion so as to preclude federal exclusivity beyond particular
prohibitions in Article I, Section 10. Additionally, a close reading of
Article I, Section 10 reveals the necessity of the second and third pa-
ragraphs since those paragraphs do not provide blanket bans on state
actions but instead require Congressional authorizations prior to
states taking certain actions. They both begin with the words: "No
state shall, without the Consent of Congress. . . ." Further, much of
what is found in the first paragraph of Article I, Section 10 is not a
denial of parallel powers allocated to the federal government-
although there are a few, such as the denial to states of the right to
enter into a Treaty-but rather, this language places prohibitions on
the states that are parallel to the prohibitions placed on the federal
Congress. In this light, it is difficult even as a textual matter to in-
terpret Article I, Section 10 as standing for the proposition that the
federal government's foreign affairs powers are not exclusive beyond
the specific bans in Article I.
Other textual based arguments against a dormant foreign affairs
doctrine abound. For example, some argue that since the Constitu-
tion allows the states to enter into compacts and agreements with for-
eign powers with the approval of Congress, it necessarily foresees
states entering into negotiations with foreign nations; thus, states
86
could engage in foreign affairs prior to the Congressional approval.
For instance, under such an argument, a state governor could enter
into negotiations with Burma or the Sudan to conclude a human
rights agreement. Such a limited textual reading, however, ignores
83 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
8 See infra Part I.B.
8 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10 (emphasis added).
8 See, e.g., Michael H. Shuman, Dateline Main Street: Courts v. Local Foreign Policies,
86 FOREIGN POL'Y 158, 163 (1992).
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and is contrary to the interpretation one would reach after engaging
in other modes of constitutional interpretation. There are strong in-
dications that the Supreme Court would declare unconstitutional a
state's entering into negotiations on a topic of that nature. Indeed,
scholars have argued for a dormant Treaty Power preventing states
from directly negotiating with a foreign country and even prohibiting
881
state actions involving indirect negotiations, such as passing a sanc-
tions law, which is viewed as a negotiating offer of "if you change your
behavior, we will no longer sanction you." Such an argument was
created to lodge much of what is currently found in the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine in a specific textual allocation of power to the
federal government, namely the Treaty Clause. One potential com-
plication with declaring the existence of a dormant foreign affairs
doctrine, as mentioned above, is that no general foreign affairs power
is granted to the federal government. One might argue that dor-
mant doctrines can only develop for specific clauses, hence the ar-
gument for a dormant Treaty Clause to replace much of what is cov-
ered by the more general dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 0 But this
type of argument overlooks the importance of structure and intent in
constitutional interpretation. The collection of grants of power to
the federal government in the Constitution related to foreign affairs
give the federal government authority to regulate on all matters of
8 See Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947) ("Nor has California entered the
forbidden domain of negotiating with a foreign country.") (citing U.S. v. Curtiss-
Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 316-17 (1936)). Additionally, while the Logan Act may
preempt such negotiations, it is unlikely that anyone would want to proclaim that in
the absence of the Logan Act a state could negotiate with a foreign power on any
topic. See 18 U.S.C. § 953 (2006). It is true that states have entered into negotiations
and even concluded agreements with other sub-federal jurisdictions without the con-
sent of Congress. See Duncan B. Hollis, The Elusive Foreign Compact, 73 Mo. L. REV.
1071 (2008) (analyzing state agreements with foreign countries in absence of Con-
gressional consent and the role of the Executive in such situations). In fact, the
Court has held that only those agreements infringing on the "just supremacy of the
United States" require Congressional approval. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S.
503, 519 (1893); see also United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm'n, 434 U.S.
452, 468-69 (1978). But legally binding agreements clearly would need approval. In
any event, the Court has interpreted and must interpret the Compacts Clause by rely-
ing on other modes of interpretation beyond its text. Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking
the Compact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REV. 741, 743-44 (2010).
8 See Edward T. Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant
Treaty Power, 49 DuKE L.J. 1127, 1134 (2000).
9 See discussion supra Parts II.A.
9 Indeed, courts have occasionally referred to a dormant war power, derived on-
ly from those clauses dealing with war and military matters. See, e.g., Von Saher v.
Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d. 954, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2010).
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foreign affairs.9' Again, there are no significant suggestions among
scholars or courts that there is a gap in the foreign affairs powers of
the federal government. Interpretation of all of these powers indivi-
dually and collectively leads to the conclusion that the foreign affairs
powers, at least to a significant degree, are exclusive to the federal
government. Federal exclusivity necessitates a dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine. A dormant doctrine is the necessary partner of federal
exclusivity. If federal power over certain matters is exclusive, then
state intrusions are prohibited even where the federal government
has not spoken (i.e., the power lays dormant).
Finally, one critic of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine has
pointed out that the clause granting federal courts jurisdiction over
"controversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and for-
eign states, Citizens or Subjects" 92 necessarily assumes interaction be-
tween the states and foreign states. While it is likely that the main
concern of the Founders was cases involving foreign citizens and not
cases between a State and a foreign nation, the clause, nevertheless,
was drafted in this particular manner and another formulation could
have excluded the possibility altogether of a case involving a state and
a foreign state. To infer that this clause allows states to engage in
foreign affairs, however, stands the purpose of the clause on its head.
The jurisdictional clause does not mention what the nature of the in-
teraction between states and foreign states would entail. Those issues
are covered in other clauses and provided for in the structure of the
Constitution.
B. Original Understanding
The clause that gives the federal courts jurisdiction over suits be-
tween an American state and a foreign state is but another example
of the structural framework apparent in the Constitution of keeping
the actions of one state from endangering the nation as a whole. Al-
exander Hamilton wrote in Federalist No. 80:
To judge with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal ju-
dicature it will be necessary to consider, in the first place, what are
its proper objects.
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy that the Judiciary au-
thority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions
of cases: ... 4th. to all those which involve the peace of the Con-
federacy ....
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1621.
U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
93 See Shuman, supra note 86, at 163.
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The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace
of the whole, ought not to be left at the disposal of a part. The
Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign Powers for the
conduct of its members... . As the denial or perversion ofjustice
by the sentences of courts, is with reason classed among the just
causes of war, it will follow that the Federal Judiciary ought to
have cognizance of all causes in which citizens of other countries
are concerned.... So great a proportion of the controversies in
which foreigners are parties involve, national questions, that it is
by far most safe, and most expedient, to refer all those in which
they are concerned to the national tribunals. 4
While state-level foreign policy was not the subject of robust de-
bate during the formation of the U.S. Constitution, 5 this relative lack
of attention was not the result of a lack of concern among the Fra-
mers about the potential ramifications of separate state-level foreign
policies. Rather, it was clear to the Framers that foreign affairs, more
so perhaps than any other power, needed to be an exclusive federal
power. In Federalist No. 42, James Madison refers to a
class of powers lodged in the General Government, consists of
those which regulate the intercourse with foreign nations, [and
other particular powers].
This class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of
the Federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any re-
97
spect, it clearly ought to be in respect of other nations.
One of the listed specific powers is the power to define and punish
offenses against the law of nations. Madison noted that the Articles
of Confederation "contain [ed] no provision for the case of offenses
against the law of nations; and consequently leave it in the power of
any indiscreet member to embroil the Confederacy with foreign na-
tions."99 There is no explicit prohibition in the Constitution, howev-
er, against states defining and punishing such offenses. Nevertheless,
it is clear that such a prohibition on state activity could be found by
implication.
9 THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 434-36 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed.,
1898).
" See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 416.
96 See id. at 345.
97 THE FEDERALIST NO. 42, at 231-32 (James Madison) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
9 Id.
9 See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42
WM. & MARY L. REv. 379, 398 (2000) (citing THE FEDERALIST No. 42 (James Madi-
son)).
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The Framers envisioned instances in which a grant of power to
the federal government, although not explicitly made exclusive,
would necessarily have to operate as an exclusive power. oo Federalist
No. 32 lays out the criteria for when exclusivity of federal power
should be implied.'or Exclusivity would exist in three cases:
[1] where the constitution in express terms granted an exclusive
authority to the union; [2] where it granted, in one instance, an
authority to the Union, and in another prohibited the states from
exercising the like authority; and [3] where it granted an authori-
ty to the Union to which a similar authority in the States would be
102
absolutely and totally contradictory and repugnant.
Categories two and three are relevant to any discussion of the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine. As discussed above, in the analysis of
Article I, Section 10, a strong argument can be made that the Fra-
mers utilized category two to make at least some foreign relations
powers exclusive to the federal government. 1s Turning to category
three, Hamilton uses as an example of this category the clause of the
Constitution that declares that Congress "shall have the power to es-
tablish a uniform rule of naturalization throughout the United
States.,,o Hamilton states that this must necessarily be exclusive be-
cause if each state had power to prescribe a distinct rule, there could
not be a uniform rule.'os Thus, the question becomes whether an ex-
clusive federal power, and thus an implied prohibition on state activi-
ties in the area, can be found even in the absence of some strong lan-
guage such as "uniform." The general test elaborated for category
three above indicates that this can indeed occur.
Nevertheless, some scholars have found category three inapplic-
able to foreign affairs because most complaints over state actions in
the field are based on "expedience and convenience" rather than the
argument that such actions are "absolutely and totally contradictory
and repugnant" to the exercise of federal authority. o0 This is ajudg-
ment call, however, and is likely true only if we examine the impact of
the state actions rather than the purposes. One could well find that
state laws that impact foreign affairs without intending to do so would
'" See THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 169 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed.,
1898).
' Id.
"o See discussion supra Part III.A.
'0 THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 170 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).
1o Id.
." See Ramsey, supra note 51, at 409-10.
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not be absolutely repugnant to federal-foreign-affairs authority but
that state actions with a foreign policy purpose (i.e., those seeking to
change or criticize the behavior of a foreign government) are abso-
lutely repugnant to the federal authority.
C. Doctrinal and Historical Arguments
Those scholars opposing a dormant foreign affairs doctrine pre-
Crosby and pre-Garamendi pointed out that the first 181 years of our
constitutional history did not contain such a doctrine and that the
Supreme Court had never, prior to Garamendi, revisited the doctrine
since its 1968 Zschernig opinion. o0 The Court, however, hinted at
such a doctrine well before Zschernig and implicitly supported such a
doctrine with its recognition that foreign affairs was an "exclusive"
federal domain in numerous opinions for well over a century before
Zschernig.'0o The origins of the Court's view of exclusive federal for-
eign affairs powers dates back to an 1840s case in which Vermont
sought to negotiate the extradition of a criminal back to Canada.09
Additionally, in a little recognized case, the Court considered a claim
107 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1649; Ramsey, supra note 51, at 419.
'08 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 223 (1942) ("[Clomplete power over in-
ternational affairs is in the national government and is not and cannot be subject to
any curtailment or interference on the part of the several states."); see also id. at 244
("Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in the national
government exclusively."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1937)
("Governmental power over external affairs is not distributed, but is vested exclusive-
ly in the national government.. .. In respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear.");
Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 604-05 (1893) ("[G]reat mass of lo-
cal matters is controlled by local authorities, the United States, in their relation to
foreign countries, are one nation ... for national purposes, embracing our relations
with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power."); Ex parte Vir-
ginia, 100 U.S. 339, 354 (1879) ("[S]o to the common government which grew out of
this prevailing necessity was granted exclusive jurisdiction over external affairs.").
" Holmes v.Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 550-51 (1840).
From the very nature and organization of the general or national
government, it is vested with the sole jurisdiction over all matters of a
national character, and of external concern. The states, by the adop-
tion of the existing Constitution, have become divested of all their na-
tional attributes, except such as relate purely to their internal concerns.
They are not known to foreign governments as states ... . In short, as
to all such matters, we are one and indivisible; precisely the same as if
we had no separate states, nor any authorities in the country except
those of the Union.
... [T]hus is the whole subject of the foreign relations of the coun-
try placed under the exclusive jurisdiction of the government of the
Union.
Id.
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under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine ten years after Zschernig.no
Thus, the Court implicitly admitted the continuing vitality of the doc-
trine, although in that case the court ultimately rejected the claim
because the state measure had "insignificant international conse-
quences."... Scholars opposed to Zschernig also point to the 1941 case,
Hines v. Davidowitz,12 in which the Supreme Court explored but ulti-
mately hedged on finding a dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 1 3 Yet,
the Court's opinion in Hines is one of many that contains an indica-
tion that the foreign affairs powers of the federal government are ex-
clusive. Moreover, the Court clearly indicated in the 1947 case of
Clark v. Allen that a dormant foreign affairs doctrine was available to
strike down a state law impinging too greatly on U.S. foreign rela-
tions.'1 4 Additionally, the ready availability of the preemption doc-
trine in most cases involving a challenge to state laws in the foreign
affairs realm, and the Supreme Court's preference for relying on
preemption grounds in its opinions, may readily explain why the Su-
preme Court generally finds it unnecessary to rely on the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine.
There is an additional, and perhaps stronger, rebuttal to the ar-
gument as to why the dormant foreign affairs doctrine was not relied
upon by the Supreme Court until 1968. As discussed in the introduc-
tion, state involvement in foreign affairs has only existed to a signifi-
cant degree in the past five decades, or at the very least, it has been
more prevalent in the past five decades and increased throughout
this time period.'1 5 There was no significant state involvement in for-
eign affairs prior to the second half of this century of the type that a
dormant foreign affairs doctrine, involving purpose review as op-
posed to threshold effects or balancing tests, would capture. While
one can list numerous state measures throughout our nation's history
that caused diplomatic protests, most of these measures did not car-
ry the primary purpose of changing or criticizing foreign government
policies. State laws imposing a tax on the arrival of foreigners1 1 7 were
no Ray v. Atl. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
.. Id. at 180.
'" 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
' See, e.g., Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey, American Insurance Asso-
ciation v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Affairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv.
825, 855-56 (2004).
" 331 U.S. 503, 516-17 (1947).
See also Kline, supra note 2, at 106-07; Schaefer, supra note 38, at 37.
"6 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1653-58.
"1 See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 298 (1849).
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not enacted with the primary purpose to change or criticize the poli-
cies of foreign governments."8 The prosecution of a British agent for
murder in connection with the Caroline incident"9 was not done with
the primary purpose of changing or criticizing the policies of the
British government. Several Southern States in the early to mid-
1800s adopted Negro Seamen Acts, which required imprisonment of
black seamen upon arrival. While these acts caused "a persistent
diplomatic embarrassment," the changing of foreign government pol-
icies was not their primary purpose. Similarly, the primary purpose
of Anti-Alien Acts passed by the states in the late 1800s and early
1900s, at least those that did not single out aliens from particular na-
tions, was not intended to change foreign government policies.12
State Buy-American Procurement Laws enacted in the 1930s1 simi-
larly did not have the primary purpose of changing foreign govern-
ment policies; rather, these laws were meant to protect in-state and
U.S. industries. Thus, few, if any, historical examples pointed to by
scholars are glaring examples of the absence of a dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine because such claims were not even made in these cas-
es. They simply did not deal with state actions whose primary pur-
pose was to change or criticize the policies of foreign governments.
The absence of dormant-foreign-affairs-doctrine-styled-claims in these
early cases might simply indicate that federal "exclusive" powers over
"1 See, e.g., Jason Mazzone, The Security Constitution, 53 UCLA L. REV. 29, 54 n.115
(2005) ("measure aimed at deterring the indigent").
"' See People v. McLeod, 1 Hill 377, 483 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1841).
2 See Impunity of Agents in International Law, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, Sep-
tember 22, 1993, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-
intelligence/kent-csi/vol5no2/html/v5i2al0p_0001.htm (indicating the United
States ultimately viewed the Caroline incident as a public sovereign act and thus im-
mune but that New York State considered it an act of an individual for murder rather
than an act of the British government and thus, rejected the habeas petition of the
British agent).
' See The Cynosure, 6 F. Cas. 1102, 1103 (D. Mass. 1844).
'" Gerald L. Neuman, The Lost Century of American Immigration Law, 93 COLUM. L.
REV. 1833, 1873-77 (1993) (sparked by fears of insurrection if black seamen were al-
lowed "to wander at liberty").
2- See Nicholas Montario, The Issue of Mexican Immigration: Where Do We Go From
Here?, 6J. INT'L Bus. & L. 169, 176-77 (2007) (stating that anti-alien fervor behind
laws was due to job concerns not changing foreign government policies).
124 SeeJames D. Southwick, Binding the States: A Survey of State Conformance with the
Standards of the GATProcurement Code, 13 U. PENN.J. INT'L Bus. L. 57, 71 (1991).
'" See id.; see also Lawrence Hughes, Buy North American: A Revision to FTA Buy
America Requirements, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 207, 208 (1995) (asserting the purpose of the
Buy America Acts was "to require the federal government to spend taxpayers' dollars
only on goods produced in the United States").
'2 See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1653.
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foreign affairs only prohibited state actions with a primary foreign
policy purpose rather than actions having a direct and significant im-
pact on U.S. foreign relations. Additionally, it might indicate that
lawyers were comfortable with the strength of their other claims,
preemption or otherwise.
To be fair, there are examples of state laws enacted prior to the
1960s that involved a primary purpose to change or criticize foreign
government policies. For example, states passed what are commonly
referred to as "sense of the legislature" resolutions on foreign affairs
issues as early as the turn of the Nineteenth Century. These types
of resolutions, however, are not necessarily captured by the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose standard of review, as will be
discussed below."' Additionally, the states enacted reciprocity sta-
tutes addressing inheritance matters in the 1940s that only allowed an
alien to inherit property in a state if the alien's home nation allowed
U.S. citizens to inherit property. Such statutes arguably have as one
of their purposes the changing of foreign government policies.1 30 Su-
preme Court precedent, however, has upheld such statutes, at least
with respect to facial challenges,'3 1 and a purpose-review test can be
respectful of prior precedent in this regard. For instance, it can be
plausibly argued that such statutes do not seek to change foreign
government policy but have as their primary purpose reciprocity (or
equal treatment) in and of itself. Thus, one need not draw the infe-
rence that the doctrine is of questionable validity because these state
actions causing diplomatic controversy occurred throughout our na-
tion's history without plaintiffs challenging such actions under a
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Instead, one might reasonably conclude that this history simply
suggests that the scope of the doctrine is limited to those actions that
have a foreign policy purpose. Indeed, under this reading of history
and law, it is unsurprising that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
was not formally relied upon until the 1960s. Significant state actions
with a foreign policy purpose began around this time. For instance,
'" See QUINCY WRIGHT, THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 264-65
(1922).
121 See infra Part IV.
'2 See generally Note, Reciprocal Inheritance Statutes and Federal Powers, 56 YALE L.J.
150 (1946) (describing 1940s state statutes regarding non-resident property acquisi-
tion and the subsequent court challenges).
1" See Moore, supra note 27, at 309 (noting an additional purpose of state statute's
of this type during this time frame may have been to keep property out of enemy
hands during World War II).
"' See infra Part IV.B.
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in 1963, Florida enacted a law that prohibited the issuance of fishing
licenses for fishing in the territorial waters of the state to any vessel
owned by a foreign state, or national thereof, which subscribed to
communism.12 Other states enacted statutes discriminating against
goods from communist countries around this time."'
IV. DOCTRINAL TEST UNDER THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DOCTRINE: MAKE IT PURPOSE REVIEW
While the existence of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine is well-
founded in modes of constitutional interpretation, "scholars and
judges have continued to puzzle over [Zschernig's] reasoning and
scope, and, in particular, over precisely where and how the courts
should draw the line between constitutionally permissible and prohi-
bited state and local action." While the starting point in any ex-
amination of the test to be adopted under the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine is the Zschernig case, that case can only be understood (or at
least is best understood) in the context of Clark v. Allen, a 1947 U.S.
Supreme Court case analyzing a similar state statute twenty-one years
prior to Zschernig, and Hines v. Davidowitz, a 1941 case in which the
Supreme Court flirted with establishing a dormant foreign affairs
137doctrine rationale. Zschernig borrowed its most often cited test from
the Clark opinion and approvingly cited to Hines."'
A. Hines v. Davidowitz
In the foreign affairs field, at least as broadly defined since it
might also be considered to fall in the immigration field, the most
well-known pre-Crosby preemption case is Hines v Davidowitz. Hines
involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's Alien Registration Act." The
'15 Enforcement of the Florida statute by state authorities against Cuban fisher-
man created a significant international incident. Cuba raised the issue at the United
Nations and cut off the water supply to the U.S. military base at Guantanamo Bay. See
Moore, supra note 27, at 312-14 (discussing the statute, enforcement of statute, and
international repercussions of enforcement).
See, e.g., Gustavo Otalvora, Note, From Stalin to Bin Laden: Comparing Yesteryear's
Anti-Communist Statutes with the Public Employer Provision of the Ohio Patriot Act, 2010 U.
ILL. L. REv. 1303, 1318-20 (2010).
' Bilder, supra note 34, at 825-26.
" 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
312 U.S. 52 (1912).
See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 649.
1 Zschernig, 398 U.S. at 432-33.
' 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
"o Id. at 59.
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Court in Hines came close to grounding its opinion in a dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine, although the Court's holding is ultimately based
on preemption analysis.
It is important to ask what we should make of the Court's "flirta-
tion" with the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. 14 At various points in
its opinion, the Court indicated that foreign affairs powers were ex-
clusive to the federal government. For instance, it stated that "our
system of government is such that the interests of the cities, counties
and states, no less than the interests of the people of the whole na-
tion, imperatively requires that federal power in the field affecting
foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference."' In
other portions of its opinion, the Court merely refers to the "suprema-
cy of the national power in the general field of foreign affairs, includ-
ing power over immigration, naturalization and deportation. "'u The
Court also stated:
Any concurrent state power that may exist is restricted to the nar-
rowest limits . . . . [O]ur conclusion is that appellee is correct in
his contention that the power to restrict, limit, regulate, and regis-
ter aliens as a distinct group is not an equal and continuously ex-
isting concurrent power of the state and nation, but that whatever
power a state may have is subordinate to supreme national law.14 5
Even this statement indicates a large measure of exclusivity in foreign
relations. Later in its opinion, the Court again hedged on whether a
dormant limitation was at issue: "And whether or not registration of
aliens is of such a nature that the Constitution permits only of one
uniform national system, it cannot be denied that the Congress might
validly conclude that such uniformity is desirable."4 6
Ultimately, the failure of the Court to adopt a dormant foreign
affairs doctrine rationale does not damage the support for such a
doctrine in this article because the law at issue in Hines would not run
afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine when employing pur-
pose review. Additionally, Hines might be best thought of as an im-
migration case rather than a foreign affairs related case.
4 See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 649 ("However, even in Hines, the Court dis-
cussed at length the federal foreign affairs powers and flirted with the dormant for-
eign affairs analysis.").
14 Hines, 312 U.S. at 63.
143 Id.
'" Id. at 62 (emphasis added).
"4 Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
1' Id. at 73.
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B. Clark v. Allen
In Clark v. Allen," the California statute at issue provided that a
non-resident alien could inherit real or personal property within Cali-
fornia "under the same terms and conditions as residents and citizens
of the United States" only if U.S. citizens enjoyed a reciprocal right to
inherit such property as residents and citizens of the alien's country
of inhabitance. In enacting the statute, the California Legislature
stated:
Because the foreign governments guilty of [confiscating inherit-
ances of U.S. citizens] constitute[d] a direct threat to the Gov-
ernment of the United States, it [was] immediately necessary that
the property and money of citizens dying in [the United States]
should remain in the [United States] and not be sent to such for-
eign countries to be used for the purposes of waging a war that
eventually may be directed against the Government of the United
States.149
The federal Trading with the Enemy Act would have prevented the
proceeds of any inheritance going to countries with which the United
States was at war. 0 The district court struck down the California law
on two separate grounds: the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and
"occupation of the field" preemption by the Trading with the Enemy
Act.'5' In the portion of its opinion dealing with the exclusive federal
power over foreign relations, the district court seemed to hinge its
decision on the purpose of the statute-in other words, the goal
sought to be achieved by the statute. ' The court noted the "ex-
pressed design was to fix a policy of international relations."53 The
district court did not examine any actual effects of the statute on for-
eign countries or U.S. foreign policy. Rather, it noted that "if the li-
mitation of the powers of the state were not sustained in principle,
evils now incapable of definition, would result from state entry into
the Federal field.",54
m 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
"' Law ofJuly 1, 1941, CAL. PROB. CODE, §§ 259, 259.1, 259.2, invalidated by Clark,
331 U.S. at 517.
... Id. at § 259.2 (as reprinted in Crowley v. Allen, 52 F. Supp. 850, 853 (N.D. Cal.
1943)).
' See 50 U.S.C. § 616 (2006).
Crowley, 52 F. Supp. at 854.
Id. at 853.
* Id.
Id. at 855.
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.'5 The
respondents seemed to argue for a dormant "war powers" doctrine
156
rather than a more general dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Spe-
cifically, the respondents argued that the Constitution had granted
the federal government the right to capture enemy property and that
the California statute interfered with this exclusive power.m The
Ninth Circuit, however, rejected the respondents' argument as illogi-
cal. If the California statute were valid in denying the property
rights through inheritance, then the property was not enemy proper-
ty but property of California.15 The Ninth Circuit also worried that
the war powers of the federal government could affect "almost every
field of private right on the basis of necessity."a'0
If this great reservoir of Federal power is ipso facto a denial of any
power to the States in that reservoir, whether or not a war is being
waged or such powers are being exercised, then the power of the
states is thrown into the utmost uncertainty and confusion.
Such a statement certainly calls into question the existence of a
broader dormant foreign affairs doctrine. It is not necessarily the
case, however, that dormant prohibitions on the states are completely
co-extensive with federal powers to affirmatively act. Dormant Com-
merce Clause jurisprudence clearly speaks to this point. 1 Additional-
ly, the cases that the Ninth Circuit cited in support of its statement
that the federal government under its war powers could affect "al-
most every field of private right on the basis of necessity" have since
been discredited.163
The Supreme Court partially overturned the Ninth Circuit's de-
cision. The Supreme Court found that the California statute was
preempted with respect to real property by the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights between Germany and the United
5 Allen v. Markham, 156 F.2d 653, 663 (9th Cir. 1946).
156 Id. at 659.
' Id.
'5 Id.
' Id. at 660.
16' Allen, 156 F.2d at 660.
'62 See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 422-23 (1946); Richard A.
Paschal, Congressional Power to Change Constitutional Law: Three Lacunae, 77 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1053, 1124 (2009).
'0 Allen, 156 F.2d at 660. For instance, the Allen court cited Korematsu v. United
States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), which has generally been discredited by commentators.
Id.
'6 Clark v. Arizona, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
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States. With respect to personal property, the California statute was
valid because it was not an unconstitutional intrusion by the state into
the field of foreign affairs. 66 After noting that the state measure was
not preempted and did not violate a specific provision of the Consti-
tution, the Court stated: "What California has done will have some
incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. But that is true of
many state laws which none would claim cross the forbidden line."
Thus, Clark indicates that there is a "forbidden line" preventing a
state's intrusion into foreign affairs. It also suggests that this line
might be drawn by determining whether the state law only has an "in-
,,168
cidental or indirect effect in foreign countries. While the Court
spent little time in its opinion justifying or considering this test, it un-
fortunately has assumed great importance in later cases. Because the
Court gave such short treatment to its dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine analysis, one would hope the statement would not forever forec-
lose the adoption of other, or at least additional, tests by the Court.
Admittedly, the Clark Court had an opportunity to adopt a purpose-
review standard. Petitioners argued that reciprocity statutes were "in
substance invitations to foreign countries to trade inheritance rights
abroad for inheritance rights in these states" and thus infringed the
federal government's sole negotiating authority. Indeed, this ar-
gument seems most akin to a dormant Treaty Clause argument.1o
Most of the petitioners' argument, however, focused on the effect of
such statutes on foreign relations, rather than the purposes of the
law. 7' Respondents' argument also focused primarily on the effects
test and laid out the test that Justice Douglas ultimately incorporated
into his opinion.172 Specifically, the respondents argued that it would
be a novel and startling proposition to rule that a state statute "is
invalid merely because that state action has some incidental or indi-
rect effect in foreign countries."m
'6 Id. at 517.
" Id. at 516-18.
67 Id. at 517.
' Id.
'0 Brief of Petitioner at 70, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626).
170 See Swaine, supra note 88, at 1138.
.. Brief for the Petitioner at 72-73, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626).
172 Brief for Respondents at 63-64, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No. 626).
'" Id. at 59.
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C. Zschemig v. Miller
Zschernig v. Miller came before the Supreme Court twenty-one
years after Clark v. Allen. 7 , Zschernig, like Clark, dealt with an inherit-
ance reciprocity statute.'7 5 The Oregon statute at issue also contained
two additional criteria beyond reciprocity in order for a non-resident
alien to inherit real or personal property: (1) "the right of U.S. citi-
zens to receive payment here in the United States of funds from es-
tates in the foreign country;" and (2) "the right of non-resident aliens
to receive proceeds of Oregon estates 'without confiscation.' 1 7  The
statute was not challenged on its face, although these two additional
criteria may have made the statute distinguishable from the one in
177Clark, particularly if the Court had adopted a purpose-review test.
Instead, the statute was challenged as applied.1" The Court stated
that the statute at issue in Clark involved the state probate courts in
"no more than a routine reading of foreign laws."17 9 The Court, how-
ever, found in the application of the Oregon statute and in the "reci-
procity area under inheritance statutes" generally, that:
the probate courts of various States have launched inquiries into
the type of governments that obtain in particular foreign na-
tions-whether aliens under their law have enforceable rights,
whether the so-called "rights" are merely dispensations turning
upon the whim or caprice of government officials, whether the
representation of consuls, ambassadors, and other representatives
of foreign nations is credible or made in good faith, whether
there is in the actual administration in the particular foreign sys-
tem of law any element of confiscation.'so
The Court struck down the Oregon statute as applied, finding that it
had "more than 'some incidental or indirect effect in foreign coun-
tries."""' Before turning to the Court's elaboration of a doctrinal test,
it is important to realize that the Court's opinion, authored by Justice
Douglas, was grounded in dormant foreign affairs doctrine, rather
than preemption analysis:
' 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
'o Id. at 430.
17 ORE. REV. STAT. § 111.070 (1957).
117 The reason for this is that only communist countries would subject proceeds to
confiscation (although other countries may have subjected proceeds to high taxes).
Thus, the statute can be viewed as seeking to change communist governments' beha-
vior with respect to treatment of the proceeds. See supra Part IV.B.
. Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 430.
Id. at 433.
Id. at 432-33.
8 Id. at 434 (quoting Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 517 (1947)).
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[W]e conclude that the history and operation of this Oregon sta-
tute make clear that [the statute] is an intrusion by the State into
the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts to the
President and the Congress.... The several States, of course, have
traditionally regulated the descent and distribution of estates.
But those regulations must give way if they impair the effective
exercise of the Nation's foreign policy.. . . Where those laws con-
flict with a treaty, they must bow to the superior federal policy....
Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a State's policy may disturb for-
eign relations.18 2
The Court did not find the Oregon statute preempted by treaty or by
legislation but nonetheless invalidated it for disturbing foreign rela-
.183
tions.
With regard to the doctrinal test elaborated by the Court for the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine, one can discern numerous possible
tests from Justice Douglas's Zschernig opinion, beyond the "more than
some incidental or indirect effect in foreign countries."m These tests
include:
1. Does the state action have a "great potential for disruption"
of U.S. foreign relations or "embarrassment" to the United
185
States or a foreign country?
2. Does the state action "affect[] international relations in a
persistent and subtle way"?1
3. Does the state action have a "direct impact upon foreign re-
lations" and might it "adversely affect the power of the cen-
tral government to deal with [foreign affairs] problems"?
4. Does the state action "impair the effective exercise of the Na-
188
tion's foreign policy"?
5. Does the state action threaten to create an international con-
troversy or retaliation?xs
'" Id. at 432, 440, 441.
'" Id. at 441.
Clark, 331 U.S. at 517; see also Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433 (explaining how the
California statute at issue in Clark would have only "some incidental or indirect effect
in foreign countries").
'8 Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435.
'8 Id. at 440.
187 Id. at 441.
'" Id. at 440.
'" Id. at 441 ("Yet, even in absence of a treaty, a State's policy may disturb foreign
relations.. . . Experience has shown that international controversies of the gravest
moment, sometimes even leading to war, may arise from real or imagined wrongs to
another's subjects inflicted, or permitted, by a government.") (internal quotations
omitted).
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Each of these tests laid out in Justice Douglas's opinion appears
to focus on the impact or effects of a particular state action, rather
than the purpose of the state law. The Court's opinion, however, also
gives some credence to the establishment of a purpose-based test.
Justice Douglas stated that "[a]s one reads the Oregon decisions, it
seems that foreign policy attitudes, the freezing or thawing of the
'cold war,' and the like are the real desiderata"'" and that the Cali-
fornia decisions "radiate some of the attitudes of the 'cold war,'
where the search is for the 'democracy quotient' of a foreign re-
gime."'9 ' These statements indicate the Court's concern that the sta-
tutes as applied served a foreign policy purpose. Importantly, the
Court specifically pointed out that although the district court in Clark
had found the statute at issue unconstitutional based upon its pur-
pose, that unconstitutional purpose was not argued before it in
Clark. 192 As discussed above, this is largely true; the briefs in Clark fo-
cused almost exclusively on effects rather than purpose, and to the
extent that purpose was argued, the argument focused on implied
negotiations with foreign countries or something more akin to a
dormant Treaty Clause. The Court noted that in Clark the statute
was only challenged on its face and at that time it had "no reason to
suspect that the California statute in Clark was to be applied as any-
thing other than a general reciprocity provision requiring just match-
ing of laws."'9 4 Additionally, Justice Douglas stated: "The Oregon law
does, indeed, illustrate the dangers which are involved if each State,
speaking through its probate courts, is permitted to establish its own
foreign policy."'9  Thus, it is possible to read Zschernig as striking
down the statute as applied for a foreign policy purpose as well.
The fact that one finds at least some support for purpose review
is not a surprise when one examines the parties' arguments in Zscher-
nig, as well as a little known dissent by Justice Douglas, the author of
both Zschernig and Clark, in the intervening period. The heirs of the
estate at issue in Zschernig argued threshold effects, relying on Clark v.
Allen. The State of Oregon's brief found the threshold-effects test
comfortable terrain upon which to defend the state law, arguing that
the heirs could only speculate as to such effects and that the U.S. So-
"' Id. at 437.
... Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 435.
I d. at 433, n.5.
' See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 433, n.5.
5 Id. at 441.
9' Brief for Appellants at 58-62, Zschernig v. Miller 389 U.S. 429 (1968) (No 21).
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licitor General had confirmed the State Department's view that such
statutes did not interfere with foreign relations. Only in their reply
brief did the heirs finally argue for a purpose-based standard of re-
view, arguing that the purpose of the law was the same as the purpose
of the California law at issue in Clark, namely to prevent funds from
going to unfriendly nations (and thus, by denying such funds, seek-
ing to change the behavior of those nations)-the same purpose the
district court in Clark had relied upon in invalidating California's re-
ciprocity statute. * Oregon's additional statutory conditions, includ-
ing proving that proceeds of an estate would not be subject to confis-
cation, would only have provided further proof of this legislative
purpose.'" The heirs' reply brief also pointed to Justice Douglas's
dissent to the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari, on the basis of a
lack of a federal question, in the 1962 case of Ioannou v. New York.2 00
Ioannou concerned a New York State Court of Appeals ruling
upholding the application of a New York law calling for the escheat
to the state of any estate in which the assignee would not have the
benefit or use of the proceeds.2ox The statute was applied to prevent a
Czech beneficiary of an estate from giving her interest as a gift to her
niece in London.2 02 In dissent, Justice Douglas indicated that a for-
eign policy purpose would be enough to invalidate the New York sta-
tute and its application to the Czech heir:
The issue is of importance to our foreign relations and I think
this Court should decide whether, under existing federal policy
and practice, the New York statute should be given effect... . We
should note jurisdiction and ask the Solicitor General to file a
brief.
... If New York's purpose is to preclude unfriendly foreign
governments from obtaining funds that will assist their efforts
hostile to this Nation's interests[,] ... the complete prohibition of
assignments made in those countries may have some basis in rea-
son. But, if this is the purpose behind the statute, it seemingly is
203
an attempt to regulate foreign affairs.
Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 434.
198 Brief in response to Brief of Appellee State Land Board of Oregon, and Brief
for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 3-6, Zschernig v. Miller 389 U.S. 429
(1968) (No 21).
'9 Id. at 5-6.
m Id. at 3. Ioannou is located at 371 U.S. 30 (1964).
I' loannou v. New York, 371 U.S. 30, 30 (1962) (DouglasJ., dissenting).
2 Id. at 34.
2 Id. at 32-34 (citations omitted).
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To be fair, Douglas's dissent in loannou also laid out several addi-
tional effects-based tests that were later utilized in his Zschernig opi-
nion: "The present restraints are not as gross an intrusion in the fed-
eral domain as those others would be. Yet they affect international
relations in a persistent and subtle way., 204 Nonetheless, there is little
doubt that Douglas's opinion in Zschernig can be read to at least sup-
port purpose review as an additional test.
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Zschernig, joined by Jus-
tice Brennan, also displays a clear reliance on dormant foreign affairs
power doctrine rather than preemption analysis.2 0 5 Additionally, the
opinion lends support to purpose review because it places emphasis
206
on the evaluation and disapproval of foreign government policies.
Indeed, Justice Stewart and Justice Brennan would have struck down
the Oregon statute on its face, rather than only as applied:
All three [conditions in the Oregon statute] launch the State
upon a prohibited voyage into a domain of exclusively federal
competence. Any realistic attempt to apply any of the three crite-
ria would necessarily involve the Oregon courts in an evaluation,
either expressed or implied, of the administration of foreign law,
the credibility of foreign diplomatic statements, and the policies of
foreign governments. Of course, state courts must routinely con-
strue foreign law in the resolution of controversies properly be-
fore them, but here the courts of Oregon are thrust into these in-
quiries only because the Oregon Legislature has framed its
inheritance laws to the prejudice of nations whose policies it disapproves,
and thus has trespassed upon an area where the Constitution con-
templates that only the National Government shall operate. For
local interests the several states of the Union exist, but for nation-
al purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are
but one people, one nation, one power. Our system of govern-
ment is such that the interest of the cities, counties and states, no
less than the interest of the people of the whole nation, impera-
tively requires that federal power in the field affecting foreign re-
2071lations be left entirely free from local interference.
Thus, Justice Stewart's concurrence makes clear that the realm
of foreign affairs is exclusively federal, and the Justices subscribing to
Justice Stewart's opinion read Hines as well as earlier cases to establish
this federal exclusivity.
2 Id. at 32.
0 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart,J., concurring).
Id. at 443.
Id. at 442-43 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Not all of the justices agreed with the use of this doctrine. Jus-
tice Harlan's concurrence expressed concern over the dormant for-
208
eign affairs doctrine grounds relied upon by the other six Justices.
Although he concurred in the result, he would only have struck down
the statute for its conflict with the treaty between Germany and the
United States.
D. Assessing the Possible Doctrinal Tests
1. Threshold-Effects Test
As discussed above, the threshold-effects test draws significant
support from the language of Zschernig. 0 The Court, however, bor-
rowed the "more than incidental and indirect effects" test from sug-
gestions in Clark, and Clark's purported adoption of the test was
somewhat accidental, given the arguments the parties made before
the Court. " Yet there are much stronger reasons for rejecting this
test than the fact that it has its origins in Clark.
First, a threshold-effects test does not suit courts particularly
well. Are courts particularly adept at assessing the impact a state
measure will have on a foreign country or on U.S. foreign policy?
Certainly, a court can hear evidence on the impact in a foreign coun-
try. As to the impact on U.S. foreign policy, it seems that courts are
less adept at making such determinations than the federal govern-
ment.1 The courts, however, have feared that deferring to executive
branch views in amicus briefs would leave the fate of litigants solely in
the hands of the executive branch and injure the independence of
214
the judiciary. There are historical examples in the foreign relations
arena that warrant skepticism of the executive branch's ability to in-
dependently apply a legal test-in this instance, a threshold-effects
test-in a consistent and apolitical fashion. For example, one reason
that immunity decisions regarding foreign governments were taken
20 Id. at 457-58.
200 Id. at 449.
210 See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1699-1702; Swaine, supra note 88, at 1151-53.
This is true for a variety of reasons, including the fact that the executive
branch is in constant communication with foreign governments, through U.S. Em-
bassies abroad, and has a continuous flow of intelligence information, some of which
would not be accessible to a court.
211 See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring)
(suggesting resolution of fundamental constitutional issues cannot depend on "shift-
ing winds" of the executive branch).
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out of the hands of the executive branch and placed in the hands of
the courts under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act was the in-
consistent results that occurred when courts essentially entrusted the
executive branch with application of the restrictive theory of immuni-
215
ty.
Courts could also seek guidance in the amicus briefs of foreign
governments that claim damaging effects on relations with the Unit-
ed States as a result of a state measure, or rely on evidence of actual
retaliatory measures by foreign governments, or even rely on cases
brought against the U.S. government in international tribunals, such
as the World Trade Organization (WTO). But this would place the
resolution of the constitutional issue in the hands of foreign govern-
ments, a far more unacceptable result than leaving it in the hands of
the executive branch.
Even if courts resist suggestions in amicus briefs, it is likely that
inconsistent results will arise among lower courts considering similar
measures.2 1 7 For example, in Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Board of Commis-
sioners, a California state court struck down the California "Buy Amer-
ica" Act as having more than some incidental or indirect effect on
U.S. foreign relations under Zschernig.218 Conversely, in KSB Technical
Sales Corp. v. North Jersey District Water Supply Commission, the New Jer-
sey Supreme Court upheld a similar New Jersey statute, finding that
the statute did not have more than some incidental or indirect ef-
fect.2" The KSB Technical Sales court did note that the New Jersey sta-
tute had exceptions if domestic materials would unreasonably raise
220
costs or their purchase was otherwise impracticable.
Second, there is a potential problem with equity between the
states. If the test adopted is concerned with effect on a foreign coun-
try or foreign affairs, then a measure by Wyoming, North Dakota, or
New Hampshire is more likely to be upheld, because it is less likely to
have an effect on a foreign nation or U.S. foreign relations, than a
21 See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw:
CASES AND MATERIAL 74-77 (3rd ed. 2009).
216 See Swaine, supra note 88, at 1153 (expressing concern over giving foreign gov-
ernments a "heckler's veto").
211 Compare Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Bd. of Comm'rs, 276 Cal. App. 2d 221, 229
(Cal. Ct. App. 1969), with Trojan Techs. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 913-14 (3d
Cir. 1990), and K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Supply Comm'n,
381 A.2d 774, 784 (N.J. 1977).
2"' Bethlehem Steel Corp., 276 Cal. App. 2d at 229.
V9 381 A.2d 774 (N.J. 1977).
M Id. at 784.
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measure undertaken by California, New York, or Massachusetts. ,
This seems rather unfair and indeed almost ironic. Wyoming might
be able to enact a law sanctioning Burma's government while Cali-
fornia, a much larger economic actor in the world, may be denied
the ability to do so.
Third, and somewhat related, the question arises whether the
impact of each state's measure should be examined individually or in
the aggregate. If a court only examines the impact of each state's
measure individually, a situation would exist where, for example,
twenty states have enacted measures that are together creating an
enormous interference with U.S. foreign policy but no single meas-
ure has a "more than indirect effect."222 Additionally, the potential
inequities between large and small states would need to be addressed.
It seems that a court must aggregate the incidence of all state practic-
es. Indeed, there is some support in Zschernig for cumulating the to-
223
tal incidence of a particular action taken by several states. A court,
however, would also need to go further. It would need to assess a
particular state's foreign policy measure based on the assumption
that all fifty states enacted similar measures, whether or not other
states actually have such measures in place at the time of the chal-
lenge. Otherwise, the validity of a state's measure will depend on
how many other similar state measures are in place at time of the liti-
gation. For example, if a particular state enacts a Burma law similar
to Massachusetts and it is challenged in court under a threshold-
effects test, then a court unconcerned with accumulation could find
the statute does not create sufficient effects on Burma or U.S. foreign
policy to invalidate it. If in the next six to twelve months, twenty or
thirty other states enact such measures, then a new challenge to that
state's Burma statute leads to a different result. Ultimately, however,
2' See, e.g, Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 12, at 158 n.146 (discussing
how immigration measures by those states with large alien populations are more sub-
ject to invalidation under a foreign affairs rationale because measures by those states
are more likely to cause foreign policy effects).
2" See PeterJ. Spiro, State and Local Anti-South Africa Action as an Intrusion upon the
Federal Power in Foreign Affairs, 72 VA. L. REV. 813, 825 (1986) [hereinafter Spiro, State
and Local] (indicating that this would have been the case if state sanctions against
South Africa were analyzed in such a fashion in the 1980s).
2' See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 438 n.8 (1968); see also NYTC v. Natsios,
181 F.3d 38, 53-54 (1st Cir. 1999); Daniel M. Price &John P. Hannah, The Constitu-
tionality of United States State and Local Sanctions, 39 HARV. INT'L L. J. 443, 458 (1998)
(" [C]lonsideration should also be given to the cumulative effect that a multiplicity of
such laws would have on the ability of the federal government to conduct a coherent
foreign policy.").
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even hypothetical accumulation fails to cure the significant problems
with a threshold-effects test.
Fourth, a threshold-effects test provides little useful guidance to
state officials. State officials, much like courts, will be hard-pressed to
assess the potential impact of their actions on foreign governments or
U.S. foreign relations, let alone assess the impact of their measure in
combination with other states, real or hypothetical. Moreover, they
will face political pressures to conclude that their actions only cause
an "indirect effect" on U.S. foreign relations.
Finally, a threshold-effects test is potentially more threatening to
224
state regulation in traditional areas, such as criminal law, and po-
tentially less respectful of federal government views on whether cer-
tain international obligations (i.e., treaty obligations) should be self-
executing than a purpose-based test. There is, of course, some irony
here given that respect for traditional areas of state regulation, such
as testamentary disposition, was one of the reasons that a threshold-
effects test was argued for by state entities in their briefs before the
Supreme Court in the Clark and Zschernig cases.2  Part of the prob
lem is that many additional areas of regulation have become of inter-
est to foreign nations in their relationship with the United States in
226
the post-WWII era. For example, imposition of the death penalty
227
by U.S. states leads to constant diplomatic protests by other nations,
and thus one could envision an argument that such statutes have
more than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign rela-
tions. But one could hardly make the argument that the primary
purpose of death penalty statutes is to change or criticize the beha-
vior or policy of a foreign government, and thus such laws are not at
risk under a purpose-based test.
Similarly, state court unwillingness to implement a World Court
ruling requiring "review and reconsideration" by state judicial bodies
of convictions and sentences of foreign nationals not read their con-
sular notification rights at the time of arrest, as required by the Vien-
na Convention on Consular Relations, has arguably caused more
than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign relations-as
evidenced by the World Court cases and diplomatic protests against
" See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1711.
'2 See Brief for the Respondent at 56-57, Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947) (No.
626); Brief of Appellee State Land Board of Oregon at 7-11, Zschernig v. Miller, 390
U.S. 974 (1968) (No. 21).
2"' See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1671.
22 See, e.g., Arizona Executes German Killer Pleas for Clemency Unheeded as State Uses Gas
Chamber, KAN. CiTy STAR, March 4, 1999, at A3.
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such failures.228 The Supreme Court, however, in a 2008 case, Medel-
lin v. Texas, found that World Court rulings are non-self-executing
(thus not a part of domestic law), and accordingly, they do not bind
state courts nor do they preempt state procedural default doctrine
rules.m The Medellin Court even found Presidential attempts to im-
plement the World Court rulings by memorandum invalid given Se-
nate intent that such rulings be non-self-executing. If one made a
Zschernigbased argument using a threshold-effects test, such state
court activity could be ruled unconstitutional given the number of in-
ternational disputes and diplomatic protests concerning the applica-
tion of state procedural default doctrines in such circumstances. This
would lead to a result contrary to that which the legislative branch
desired.
2. Balancing
Several scholars, analogizing the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine to the dormant Commerce Clause, have proposed a balancing
test that would weigh the impact that a state's measure has on foreign
relations (or a foreign country) against the state's interest in the
measure. There is, of course, a question whether the balancing that
occurs under the dormant Commerce Clause is mere window dress-
232ing for purpose-review. Indeed, other scholars surmised shortly af-
ter Zschernig that balancing is what courts would ultimately lean to-
233
ward. But such a proposal has many flaws both as a descriptive
matter of what courts are doing and as a practical matter of what
courts should be doing under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
The Zschernig opinion lends no support to a balancing test. Moreo-
ver, a lower court proposed a balancing test on only one occasion,
and in that case the court never actually engaged in balancing be-
cause it found no effect on foreign affairs.3 Thus, courts have almost
28 See, e.g., Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.),
2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31) (finding that the Court had jurisdiction to hear claim
against the United States and that Mexican nationals in U.S. Custody were entitled to
review of their convictions); see also supra note 227.
2 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008).
2 Id. at 530.
2 See Lewis, supra note 5, at 501; see also McRoberts, supra note 27, at 651 (apply-
ing balancing test after first asking whether primary purpose was to influence foreign
government conduct).
2 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1217.
2" See Henkin, supra note 12, at 164 (questioning also the need for the doctrine
altogether).
224 See State v. Bundrat, 546 P.2d 530, 542 (Ala. 1976).
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uniformly rejected the adoption of a balancing test. The rejection of
balancing by courts is appropriate since such a doctrinal test leads to
even greater problems than a threshold-effects test.
First, the Court, Justice Scalia in particular, has criticized balanc-
ing in the dormant Commerce Clause context, primarily because it
can lead to uncertain results.m If one wonders about a court's ability
to discern the appropriate line in a threshold-effects test, then one
can be truly skeptical of a court's ability to balance the effect of a
state action on U.S. foreign policy or a foreign country with the right
of states to regulate matters of traditional state concern (e.g., inherit-
ance or achievement of a legitimate local purpose). The question
whether courts have the competence to properly balance becomes
even greater when one considers that in numerous cases the con-
straint will be interpreted by state legislators themselves. Balancing,
like a threshold-effects test, simply does not give state legislators suffi-
cient guidance regarding their conduct.
Second, as will be discussed in greater detail in Part V of this Ar-
ticle, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is analogous only to the ex-
tra "one voice" prong of analysis under the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause, as opposed to the facial discrimination and balancing
236
tests that occur prior to the "one voice" prong. In Japan Line, Ltd. v.
Los Angeles County, the Supreme Court identified two additional
prongs of analysis to undertake when a state tax affects foreign com-
merce as opposed to interstate commerce.1 First, the Court needs to
238
consider whether the state tax creates a risk of multiple taxation.
Second, the Court queries whether the state tax interferes with an
area where federal uniformity is essential. Some, including the
Court itself, have termed this second prong the "speak with one
voice" test since the prong is often paraphrased as a question of
whether the state tax prevents the federal government from speaking
2 See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167, 203 (1990) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (claiming that balancing the importance of the state interest against the de-
gree of impairment to commerce is "weighing the imponderable"); see also Tyler Pipe
Indus. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 260 (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (arguing that balancing leads to unpredictable results).
23 See infra Part V.
' 441 U.S. 434, 446 (1979).
2 Id.
2 Id. at 448.
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with one voice.24 The dormant foreign affairs doctrine has been de-
scribed in terms similar to this second prong in Japan Line.
While differences and similarities between the extra prongs of
analysis under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause and the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine will be explored further below,242 the
crucial point here is that the Court has utilized these additional
prongs after finding a state tax would satisfy the test for the dormant
interstate Commerce Clause. Thus, the extra tests are separate from
the normal test for interstate commerce and apparently are applied
243
after any balancing has taken place. Accordingly, the Court has at
least implicitly rejected any sort of balancing under the second prong
of the Japan Line test. Therefore, support for balancing under the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine is further weakened.
3. Purpose Review
Purpose review is the best available means of assessing state ac-
244
tions under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Under purpose
2 See, e.g., id. at 449. See also Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463
U.S. 159, 186 (1983).
21 See, e.g., Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1637.
242 See discussion infra Part VI.
243 The Japan Line tests to date have only been applied by the Supreme Court to
state taxes and not state regulations, and the interstate Commerce Clause tests for
taxes do not involve balancing. But lower courts have applied the Japan Line addi-
tional tests even to regulations after engaging in facial discrimination and balancing
tests. See Piazza's Seafood World, L.L.C. v. Odom, 448 F.3d 744, 750 (5th Cir. 2006);
Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 57 (1st Cir. 1998).
..4 Support for purpose review can be gleaned from the articles of several scholars
and practitioners, although these articles combine purpose review with other addi-
tional tests criticized in this Article or view purpose review as a second best option to
eliminating the doctrine altogether. Professor Fenton places the greatest emphasis
on purpose review of any commentator; however, he also places continued reliance
on asking whether the state action prevents the federal government from "speaking
with one voice," a test which this Article criticizes. See Fenton, supra note 34, at 571.
Professor Goldsmith criticizes the existence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine;
however, he admits that purpose review is most appropriate if the doctrine is to exist.
See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 652. Similarly, McRoberts would initially review state
laws for a primary foreign policy purpose but would secondarily examine state laws
lacking such a purpose under a balancing test. See McRoberts, supra note 27, at 652.
Professor Moore appears to argue for a purpose-based test that would invalidate state
laws having a foreign policy purpose but would also engage in a balancing test weigh-
ing a state law's effect on international relations with a legitimate local purpose,
aruging at various points for a purpose test, balancing test or a combination of the
two. See Moore, supra note 27, at 289, 306, 311, 321. Daniel M. Price and John P.
Hannah argue that a primary purpose to "singl[e] out individual foreign regimes for
condemnation; and . . . coerce changes in their domestic policies" places a state law
"well within Zschernig's zone of constitutional impermissibility." Price & Hannah,
supra note 223, at 460. But at other times in their article, they seem to apply an ef-
[Vol. 41:201248
REASSESSING CONSTRAIATS
review, courts would ask if the primary purpose of the state law is to
change or criticize the policy of a foreign government or govern-
ments. This may strike some readers as strange at first glance-even
after reading concerns raised about a threshold-effects test and ba-
lancing-because of one of the central policy justifications for ex-
cluding states from foreign policy, and a concern that the Framers
focused upon, was that state foreign policy measures could have an
effect on a foreign country, or U.S. foreign policy towards that coun-
try, and this could lead to retaliation that might befall the country as
a whole. This seems to indicate that it is indeed the effects of the
state measure that should be the preeminent concern under the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. But courts cannot gauge well the
effects of a state action on the achievement of U.S foreign policy
goals and the potential for retaliation.2 The best independent indi-
cator of a state measure's effect that does not require a court to rely
on judgments of the executive branch or, more disturbingly, foreign
governments, is its purpose. Simply put, purpose is not entirely de-
tached from effect. Purposes are important, at least in part, because
of the likely effects. A foreign country is much less likely to cooperate
with the United States or be more likely to institute retaliatory meas-
ures against state actions that have as their explicit purpose criticism
of that foreign country's policies or the desire to change those poli-
cies.
Other questions or concerns regarding purpose review have
been raised, particularly in the context of the dormant Commerce
Clause. First, there is the worry of mixed purposes of a state measure
or that different legislators may have different motives for approving
a measure. For instance, the Massachusetts Burma law may have
been passed by some legislators to change human rights policies in
Burma and by others to increase their chances for reelection because
it was a popular measure that polls seemed to support. This last mo-
tivation is irrelevant. Many legislators may have the ultimate goal of
246,being reelected, but this is not the relevant motive or purpose. The
relevant purpose is the goal that the legislation is designed to accom-
plish.2 Having eliminated the motive of increasing chances of ree-
lection, one would now have to decide whether the primary purpose
fects test. Id. at 463 ("Therefore, a reviewing court should consider [state laws for]
their potential cumulative impact on the federal government's ability to conduct a
coherent foreign policy[J" including by examining foreign diplomatic protests).
.45 See discussion infra Part VII.
26 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1149, n.98.
241 See id. at 1142-51.
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of the Burma law was to change or criticize the behavior of the Bur-
mese government.
The next concern raised with regard to purpose or motive re-
view in the context of the dormant Commerce Clause is the problem
of "laundered legislative history" to disguise the legislature's true
purpose.2" This is less likely to happen in foreign affairs legislation
than in protectionist legislation, and it is surprising how many times
even a protectionist motive is revealed in the development of legisla-
tion. In the context of protectionism, legislators are sometimes an-
xious to reveal their purpose in order to obtain the maximum politi-
cal rewards for favoring domestic industry.250 Legislators, in general,
251
will be similarly anxious to reveal their foreign policy purpose. In-
deed, the Massachusetts Burma law's sponsor, state Rep. Byron Rush-
ing, stated upon introduction of the bill:
The Commonwealth has a history of assisting fledgling, democrat-
ic movements throughout the world. Burma calls on our support
now. The new South Africa demonstrates that economic pressure
can be effective in moving governments away from oppression.
Continued pressure from Massachusetts is necessary to vigorously
combat well-documented repression and intolerance in Burma.
Assuming, however, that legislators attempt to hide their purpose,
they are unlikely to be successful, even if legislators launder the legis-
lative history. A foreign policy purpose is more likely to be evident
from the face of the statute than a protectionist purpose. Often such
253legislation singles out a particular foreign country. Indeed, lower
courts applying a purpose-based test have highlighted the singling
out of a particular foreign nation as a key determinant of the state ac-
1354
tion's purpose. Some scholars have even declared that singling out
a foreign nation should be the sole test for reviewing state actions
. See id. at 1239.
2 See, e.g., Matthew Schaefer, Sovereignty, Influence, Realpolitik, and the World Trade
Organization, 25 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 341, 350 (2002) (discussing the
WTO Reformulate Gasoline case that "involved a 'smoking gun' in that an EPA offi-
cial testifying before Congress admitted that they wanted to give domestic refiners a
break").
' See Regan, supra note 30, at 1156.
251 See Spiro, State and Local, supra note 222, at 822.
252 See Price & Hannah, supra note 223, at 462.
2 See, e.g., Tayyari v. N.M. State Univ., 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1367-68 (D.N.M. 1980)
(singling out Iran); Springfield Rare Coin Galleries v. Johnson, 503 N.E.2d 300, 307
(III. 1986) (singling out South Africa).
m See, e.g., Tayyar, 495 F. Supp. at 1371; see also Springfield Rare Coin Galleries, 503
N.E.2d at 307 (striking down state tax law that discriminated against South African
currency on state constitutional grounds for having a foreign affairs purpose).
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under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.2 But using singling out
as the lone test may not be wise if a state targets, for example, a large
group of countries that maintain a particular policy such that singling
out loses meaning (e.g., one that targets all foreign nations placed on
a list by the U.S. Trade Representative as providing insufficient intel-
lectual property protection or all foreign nations lacking a free trade
agreement with the United States). Additionally, one has to be care-
ful that a singling-out test does not give blanket immunity to general-
ly applicable or facially neutral laws (non-foreign affairs related laws)
that may be used in a particular case or applied in a manner that has
256
a primary foreign policy purpose. Nevertheless, singling out will be
present in many cases, and therefore, even without legislative history,
the foreign policy purpose of a law can often be determined by refer-
ence to its text and structure. For example, one might compare a
generally applicable state tort law being applied in a manner that
causes foreign policy effects to a specific cause of action or an exten-
sion of an applicable statute of limitations that apply only with respect
to actions arising from certain historical occurrences such as WWII
forced labor or the "Armenian genocide." The former type of law is
more likely to survive purpose review while the latter type of provision
is more likely to be found to have a foreign policy purpose-a prima-
ry motive of changing or criticizing the behavior of certain countries.
Legislators may also attempt to disguise their purpose as pro-
tecting the moral or psychological health of their constituents from
the damage that would be caused by procuring from (or investing in)
companies active in a country with a poor human rights record. But
courts have not accepted such arguments in the context of extraterri-
torial legislation and are unlikely to do so in the context of dormant
255 See Vasquez, supra note 15, at 1262.
256 For an example of a court checking to ensure a generally applicable statute is
not in fact being used to target a particular country, see North American Salt Co. v.
Ohio Department of Transportation, 701 N.E.2d 454, 462 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997). The
court found that the Ohio law and regulations
do not provide Ohio officials with an opportunity to treat foreign na-
tions differently based upon the ideological bent of a nation's govern-
ment, or based upon any other factor. Rather, the provisions apply
equally to all foreign nations. Nor is there any evidence in the record
that suggests that these provisions have been selectively applied to
goods mined or produced in Canada. As a result, we are unable to find
that [the Ohio laws and regulations] have any more than an indirect or
incidental effect upon the nation's foreign affairs.
Id. For those familiar with subsidy rules in the WTO system, one might wish to ana-
logize to the concept of de facto specificity (e.g., where a subsidy is generally availa-
ble under neutral criteria but only given to or utilized by selected companies or in-
dustries).
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foreign affairs doctrine decisions.m Admittedly, there will be close
calls, and states may make a significant attempt to hide purpose. For
example, one could envision a divestment statute that calls upon
fund administrators to divest from any excessively risky investments.
The fund administrator determines that companies active in a partic-
ular foreign country with a terrible record on human rights are par-
ticularly risky investments since they might become subject to con-
sumer boycotts. Alternatively, those companies' assets could be
viewed as particularly subject to political risk because, for example,
the regime may grow weary of a foreign presence. If the fund admin-
istrator only divests from companies active in that particular foreign
country, we may have a situation where it must be determined if the
divestment statute as applied runs afoul of the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine with purpose review. It is, however, very likely that the
fund administrator will have a series of risk calculations and projec-
tions exclusively based on the financial impact of various investments
and thus be able to demonstrate alternative support for such a deci-
sion. The argument is not that there will never be close calls under a
purpose-based test but rather that close calls are likely to be less fre-
quent than under the other tests.
Other concerns expressed with respect to purpose review in the
context of the dormant Commerce Clause are also likely to be less
prevalent with regard to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. For
example, it is hard to imagine a particular piece of legislation being
kept in place for a foreign policy purpose, although not originally
enacted for such a purpose, in the context of the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine. Similarly, it seems that judges should be less timid
about concluding that state legislators have enacted legislation (or
state executive branch officials have taken certain actions) for a for-
eign policy purpose than a protectionist purpose.m A court finding
that a state has acted with a foreign policy purpose is less directly of-
fensive to other states in the nation than a finding that the state acted
with a protectionist purpose.
Purpose review also fits the competence of judges better than
the other two tests in the context of foreign affairs. It is hard to argue
" See Spiro, supra note 222, at 834 (claiming that recognition of a state's moral
interest as legitimate in the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause context would be
unprecedented). The Maryland Court of Appeals, however, did accept such an in-
terest in its review of the City of Baltimore's divestment statute in the mid-1980s. See
Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 746 (Md.
1989).
25 See Regan, supra note 34, at 1215 (suggesting that courts are reluctant to find a
protectionist purpose).
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that U.S. judges are somehow less adept at fleshing out legislative
purpose vis-a-vis their counterparts in other nations. In both Austral-
ia and Canada, judges undertake the task of characterizing a particu-
lar law as one either dealing with foreign affairs or one dealing with a
matter of state or provincial concern.2 A central consideration in
the characterization is the purpose of the law or, in other words, the
object the law seeks to achieve.26 0 This is normal, everyday fare for
Australian and Canadian judges. U.S. judges are no less able to flesh
out purpose and do so in many contexts outside the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine.2 Additionally, a purpose-based test is also likely to
achieve more consistent results among lower court judges and pro-
262
vide the best guidance to state government officials.
An examination of lower federal court and state court decisions
in the post-Zschernig (1968) and pre-Crosby (2001) era reveals a signif-
icant number of lower courts paying fealty to the threshold-effects
test but prominently adding purpose review as a sub-factor or an in-
dependent test as well. In Tayyari v. New Mexico State University, the
federal district court for New Mexico considered a challenge to a
university board of regent's ban on Iranian students enrolling during
263
the Iranian Hostages Crises. The court struck down the board of
regent's measure, in part relying on the ban's purpose: "[The Board
of] Regents' motion is directed at one nation, Iran. Their purpose
was to make a political statement about the hostage situation in Iran
and retaliate against Iranian nationals here." In Spingfield Rare Coin
Galleries v. Johnson, the Illinois Supreme Court considered a dormant
foreign affairs challenge to an Illinois law excluding the South Afri-
can Krugerand from a tax exemption given to currency from every
265
other country. In striking down the law, the court stated: "[I]n
both purpose and effect, the exclusion shares important attributes
with the various measures struck down in Zschernig [and post-Zschernig
lower court cases].... In this case we hold only that disapproval of
the political and social policies of a foreign nation does not provide a
2" See PETER HOGG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA 15-7 to 15-10 (5th ed. 2007);
KEVEN BOOKER, ARTHUR GLAss & ROBERT WATT, FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 50 (1994).
2 See HOGG, supra note 259, at 15-7 to 15-10; see BOOKER, supra note 259, at 50.
261 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1145.
2 On this latter point, see Regan, supra note 30, at 1146-47 (arguing that motive
review provides the best guidance to state legislators in the context of the dormant
Commerce Clause).
3 495 F. Supp. 1365, 1368 (D.N.M. 1980).
264 Id. at 1379-80.
265 503 N.E.2d 300, 307 (Ill. 1986).
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valid basis for a tax classification by this state." 6 In National Foreign
Trade Council v. Natsios, the First Circuit invalidated a Massachusetts
statute that provided a negative ten percent preference in state pro-
curements against companies active in Burma.2 The court paid feal-
ty to the threshold-effects test finding that "Zschernig stands for the
principle that there is a threshold level of involvement in and impact
on foreign affairs which the states may not exceed."2 But the first
factor the court pointed to in finding the law had more than some
incidental or indirect effect on foreign affairs was that the "design
and intent of the law [was] to affect the affairs of a foreign coun-
ty,,269try."
E. Is Purpose Review Too Weak, Too Strong or Just (About) Right (i.e.
Is Purpose Review Revolutionary in Its Consequences)?
One major concern with adopting purpose review to assess state
actions under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is that it will cap-
ture too many state actions. In short, there is some concern that
purpose review is too harsh, particularly with respect to non-binding
resolutions. But purpose review allows state actions that affect for-
eign policy or foreign countries to escape condemnation provided
that the actions do not have a foreign policy purpose. Thus, some
might alternatively argue that this makes purpose review too weak for
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. In responding to arguments
that purpose review is either a too aggressive or too lenient test under
the doctrine, one must begin by again recognizing and acknowledg-
ing that purpose is linked to a certain extent with effects. Effects may
be a small part of the evidence assessed in searching for purpose.
Nonetheless, the text and structure of enactments will probably be
sufficient in most cases to assess purpose, particularly the singling out
a particular country or group of countries in the legislation or action.
As already mentioned, legislation passed with the purpose of chang-
ing or criticizing the policies of a foreign government is more likely
to have effects on U.S. foreign policy or foreign countries than some
measure whose primary purpose is not to change or criticize a foreign
270government's behavior. In most cases where a foreign policy pur-
pose is found, effects on U.S. foreign policy or the foreign country
will also be found.
2W Id.
m 181 F.3d 38, 46 (ist Cir. 1999).
2' Id. at 52.
2 Id. at 53.
270 See discussion supra Part IV.D.3.
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But what about cases in which purpose is present but substantial
effects are not, or a case where substantial effects are present but
purpose is not? As to the latter, which I would consider a rarer state
of affairs than the former, federal government preemption is always
available. Since it is rare, the "overburdened policing" concern is not
as significant. Additionally, the failure of the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine to capture state actions in this category is not troublesome
because a state legislature is not likely to have any notice or reasona-
ble means of assessing such effects in advance. As to the former cate-
gory, where purpose is present but effects are not, a measure that is
essentially ineffectual will be involved, such as a non-binding resolu-
tion.
To further explore this problem, it is appropriate to contrast the
Massachusetts Burma law imposing a negative ten percent preference
in the procurement bidding process against companies active in
Burma with the following hypothetical non-binding resolution passed
by the Massachusetts legislature:
Be it resolved:
The state of Massachusetts deplores the human rights situation
in Burma. It believes sanctions should be imposed on the
SLORC.
This resolution shall be transmitted to U.S. representatives and
senators serving the state of Massachusetts by the Governor.
Under a threshold-effects test, a procurement sanctions law is
more likely to be invalidated than a non-binding resolution. Under
purpose review, it appears at first glance that both types of laws will be
held unconstitutional. It is important to remember, however, that
the primary purpose behind the law must be a foreign policy pur-
pose; that is, a primary purpose to change or criticize the behavior or
a policy of a foreign nation.
It could be argued that the primary purpose behind the resolu-
tion is to voice the opinion of the Massachusetts State Legislature to
the federal government. Perhaps this is drawing too fine of a line,
particularly given that state laws sanctioning companies active (in
trade or investment terms) with a rogue foreign country ultimately
are designed to change or criticize the targeted government's beha-
vior. One could certainly argue that the ultimate purpose is to
change the policy of the Burmese government although the interme-
diate purpose is somewhat different- namely, to have the federal
government enact a stronger policy towards Burma. Similarly, state
and local actions such as naming a street after a famous dissident in a
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foreign country,2 7 1 or establishing sister state or sister city relation-
ships,m or even sending humanitarian aid would all be upheld un-
der a purpose-based test since one could likely successfully argue that
the primary purpose of such laws is not to change or criticize the poli-
cies or behavior of a foreign government. Street naming ordinances
recognize efforts of courageous individuals, sister city/state relation-
ships primarily are intended to enhance cultural and economic ties
274
of private actors in the sister communities, and sending aid is hu-
manitarian in nature with the purpose to alleviate suffering. If one is
dissatisfied with making these types of distinctions among purposes
or believes that deciding upon a primary purpose is simply too close
to call, then one could consider limiting the test in four other possi-
ble ways.
First, a dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based
test can be respectful of historical practice. For example, there is sig-
nificant historical support for allowing "sense of' resolutions since
such resolutions date at least as far back as the turn of the Nineteenth
Century.m Thus, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a pur-
271 See Opusunju v. Guliani, 669 N.Y.S.2d 156, 159 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997).
Petitioners have made no reasonable showing that the naming of the
street corner will have more than 'some incidental or indirect effect,' if
any, on foreign affairs, that would intrude unconstitutionally on the
exclusive federal powers of the United States . . .. The name 'Kudirat
Abiola Corner' honors and commemorates a slain Nigerian woman
whose husband, a dissident, is jailed in Nigeria. This cannot reasonably
be deemed to be New York City 'establish[ing] its own foreign policy,'
as petitioners argue.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
27 See, e.g., Bilder, supra note 34, at 822 (noting that over 830 cities and municipal
governments have established sister-city relationships with over 1,270 cities in 90
countries).
27- In the 1980s, Burlington, Vermont sent 560 tons of humanitarian goods, in-
cluding medicine, to its sister city in Nicaragua. See Michael Shuman, Dateline Main-
street: Local Foreign Policies, 65 FOREIGN POL'Y 154, 161 (1986-1987).
274 See, e.g., Fry, supra note 1, at 286; see also Kline, supra note 2, at 113 (noting that
in the 1980s, political objectives emerged in sister-city relationships established be-
tween U.S. cities and communities in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Palestine).
2 For a brief description of similar "sense of" resolutions at the federal level, see
CHRISTOPHER M. DAVIS, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS: "SENSE OF" RESOLUTIONS AND
PROVISIONS (April 20, 2007), available at http://www.rules.house.gov/archives/98-
825.pdf.
A "sense of" resolution is not legally binding because it is not presented
to the President for his signature. Even if a "sense of" provision is in-
corporated into a bill that becomes law, such provisions merely express
the opinion of Congress or the relevant chamber. They have no formal
effect on public policy and are not considered law.
Id. at 1. For examples of modern resolutions, see Robinson, supra note 74, at 707-09.
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pose-based test need not interfere with the transmission of views from
state governments to the federal government via non-binding resolu-
tion.26  Although individual politicians could transmit such views,
there may be benefits to allowing formal transmission. 7 It is, howev-
er, important to keep in mind that there are some state constitutional
and statutory restrictions on transmitting state or local views on for-
278
eign policy via referendum. As another example, a dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test, particularly one that
accounts for historical practice, need not threaten even the vast ma-
jority of state and local government agreements with foreign govern-
ments (national or sub-national), some 340 of them over the past fifty
years.m Agreements between states and foreign governments, either
national or sub-national, creating detailed regulatory regimes to force
a change in foreign country practices by legally binding agreement
would be the most prominent agreements threatened by a purpose-
based test. Agreements meeting these criteria, however, are rare, and
Congress can use its power to grant approval to save them from the
280dormant foreign affairs doctrine should it so desire. Most of the
agreements between states and foreign or foreign sub-national gov-
ernments simply create cooperation similar to a services contract
276 Indeed, such resolutions are unlikely to be challenged in the courts anyway.
SeeJudith Resnick, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Federalism and For-
eign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 EMoRY L.J. 31, 77-78
(2007).
While hortatory resolutions calling for federal legislation are unlikely
to be challenged or, if challenged, are likely to be protected by the
First Amendment, implementation efforts that impose obligations
would not be so shielded. But the courts cannot reach the question
without a challenger, and it is a pattern in the case law that most chal-
lenges arise because a local action affects the commercial interests of a
person or an entity, in some instances of a network of entities.
Id.
277 See Duchacek, supra note 1, at 9 (noting that sub-federal lobbying of federal
governments has always been consistent with both democratic and federal theory and
practice).
278 See, e.g., Brant v. Beermann, 350 N.W.2d 18 (Neb. 1984) (finding that an advi-
sory vote placed should not be placed on the election ballot because it was merely an
expression of public opinion); Fossella v. Dinkins, 485 N.E.2d 1017 (N.Y. 1985) (af-
firming a decision to strike a referendum from a ballot, in part, because it was an in-
direct way to influence public opinion which is against state policy).
m For an overview of these agreements, see Duncan B. Hollis, Unpacking the Com-
pact Clause, 88 TEX. L. REv. 741 (2010). Professor Hollis appears to prefer using a
reinvigorated Compact Clause to exert greater control over these state agreements
and activities than controlling them through a dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Id.
at 769.
2 See discussion infra Part VII.
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(e.g., bridge building projects or fire fighting plans ), announce a
common position with information sharing or studies as a follow-up
(and therefore involve no criticism or change in behavior unless ne-
gotiated for prior to reaching the common position), or establish an
ongoing relationship (similar to sister city/sister state arrangements,
to advance trade, investment, and tourism opportunities) . Few of
these types of agreements would appear to involve a primary purpose
of the state to change or criticize the behavior of a foreign govern-
ment, either national or sub-national. They are also unlikely to
create more than some incidental or indirect effect on U.S. foreign
relations. Again, even if one finds these distinctions among purposes
too difficult or arbitrary, as with non-binding resolutions, the long
history of these (mostly) non-legally binding agreements can be res-
pected when applying the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The
dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test could, of
course, remain a doctrinal tool used to ensure states do not become
overzealous in using these agreements in a manner deviating from
historical practice, although more robust regulation under the Com-
283
pact Clause may be preferable in any event.
A second way to possibly protect non-binding resolutions from a
purpose-based test would be to only capture state measures that em-
ploy traditional tools of foreign policy. Trade and investment sanc-
tions legislation would clearly meet this "traditional tools" test. The
question is whether non-binding resolutions would be caught within
a "traditional tools" test. Diplomatic notes transmitted to a foreign
government or the support of non-binding resolutions within inter-
national organizations might be considered "traditional tools" of for-
eign policy. But internal resolutions of a federal agency, or congres-
sional committee, or a political party's platform are not tools of
foreign policy, and state resolutions are more analogous to such reso-
lutions. Of course, state agreements with foreign governments, al-
though mostly representing political commitments at best, would still
.. Agreements on bridge building and fire fighting cooperation have garnered
congressional approval. See Hollis, supra note 279, at 742 nn.10-12.
2" See id. at 755-56, 768-69 (listing the major types/categories of agreements and
noting such agreements are most commonly political commitments without legal ef-
fect or institutions).
2' See id. at 805 (admitting that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine "remains" a
control device "on the table" but preferring more robust regulation by federal actors
under the Compact Clause). It may well be that a reinvigorated Compact Clause is
the best way to treat state agreements with foreign governments (both national and
sub-national) given that we typically think that the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
applies to activities beyond those express limitation on the states in Article I, Section
10 of the Constitution.
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be captured under a "traditional tools" test. Moreover, problems with
a "traditional tools" test could arise because tools can change over
time, and lower courts struggled with the "traditional governmental
functions" test that was used in the context of limits on the scope of
the federal government's Commerce Clause powers in the late 1970s
and early 1980s.m
A third possibility to try to limit difficult determinations con-
cerning a state action's purpose through additional filters might be to
seek to limit only those state foreign policy measures having legal ef-
fect. This limitation, however, may be overly broad or too narrow
depending on how the force of law is defined. For instance, the hy-
pothetical non-binding resolution above directs the governor to
transmit the message to the state's representatives in Congress. It is
unclear whether this law binds the Governor and thus has legal force.
But if this provision were excluded, then there would be no legal ef-
fect present, and the issue could be easily avoided. This limiting fac-
tor would also be an alternative or additional way to ensure that the
vast majority of state agreements with foreign governments, either na-
tional or sub-national, are not implicated by the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine.
Fourth, and finally, in employing a purpose-based test, courts
can be respectful of prior court precedent and rulings concerning
particular state laws. For example, as discussed earlier, pure reciproc-
ity requirements have been upheld in a variety of contexts and one
could always argue the purpose of such reciprocity requirements is
just that-reciprocity-rather than an attempt to change or criticize
the behavior of the foreign government in failing to allow U.S. na-
tionals to inherit property or engage in certain professions in the for-
eign country. At least three of these four refinements or additional
filters (historical practice, legal effect, and respect for precedent)
seem quite workable should courts struggle in close cases in deter-
mining a state action's primary purpose.
2 See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849-52 (1976) ("We hold that
insofar as the challenged amendments operate to directly displace the States' free-
dom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,
they are not within the authority granted Congress."), overruled by San Antonio Me-
tro. Auth. v. Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 546-47 (1985) ("We therefore now reject, as un-
sound in principle and unworkable in practice, a rule of state immunity from federal
regulation that turns on a judicial appraisal of whether a particular governmental
function is 'integral' or 'traditional.' Any such rule leads to inconsistent results.").
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V. A MARKET-PARTICIPANT EXCEPTION TO THE DORMANT FOREIGN
AFFAIRS DOCTRINE?
The Supreme Court has recognized a market-participant excep-
285
tion to dormant Commerce Clause restraints on states. Specifically,
when a state acts as a market participant, rather than a market regula-
286
tor, it is exempted from the constraints of the doctrine. The excep-
tion primarily creates carve-outs for state purchases of goods and ser-
281
vices. In the past several years, the Roberts' Court has created an
additional "state self-promotion" exception that allows states to favor
an in-state public entity above both in-state and out-of-state private
entities, and three justices have indicated a willingness to expand the
market-participant exception to cases where state regulation is ac-
288
companied by state market participation.
The Court has never formally decided whether the market-
participant exception applies to the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause much less the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The Court,
219 211however, has strongly hinted, and several lower courts have held,
28 See, e.g., White v. Mass. Council of Constr. Emp'rs, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 206-10
(1983) ("Nothing in the purposes animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a state,
in the absence of congressional action, from participating in the market."); Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439 (1980) ("Evenhandedness suggests that, when acting
as proprietors, States should similarly share existing freedoms from federal con-
straints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause."); Hughes v. Alexan-
dria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807-10 (1976) ("Nothing in the Commerce Clause
prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, form participating in the
market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.").
286 See Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 439.
Il will not address a separate exception under the dormant Commerce Clause
for direct payment subsidies in this Article. Certain direct subsidies, however, will
not survive dormant Commerce Clause challenge. See, e.g., West Lynn Creamery, Inc.
v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186, 194 (1994) (holding that a direct payment subsidy to in-state
milk producers was invalid because it was funded through tax on all retail milk sold,
rather than general treasury funds).
2 See Dan T. Coenen, Where United Haulers May Take Us: The Future of the State-
Self-Promotion Exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause Rule, 95 IOWA L. REv. 541, 541
(2009) [hereinafter Coenen, United Haulers] (arguing that this new exception may
have significant consequences and application in various factual contexts); Dan T.
Coenen, The Supreme Court's Municipal Bond Decision and the Market-Participant Excep-
tion to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. 1179, 1185 (2009) [hereinafter
Coenen, Municipal Bond Decision] (arguing against any such expansion of the market-
participant exception for fear it will undermine the purposes of dormant Commerce
Clause).
m See South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (involving
a dormant Foreign Commerce Clause challenge where the Court still examined the
state's claim that it was a market participant not a market regulator, implying the ex-
ception would be available under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause). Four
REASSESSING CONSTRAINTS
that the exception should exist under the dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause. Such a holding is in fact necessary if courts are serious
about preserving the exception under the dormant interstate Com-
merce Clause. If the exception were not recognized in foreign com-
merce cases, its existence would risk obliteration. This is true be-
cause in a global economy most state actions affect both interstate
and foreign commerce. A state does not have to specifically target or
discriminate against foreign commerce in order to be subject to
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause constraints. Indeed, in South-
Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, the Court subjected a
state measure that de facto required in-state processing of raw logs
sold by the state to heightened scrutiny under the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause because ten percent of the raw logs subject to the
de facto in-state processing requirement were bound for export.
Thus, this Article presumes that the market-participant excep-
tion does exist for the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. Al-
though, as will be explored later, such an exception should only ap-
ply to the facial discrimination and balancing tests of the dormant
Commerce Clause, and not the additional "one voice" prong.m An
analysis of the reasons for the market-participant exception in the
dormant Commerce Clause context indicates that such an exception
should not exist for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, in spite of a
years earlier, the Court expressly declined to rule on the issue. See Reeves, 447 U.S. at
439 n.9.
m Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 750-
752 (Md. 1989) (holding that conditions enforced by the city did not "have a sub-
stantial regulatory effect outside of the market in which it is participating"); Carll v.
S.C. Jobs-Econ. Dev. Auth., 327 S.E.2d 331, 337 (S.C. 1985) (holding that "[t]he
Commerce Clause does not prohibit implementation of any portion of this Act be-
cause South Carolina is a market participant and is entitled to establish guidelines
for its participation regardless of the effect on interstate or foreign commerce");
K-S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. N. Jersey Dist. Water Comm'n, 381 A.2d 774, 787 (N.J.
1977) (upholding state "Buy American Act" under market-participant exception and
claiming it would be ironic to hold that as a state became less parochial vis-i-vis a
"buy New Jersey" act that a state law becomes invalid under the dormant Commerce
Clause). Most commentators have argued that the exception should not apply in the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause context. See McArdle, supra note 65, at 831;
Mendelson, supra note 5, at 89. As discussed below, I would find the exception does
apply but not to the second additional prong of analysis that occurs under the dor-
mant Foreign Commerce Clause. See infra Part V. In essence, it is really the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, and thus should be subsumed within the doctrine.
467 U.S. 82, 99-100 (1984).
m See infra Part VI.B.
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split among lower courts on this issue . Prior to proceeding to that
analysis, two additional points regarding the Supreme Court's dor-
mant Commerce Clause and market-participant exception jurispru-
dence must be explained. First, it logically follows that if the justifica-
tions for the current (narrow) market-participant exception are not
supported within the context of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine,
neither would any expanded version of such exception be supported.
Additionally, it logically follows that the new "state self-promotion"
exception should not apply in the context of the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine. The state self-promotion exception is based on a "pri-
vate-gains-centered notion of state protectionism," namely that the
anti-protectionism norm of the dormant Commerce Clause allows a
state to favor public in-state entities as long as it is not discriminating
among private entities from inside and outside the state.2 9 ' The dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine is not concerned with protectionism so
the new effort under the state self-promotion exception to limit the
conception of protectionism has no relevance in the context of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
A. Textual
The market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause has a textual basis that is inferred from the grant of power to
Congress to "regulate" interstate and foreign commerce."" While this
grant acts as a limit on state power even when Congress has not spo-
ken, the actual text of the clause suggests it is regulatory activities ra-
ther than non-regulatory activities that are exclusive to Congress.9
No such textual basis exists for establishing a market-participant ex-
297
ception to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. This is because the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine is implied not from a particular
clause granting the federal government power to "regulate" foreign
"' See Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d. at 748-49 (Md. 1989); See also
Price & Hannah, supra note 223, at 42 (concluding that the market-participant ex-
ception would not be available under a foreign affairs challenge).
"9 See Coenen, United Haulers, supra note 288, at 545.
29 See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Daniel T. Coenen, Untangling the Market-
Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MICH. L.REv. 395, 436-37
(1989) [hereinafter Coenen, Untangling].
296 Id.
"' See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1639 (stating that "in contrast to treaties, cus-
tomary international law is not mentioned in either the Supremacy Clause or Article
III").
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affairs but rather an amalgam of clauses and the structure of the Con-
2981
stitution relating to foreign affairs.
B. Analogy to a Private Actor in the Market
The market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce
Clause also draws support from analogizing a state participating in
the market to a private actor in the market.m Private actors can pick
and choose to and from whom to buy and sell their goods and servic-
es. A private company could choose to buy inputs from only in-state
suppliers, or sell its products to only in-state buyers. States, it is ar-
gued, should be treated in an "evenhanded" fashion and subject to
. 300
no greater restraints than private actors.
Private actors will be driven by profit maximization in choosing
buyers and sellers. It is possible that a private company might choose
to buy from a "higher-priced" in-state supplier rather than a "lower-
priced" out-of-state supplier as a profit-maximizing strategy. For ex-
ample, utilizing in-state suppliers may allow for more long-term relia-
bility in terms of a source of supply or may lead to a higher tax base
in the community and thus lower tax rates. It is questionable whether
states act on a profit-maximizing rationale; however, one can analog-
ize to a state's in-state procurement preference (or a subsidy to attract
investment) on a revenue-maximization basis. Although a state will
pay more for the "higher-cost" in-state goods, the extra employment
created may increase the tax base and leave the state treasury better
off as a whole.
The merits of such an argument are considerably weakened un-
der the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, however, because the anal-
ogy between state and private actors clearly breaks down with regard
to participation in foreign affairs. Nonetheless, those sympathetic to
state participation in foreign policy often point to the foreign policy
influence of large U.S.-based multinational corporations. Since U.S.-
based multinational corporations can suffer a reduction in profits to
ensure human rights or labor standards are met in foreign countries,
why shouldn't states be allowed to restrict their purchasing on similar
foreign policy considerations?
First, it is not as likely that states can justify such actions as reve-
nue-enhancing measures and thus the analogy to private actors seems
to wear thin. Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) of corporations are
". See id. at 1642.
See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976).
Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 421.
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charged with maximizing profits and traditionally needed to justify
measures meant to encourage human rights in foreign countries in
such terms.3o' Naturally, they do not make such explanations public
because to do so would negate the positive public relations image
sought by taking such steps. Second, and much more importantly,
states are in fact far different from private actors, since the Constitu-
tion limits governmental power, not private conduct. Indeed, the
Supreme Court stated-in discussing a state procurement law sanc-
tioning labor law violators-that "government occupies a unique po-
sition of power in our society, and its conduct, regardless of form, is
rightly subject to special restraints" and "in our system States simply
are different from private parties and have a different role to play."3 0 2
Foreign nations are far more likely to be offended by government as
opposed to private actions. Indeed, international law holds federal
states responsible for violations of international rules by their sub-
303federal governments but not for actions taken by private parties un-
less the government, through acts or omissions, was somehow con-
nected to the private conduct.304 Thus, the chances for retaliation
and unfairness are greater with governmental action. Additionally,
the federal government employs traditional foreign policy tools like
305procurement restrictions. To exempt state spending and state pur-
chasing decisions from the purview of the doctrine would be to ex-
empt traditional tools of foreign policy from the limits of the doc-
trine.
C. Allowing Particular Projects to Go Fonard
Another reason for the market-participant exception to the
dormant Commerce Clause is to allow states and localities to meet
particular local needs. Without the exception, some have argued that
' See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMEs MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, available at
http://www.umich.edu/~thecore/doc/Friedman.pdf. Stakeholder models of corpo-
rate governance, questioning this traditional (narrow) duty of corporate chiefs, have
recently been revived. For a discussion, see, e.g., Aaron A. Dhir, Realigning the Corpo-
rate Building Blocks: Shareholder Proposals as a Vehicle for Achieving Corporate Social and
Human Rights Accountability, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 365, 369-72 (2006)..
' Wis. Dep't. of Indus., Labor & Human Relations v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282,
290 (1986).
a See Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, G.A. Res. 56/83,
Chap. II, Art. 4, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001) available at
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/NO7/590/90/PDF/N759090.
pdf?OpenElement.
3" See G.A. Res. 56/83, supra note 303, Art. 8-9.
3 See WRIGHT, supra note 127, at 302-03.
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certain projects may not be undertaken at all. In short, if, for ex-
ample, a state could not require a certain percentage of workers on a
project to be local residents, then the project, like the building of a
road, would not go forward. This argument, to the extent it has valid-
ity, is certainly weaker in the context of state foreign affairs legisla-
tion. If a state cannot refuse to buy from a particular rogue foreign
country or companies active in that rogue country, it is unlikely to
decrease the chances of a project going forward.
D. Reduced Risk to Constitutional Values
In the context of the dormant Commerce Clause, it is argued
that when a state acts as a market participant and favors its own resi-
dents, there is less risk of harm to the unified market intended to be
constitutionally established.o' This is so because other states will see
favoritism to in-state residents by another state as less hostile when
done through a procurement preference rather than through a tax
or regulation.3e' The argument continues that because other states
will find such actions less hostile they are less likely to retaliate.30s It is
not necessary here to debate and resolve whether this is indeed an
accurate assessment of how other states will view such actions in the
dormant interstate Commerce Clause context. It does not appear,
however, that a state acting as a market participant in foreign affairs
will lessen the risk to the constitutional values at issue under the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine. First, the offense or hostility en-
gendered in a foreign nation is not likely to be any less because a
state acts as a market participant.s0 This is all the more so because
procurement sanctions are, as previously mentioned, traditional tools
of foreign policy. 1 Second, the injury to foreign policy is not les-
sened because such enactments will change the U.S. federal govern-
312
ment's chosen manner or degree of pressure or support.
The other argument as to why a reduced risk to Commerce
Clause values exists when a state acts as market participant relates to
the inherent costliness of such measures.m Protectionist procure-
ment preferences are relatively expensive and have a direct link to
"0 See Regan, supra note 30, at 1194.
0 See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 430-35.
"8 See id. at 434; Regan, supra note 30, at 1194.
See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 434; Regan, supra note 30, at 1194.
See Spiro, supra note 222, at 846.
" See WRIGHT, supra note 127 at 302-03.
See Spiro, supra note 222, at 845-46
See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 434; Regan supra note 30, at 1194.
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the state treasury. Procurement sanctions for foreign-policy pur-
poses will, however, likely be significantly less expensive than pro-
curement preferences for protectionist purposes.3 '5  The reason is
simple: a procurement preference targeted at suppliers from a par-
ticular nation, or even suppliers active in a particular foreign nation,
will exclude less low-cost bidders than a preference that discriminates
against all foreign bidders, as in the case of state "Buy-American" leg-
islation.
E. "Sowing and Reaping" or Investment Capture
Others have suggested a "sow and reap" rationale to justify the
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.1 6
Put in other terms, it is argued that in-state residents should be able
to capture the benefits of their investments (i.e., programs created
through their tax payments) to the exclusion of out-of-state persons,
at least in some instances. 17 The argument is that if a state's residents
have invested in a particular enterprise, then they should be able to
reap the rewards.1' For example, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, the citizens
of South Dakota, through their tax payments, invested in the creation
of a cement plant.3" Thus, the citizens should be able to choose to
reap the rewards, namely be "first in line" to purchase cement from
the plant during times of shortage. The "sow and reap" rationale in-
volves a distinction made between investors (i.e., residents) and non-
investors (i.e., non-residents) in a particular enterprise. Using the
"sow and reap" rationale for a distinction between buyers or sellers of
goods and services based on a foreign-policy purpose makes little
sense. Moreover, some foreign policy legislation prevents those who
have "sowed" from "reaping." For instance, Massachusetts Burma law
denied procurement opportunities to Massachusetts firms active in
Burma."o
3 See id.
31 See Regan supra note 30, at 1193-95.
316 See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 421-26.
. See Norman R. Williams, Taking Care of Ourselves: State Citizenship, the Market, and
the State, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 469, 469 (2008).
31 See Coenen, Untangling, supra note 295, at 423; Jonathan D. Varat, State "Citizen-
ship" and Interstate Equality, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 487, 523 (1981).
319 447 U.S. 429, 430 (1980).
3 Crosby v. Nat'I Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366 (2000).
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F. The Inapplicability of the Market-Participant Exception in
Numerous Cases
Even if the market-participant exception were theoretically avail-
able under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, it is unlikely that
many state foreign policy actions would fit within its confines. In
South-Central Timber Development, Inc. v. Wunnicke, Alaska only sold
timber from state lands to those buyers willing to agree by contract to
process the timber in-state.1 Alaska claimed that as a seller and as a
market participant, it could choose to whom to sell, and thus, the
322
measure was valid under dormant Commerce Clause analysis. The
Court, however, invalidated the provision, holding that the market-
participant exception only allows a state "to impose burdens on
commerce within the market in which it is a participant." The mar-
ket-participant exception did not allow the state to "impose condi-
tions . . . that have a substantial regulatory effect outside ... [the]
market."324 Alaska, the Court found, was "attempting to govern the
private, separate economic relationships of its trading partners."3 2 5
Thus, for example, it is likely that the Massachusetts Burma law would
not fit within the market-participant exception's confines because
even if the exception were theoretically available under the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, Massachusetts was seeking to control the re-
lations and transactions of those companies from whom they consi-
326dered purchasing. Indeed, in South-Central Timber, the Court noted,
referring to a previous case, that a state could not impose a residency
requirement with respect to the work force of all projects (both pub-
327lic and private) of a contractor doing business with a state. It might
be possible, however, for Massachusetts to reject buying Burmese-
made goods under the market-participant exception since the state
would not be imposing restrictions outside of the particular transac-
tion involved. Additionally, divestment statutes may fall within the
exception; the state has a continuing relationship with those compa-
nies in which its pension fund invests, and once it divests and no
longer has a relationship, it no longer cares whether the company is
121 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984).
'2 Id. at 95.
3.3 Id. at 97.
324 id
125 Id. at 99.
326 See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 63 (1st Cir. 2001).
121 South Central Timber, 467 U.S. at 97-98, n.10.
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active in the targeted country. 3 Thus, rejection of the market-
participant exception under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is
still relevant to some possible state-foreign-policy measures.
VI. FURTHER DISTINGUISHING THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS
DOCTRINE FROM THE DORMANT FOREIGN COMMERCE CLAUSE
As discussed briefly in Part V, scholars are split as to what type of
analysis courts are or should be undertaking in the dormant Com-
merce Clause context. 2 The language of courts' opinions seems to
indicate that courts are balancing the effect of the state measure on
3301
commerce with the achievement of a legitimate local purpose.
There is an exception for facially discriminatory measures which are
virtually per se illegal,3 although even in such cases a particularly
high showing of the need for the discrimination to achieve an impor-
tant legitimate local purpose might save the law.3  In the course of
the analysis, courts ask whether the state could achieve its legitimate
objective through a less trade-restrictive means.3 33 This question indi-
cates that courts may actually be attempting to flesh-out a protection-
ist motive. If a state can achieve its purported objective by a less
trade-restrictive means, then the state probably has a different or ad-
ditional motive, namely protectionism. Those scholars supporting
purpose review believe that courts are striking down state actions that
have a primary purpose of protectionism or, in certain cases, isolating
out-of-state interests, even though not competitors. How might the
Massachusetts Burma law fare under the dormant Commerce Clause
with a balancing or purpose-review test? The Massachusetts Burma
law would survive purpose-review scrutiny because the purpose of the
1 Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d. 720, 750-52
(Md. 1989).
' See supra Part V.
.. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) ("Where the statute
regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden im-
posed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local bene-
fits.").
.. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) ("Where
simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, [there exists] a virtual-
ly per se rule of invalidity....").
3 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 148-50 (1986) (upholding a state law banning
the import of live baitfish, and noting that "Maine's fisheries are unique and un-
usually fragile.").
' See, e.g., id. at 146.
See Regan, supra note 30, at 1143.
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law is not protectionism and it does not isolate out-of-state interests.
Indeed, the law applies to both Massachusetts companies active in
336Burma and non-Massachusetts companies. Under a balancing anal-
ysis, however, the law may very well be invalidated. While the extent
of the law's effects on commerce may be debated, the objective the
337law seeks to achieve is not a legitimate one for the state. But even
under a balancing analysis, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is
not superfluous because a portion of the law may be protected by the
market-participant exception to the dormant Commerce Clause.
Specifically, Massachusetts could refuse to purchase Burmese-made
goods. The discussion above has ignored the additional analysis that
Supreme Court jurisprudence requires for state actions affecting for-
eign commerce. Yet, this is the most important part of the compari-
son between the two constraints because the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine is most analogous to one of the additional inquiries the
court undertakes when state action affects foreign commerce, as op-
. 338posed to simply interstate commerce.
As described earlier, when foreign commerce is implicated by a
state measure, the Supreme Court has launched two additional inqui-
ries.33 9 First, in tax-related measures, the Court has asked whether the
state action risks multiple taxation .o Second, the Court queries
whether the state action interferes with federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential.3 This second additional prong
of analysis is paraphrased by the Court as a question of whether the
state prevented the federal government from "speaking with one
,,341
voice. If any part of the dormant Commerce Clause analysis is ana-
logous to the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, it is this second prong
of the additional tests under the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause. Indeed, several lower courts have acknowledged the simi-
larity between the two inquiries and even transferred results from one
" See Crosby v. Nat'I Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 367-68 (2000) (de-
scribing the Massachusetts law).
" Id. at 366.
3 See id. at 370; see also supra Part IV.D.2.
3 Compare Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 (1968), withJapan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty.
of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979); see supra Part IV.C. and infra Part VI.A.
3 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451; see also supra notes 237-41 and accompanying text.
4 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
ml Id.
M2 Id.
3 See, e.g., Spiro, States and Immigration, supra note 221, at 164; Goldsmith, supra
note 12, at 1637.
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context to the other." But, of course, the states can never prevent
the federal government from "speaking with one voice." 45 The prob-
lem with leaving the control of state-level foreign policy to federal
preemption is that the states can prevent the federal government
from speaking with "no voice" or a "quiet voice," or more generally,
change the voice that the federal government would otherwise
choose. If the federal government, for example, chooses quiet dip-
lomacy to address a situation, then a state enactment sanctioning the
foreign government, if not challenged under a dormant doctrine,
leads the federal government into a Hobbesian choice: say nothing
about the state law and thus risk undermining its preferred strategy
of quiet diplomacy, or preempt the state law and thus risk sending a
message that the foreign government's behavior is not so objectiona-
ble. Therefore, the "one voice" paraphrase is inappropriate. So what
really lies beneath this second prong, and what are its implications
for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine? An examination of the line
of Supreme Court dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases is neces-
sary to answer these questions.
A. Examining the Line of Supreme Court Dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause Cases
346
The 1979 case, Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, was the
first Supreme Court case that enunciated the additional prongs of the
analysis when a state measure implicates foreign commerce. Japan
Line involved a challenge to a California tax on cargo containers that
347
would have disturbed an almost-uniform international custom. The
custom almost assuredly did not rise to the level of a customary inter-
348
national law rule, perhaps due to a lack of opinio juris. The Court
believed retaliation would be the inevitable result of allowing the Cal-
ifornia tax. Moreover, the nation as a whole would feel such retalia-
tion.sso Additionally, "if other States followi[ed] California's exam-
See Trojan Techs., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d. 903, 912-13 (3d Cir. 1990)
(keeping the two doctrines separate in its opinion but using a similar analysis for
each); Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 752
(Md. 1989) ("[T]he concerns which underlie the Foreign Commerce Clause are
closely related to concerns underlying the limits on a state's authority to affect for-
eign policy.").
' See discussion infra Part VIII.A.
441 U.S. 434 (1979).
See id. at 452-53.
8 See id. at 438.
Id. at 453.
&w Id.
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ple,... foreign-owned containers w[ould] be subjected to various
degrees of multiple taxation, depending on which American ports
they enter." 3 ' The Court believed this "would make 'speaking with
one voice' impossible." ,5
In the 1983 case, Container Corporation of America v. Franchise Tax
Board, a domestic corporation with foreign subsidiaries challenged
California's system of unitary taxation.153 California's unitary taxation
scheme had led to actual multiple-taxation as in Japan Line.3 " None-
theless, the Court, in a 6-3 ruling, found that the taxation scheme did
not violate the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause.3 5' Based on prior
rulings, the Court explicitly found that the tax satisfied the tests ap-
plied to interstate commerce.3 ' After this initial finding, the Court
proceeded to examine the two additional prongs of analysis laid out
in Japan Line. 35 With respect to the second prong of Japan Line, the
Court iterated the two formulations of the tests: (1) whether the state
action "may impair federal uniformity in an area where federal un-
iformity is essential;" and (2) whether it "prevents the Federal Gov-
ernment from 'speaking with one voice' in international trade."5
The Court held that "a state tax at variance with federal policy will vi-
olate the 'one voice' standard if it either implicates foreign policy is-
sues which must be left to the Federal Government or violates a clear
federal directive." It noted that the latter half of this test is essen-
tially a preemption analysis.3o The Court then found that "[t] he most
obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat it might
pose of offending . .. foreign trading partners and lead [ing] them to
retaliate against the Nation as a whole."3 6 ' The Court acknowledged
that it had little competence in determining when a foreign nation
3" Id.
. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453 (quoting Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S.
276, 285 (1976)).
' 463 U.S. 159, 163 (1983).
' Id. at 187 ("[T]he tax imposed here, like the tax imposed in Japan Line, has re-
sulted in actual double taxation.").
. Id. at 197.
6 Id. at 169-84.
Id. at 185 ("Given that [unitary business here] is international, however, we
must subject this case to the additional scrutiny required by the Foreign Commerce
Clause."); see also id. at 185-97 (outlining the Court's examination of the additional
prongs).
" Id. at 193 (citations omitted).
a' Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
. Id. ("The second of these considerations is, of course, essentially a species of
pre-emption analysis.").
361 Id.
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would be offended by particular acts and "even less competence in
deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the so-
vereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax as
they please." Nevertheless, the Court attempted to "develop objec-
tive standards that reflect very general observations about the impera-
tives of international trade and international relations. "" Ultimately,
the Court did not develop general objective considerations for de-
termining the risks of retaliation and instead identified "three distinct
factors ... [which] weigh [ed] strongly against the conclusion that the
tax imposed by California might justifiably lead to significant foreign
retaliation."3 6 4 First, the Court noted that the tax at issue did not
365
create an automatic asymmetry. Second, the tax was imposed not
on a foreign entity but rather a domestic entity.366 Third, foreign na-
tions would have less of an interest in the tax burden of domestic
367
corporations than corporations based in their particular nations.
Further, foreign nations would realize the domestic entity was ame-
nable to be taxed in California and the amount of the tax it paid was
more a function of the tax rate than its allocation method.m While
the Court did note that a state tax might have foreign policy implica-
369tions other than the threat of retaliation, it did not discuss any oth-
er potential implications and instead observed that unlike in Japan
Line, the executive branch had decided not to file an amicus brief in
opposition to the state tax. 37 The Court made clear that the lack of a
submission was not dispositive, but it did "suggest that the foreign
policy of the United States-whose nuances ... are much more the
province of the Executive Branch and Congress than of this court-is
not seriously threatened by California's unitary taxation scheme.,3 7
There are several important conclusions to draw from these first
two Supreme Court cases addressing the second additional prong of
the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause. First, the Court appears to
establish a threshold-effects test under prong two of Japan Line that is
362 Id.
363 Id.
" Id. at 194.
_ Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194-95.
3 Id. at 195.
sm Id.
m9 Id.
70 Id. at 195.
171 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196.
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arguably similar to the test established in Zschernig. 7 Second, despite
establishing such a standard, the Court admitted that it was ill-suited
to perform an analysis of the standard, and, in fact, was unable to de-
velop any objective criteria other than the "automatic asymmetry"
373
standard that can be applied to the limited field of state taxes.
Third, while the Court preserves its independence in making judg-
ments on constitutional questions, as a result of its lack of compe-
tence, the Court is predisposed to give weight to the views of the ex-
ecutive branch expressed in amicus briefs.7 In short, the Court's
ability to analyze prong two of Japan Line suffers from many of the
same difficulties that led to this article's conclusion rejecting a thre-
shold-effects test for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. These
concerns are heightened in subsequent cases.
Wardair Canada Inc. v. Florida Department of Revenue followed Con-
tainer Corp. in the line of Supreme Court dormant Foreign Com-
merce Clause cases. Wardair involved a challenge by a Canadian
airline company to a Florida state tax on the sale of aviation fuel with-
in Florida. The tax at issue applied even if the air carrier used the
fuel to fly outside the state.7 The Canadian charter airline challeng-
ing the tax conceded that the tax met the all the dormant interstate
Commerce Clause tests. The airline also conceded that the state
tax did not violate prong one of Japan Line because there was no risk
of multiple taxation since the tax was imposed on a discrete transac-
379
tion occurring within Florida. Instead, the airline's claim relied ex-
clusively on prong two of Japan Line and argued that the tax threat-
372 See supra notes 358-59 and accompanying text.
37 Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
The most obvious foreign policy implication of a state tax is the threat
it might pose of offending our foreign trading partners and leading
them to retaliate against the nation as a whole. In considering this is-
sue, however, we are faced with a distinct problem. This Court has lit-
tle competence in determining precisely when foreign nations will be
offended by particular acts, and even less competence in deciding how
to balance a particular risk of retaliation against the sovereign right of
the United States as a whole to let the States tax as they please.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453.
" Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196.
* 477 U.S. 1 (1986).
376 Id. at 3.
Id. at 4.
378 Id. at 8 ("[I]t is not disputed that if this case did not involve foreign commerce,
the Florida tax on the sale of aviation fuel would not contravene the Commerce
Clause.").
Id. at 9.
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ened the ability of the federal government to "speak with one
voice.,,3so The airline argued that "a Resolution ... [of] an interna-
tional organization of which the United States is a member ... [and]
more 70 bilateral agreements, including the U.S.-Canadian Agree-
ment," established a federal policy of reciprocal-tax exemption for
aviation fuel.38' Disagreeing with the airline, the Court first noted
that the multilateral convention and the bilateral treaties did not
prohibit the taxation of the sale of fuel by political subdivisions.3 8 2
The resolution was more broadly worded than the treaties and it
sought to prohibit sales taxes by "any taxing authority within a [na-
tion] ." The Court determined, however, that since the United
States never formally agreed to the resolution, neither approving it as
a treaty nor implementing the resolution through legislation, it was
"untenable to assert ... that th[e] resolution represents a policy of
the United States, as opposed to a policy of an organization of which
the United States is one of many members." Finding the resolution
inapplicable, the Court thus found through negative implication in
the conventions that the "United States has at least acquiesced in
state taxation of fuel used by foreign carriers in international tra-
vel."3 Indeed, the Court stated that "the facts presented by this case
show that the Federal Government has affirmatively decided to per-
mit the States to impose these sales taxes on aviation fuel."3 6 The
Court continued:
Accordingly, there is no need for us to consider, and nothing in
this opinion should be understood to address, whether, in the ab-
sence of these international agreements, the Foreign Commerce
Clause would invalidate Florida's tax.
... [Nothing in Japan Line's prong two] suggest [s] ... that the
Foreign Commerce Clause insists that the Federal Government
387
speak with any particular voice.
Justice Blackmun argued in dissent that the negative implication
relied upon by the Court was not enough to remove a state tax or
regulation from dormant Commerce Clause scrutiny. Previous cas-
m Id.
Wardair, 477 U.S. at 10.
8 Id.
Id. at 11.
Id.
3 Id. at 12.
36 Id.
3" Wardair, 477 U.S. at 12-13.
' Id. at 18-19 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
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es required that the intent of the federal government to permit state
activity "must be unmistakably clear." 3 89 Thus, Wardair signals a dif-
ference between the dormant interstate Commerce Clause and the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause's additional prongs. In the for-
mer, the approval of the federal government must be unmistakably
clear; by contrast, inferred acquiescence in the latter is enough to
remove a state measure from scrutiny. But this inferred acquiescence
is only relevant once it has been determined that the state measure
satisfies the tests under the dormant interstate Commerce Clause.
Once these tests are satisfied, acquiescence is enough because the
need for uniformity becomes the sole, or key, consideration. The
Court cannot demand uniformity between a state's actions and for-
eign nation's actions where the federal government has considered
the need for uniformity and failed to require it or adopted instru-
ments in which it could have preempted state action and failed to do
so. It is important to emphasize the strength of the negative implica-
tion in Wardair, which involved over seventy conventions-including
one between Canada and the United States-that did not prohibit
the state taxation in spite of an awareness that such taxes were being
imposed.
Justice Blackmun also stated in his dissent that "Florida's actions
may also hamper the United States' position in negotiations designed
to achieve the federal policy of reciprocity because the Nation cannot
speak with 'one voice.' 3 9 0 This argument lacks merit, however, be-
cause the federal government can always speak with "one voice"
through legislation or treaty. Further, maintenance of the state taxes
might create desirable "negotiating leverage" for the U.S. federal
government. Therefore, one might argue that the Court need not
even find implied acquiescence through numerous instances of fed-
eral failure to preempt despite addressing a particular matter (e.g., a
tax on the sale of airline fuel) in treaties in order to uphold a state
law under the "one voice" prong of analysis with a threshold-effects
test.
The next in the line of dormant Foreign Commerce Clause cases
is Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Department of Revenue and Finance,
which involved a statute that discriminated on its face against foreign
commerce.391 Facially discriminatory state measures are virtually per
389 Id.
s. Id. at 20.
3"' 505 U.S. 71, 82 (1992).
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392
se illegal. Finding facial discrimination, the Court did not proceed
to examine the additional prongs from Japan Line. 9 The Court did
note, however, that because the statute discriminated against foreign
commerce it was unnecessary to find that the purpose was to benefit
local corporations.394 In other words, the singling out or discrimina-
tion prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause is not only singling
out or discriminating against out-of-state interests but also singling
out or discriminating against non-U.S. interests.
In the 1993 case, Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston,
the Supreme Court sustained a Tennessee sales tax on the lease of
containers owned by a domestic corporation used in international
315
shipping. The lower court found, and the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed, that the tax at issue satisfied the four-part test for taxes merely
affecting interstate commerce. Interestingly, the Court added that
meeting the four-part test for interstate commerce "has relevance to
our conclusion that the state tax meets those inquiries unique to the
Foreign Commerce Clause" because it confirmed a legitimate state
interest and the absence of an attempt to interfere with foreign
commerce.3 9 7  As to the additional prongs of Foreign Commerce
Clause analysis, the Court found, for several reasons, that the analysis
and holding in Container Corp. controlled.9  First, there was no risk of
multiple-taxation because the tax was upon a discrete transaction
within the state and, in any event, gave a credit against its own tax for
a tax paid in another jurisdiction.39 Additionally, regarding Japan
Line prong two, the Court found that the Tennessee tax did not
create foreign policy problems because the federal government had
acted on numerous occasions on the subject of taxing cargo contain-
ers, and the state tax at issue was not prohibited in any of the pre-
vious international conventions or federal legislation.4@ Finally, the
Court noted that the U.S. amicus brief defended the Tennessee tax.4
1 See id. at 81 ("Absent a compelling justification, however, a State may not ad-
vance its legitimate goals by means that facially discriminate against foreign com-
merce.").
". Id. at 79.
' Id.
"' 507 U.S. 60, 63 (1993).
'9 Id. at 73.
Id. at 73-74.
Id. at 74.
Id.
* Id. at 75.
'0 Itel, 507 U.S. at 75-76.
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Justice Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment, criticized the two considerations the Court relied upon under
prong two of Japan Line.402 As to the implied acquiescence from the
conventions, Justice Scalia stated this was indistinguishable from Ja-
pan Line.403 Indeed, one might argue the Court moved away from im-
posing uniformity requirements on the states, at least where the polit-
ical branches considered imposing uniformity and declined. As to
the government-filed amicus brief, Justice Scalia admitted it distin-
404guished the case from Japan Line. He complained, however, that
reliance on the amicus brief made the constitutionality of the law
turn on the position of the executive branch despite the fact that the
Constitution grants Congress the power to regulate foreign com-
merce. 405 Ultimately, the Court was responsive to Justice Scalia's criti-
cism in the subsequent case, Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax
Board.40
Barclays is the last significant dormant Foreign Commerce Clause
case that the Supreme Court decided. In Barclays, the Court once
again examined the constitutionality of California's unitary taxing
scheme, this time as applied to domestic corporations with foreign
parents and to foreign corporations with either foreign parents or
subsidiaries.407 For a variety of reasons, the Court upheld application
4018
of the California tax as applied to such entities. First, although the
risk of multiple taxation increased, multiple taxation was not an in-
evitable result, and the alternative arms-length method of allocating
income would not eliminate the risk.09 The Court also noted that in-
ternational practice, which was uniform with respect to the arms-
length method of allocation, did not have such force to "dictate" a
dormant Commerce Clause holding.4 0 As in Container Corp., Wardair,
and Itel, the Court only turned to prong two of Japan Line after find-
411
ing the challenged state action was otherwise constitutional. The
Court found that with respect to Japan Line's prong two, "Congress
may more passively indicate that certain state practices do not 'impair
4 Id. at 81 (J. Scalia, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
403 Id.
o0' Id. at 80-81.
405 Id.
4 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
407 Id. at 301.
4 Id. at 303.
401 Id. at 318-20.
410 Id. at 320.
" Id.
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federal uniformity in an area where federal uniformity is essential.'" 12
Stated differently, Congress need not convey its intent "with the un-
mistakable clarity required to permit state regulation that ... falls
,,413
short under [interstate Commerce Clause] inspection. The Court
found by negative inference that Congress had indicated its willing-
414
ness to tolerate state unitary taxation. The Court reached this con-
clusion after noting Congress's failure to preempt state unitary taxa-
tion despite considering such a step in several bills, as well as the
exemption of sub-federal governments from tax treaties requiring the
arms-length method despite congressional awareness that foreign
governments were greatly displeased with state unitary taxation sys-
tems.4 15 The Court refused to consider arguments of likely retalia-
tion, finding these were directed to the wrong forum.1  Indeed, ac-
tual retaliation had already occurred prior to the case reaching the
Court.4' The Court, following Justice Scalia's suggestions in Itel, also
rejected executive branch statements that the taxation interfered with
foreign affairs because Congress was the preeminent speaker in regu-
418lating foreign commerce.
B. The Status ofJapan Line Prong Two and Its Implications for the
Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
What does the rest of this line of dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause cases tell us about Japan Line's prong two, and what are the
implications for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine? To begin, the
Court will only consider prong two of Japan Line after concluding the
419
state law passes the test for interstate commerce. Additionally, a
state law that facially discriminates against foreign commerce will be
virtually per se illegal without ever reaching prong two of Japan Line
as was seen in Kraft.4 As to prong one, multiple taxation is not
412 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 323 (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los An-
geles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979)).
41 Id.
4 Id. at 324-28.
4 Id.
6 Id. at 328.
417 Id. at 337 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (citing a brief for Government of United Kingdom as establishing that "[alt
least one country has already enacted retaliatory legislation").
"0 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329-30.
4 See Kraft Gen. Foods, Inc. v. Iowa Dep't of Revenue & Fin., 505 U.S. 71, 83
(1992).
' Id. at 79.
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enough to violate this prong. 4 The multiple-taxation must be an
"inevitable result. In other words, multiple-taxation must result
from the application of the state tax in all instances. Additionally,
even if multiple-taxation is an inevitable result, it must be the case
424
that the alternatives would not eliminate the risk. Thus, it will be
very rare that a state tax is invalidated under prong one. As to prong
two of Japan Line, it is less clear what remains. If a court is truly look-
ing for purposes under the dormant Commerce Clause, it is looking
for a protectionist or a singling out purpose and it will have made a
finding on this prior to reaching prong two of Japan Line. So what is
the Court actually looking for under prong two? The Court appears
to be examining whether the state action has an effect on U.S. for-
eign relations or foreign policy.m The central effect the Court at-
426
tempts to assess is the risk of retaliation by foreign trading partners.
The Court, however, admits it is not competent to ascertain this
427
risk. It is also clear that the Court is not balancing this risk against a
428
state's interest in a legitimate local purpose. A certain threshold
level of risk or, more generally, effect on U.S. foreign relations is what
421
the Court tried to ascertain in its early cases.
421 Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 438 (1979).
'" Id. at 447.
423 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329-30.
424 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 447-48.
421 See, e.g.,Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 455 (1979) (stat-
ing that "California may not tell this Nation or Japan how to run their foreign poli-
cies"); Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 194 (1983) (con-
cluding that "a state tax at variance with federal policy will violate the 'one voice'
standard if it either implicates foreign policy issues which must be left to the Federal
Government or violates a clear federal directive").
426 Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 450-51.
." See, e.g., Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194.
This Court has little competence in determining precisely when a for-
eign nations will be offended by particular acts, and even less compe-
tence in deciding how to balance a particular risk of retaliation against
the sovereign right of the United States as a whole to let the States tax
as they please.
Id.; see also Itel Containers Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 505 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1993).
But given the strong indications from Congress that Tennessee's me-
thod of taxation is allowable, and with due regard for the fact that the
nuances of foreign policy 'are much more the province of the Execu-
tive Branch and Congress than of the Court,' we find no reason to dis-
agree with the United States' submission.
Id. (quoting Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 196).
428 See id.
' See Wardair Canada, Inc. v. Fla. Dep't of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 9 (1986); Con-
tainer Corp., 463 U.S. at 194; Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 446.
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In these early cases, such as Japan Line and Container Corporation,
the Court purportedly sought to establish objective criteria and rely
upon views of the executive branch to support its conclusions, al-
410
though declaring that such views were not dispositive. Unfortunate-
ly, the court failed at its attempt to establish objective criteria. The
only objective criteria the Court developed was whether the state tax
431
created an automatic asymmetry or inevitable multiple taxation.
This criteria, however, is identical to prong one of Japan Line. The
Court in its latest case, Barclays, also decided that executive branch
views were irrelevant, at least when the congressional posture, based
43
on a strong negative inference, was to the contrary. Thus, in ex-
amining a state measure under the dormant Commerce Clause, the
Court will likely find that the measure has an insignificant effect on
U.S. foreign relations or foreign policy if it finds congressional ac-
quiescence as a result of a failure to preempt after congressional con-
sideration of the state measures. The cases described above, includ-
ing Wardair, Itel, and Barclays, all suggest that it is only where
Congress, while aware of the state measures, has repeatedly focused
its attention on a policy matter and yet, declined to preempt the state
measures, that an inference of approval will be made. In the ab-
sence of implied approval, what will a court do now that it apparently
has eschewed reliance on executive branch views under prong two of
Japan Line? For instance, how would the Court handle a case like Bar-
clays minus the implied acquiescence from the legislation and treaties
that failed to preempt the state laws? The Court could look for evi-
dence of a uniform international practice or custom. But this would
seem to elevate such practice or custom to the state of customary in-
ternational law without proof of opinio juris or a sense of legal obliga-
tion. Moreover, the Court seemed to indicate in Barclays that an in-
ternational practice that is not incorporated into federal legislation
or treaty applying to the states would not dictate a dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause decision, although such uniformity may remain
peripherally important to prong one.43 5 The Court could also look
for evidence of foreign dissatisfaction through diplomatic protests,
amicus briefs, or actual retaliation. It would seem, however, rather
strange that the Court would reject executive branch views deferring
" See Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194; see also supra Part VI.A.
' Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194-95; Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 453.
Compare Container Corp., 463 U.S. at 194-95, withJapan Line, 441 U.S. at 451.
4 Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 329.
" See, e.g., Itel Containers, 507 U.S. at 70-71.
' See Barclays Bank, 512 U.S. at 328-29.
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to Congress's special role in foreign commerce only to place particu-
lar weight in the views and protests of foreign nations. Indeed, the
Court ignored an instance of actual retaliation by the United King-
dom in Barclays.4 Reliance on retaliation measures to determine the
validity of state measures challenged under the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine would have the perverse effect of encouraging foreign
retaliation because foreign nations would know that retaliation could
achieve results in U.S. courts. Additionally, the success of a challenge
would hinge on the timing of a suit. A challenge might fail prior to
foreign retaliation and succeed if filed after some form of foreign re-
taliation occurred.
Ultimately, it appears that the Court is gradually moving towards
giving up the entire exercise of engaging in analysis under prong two
of Japan Line. Lower courts applying Japan Line also seem to simply
431be avoiding an examination of the risk of retaliation. State statutes
seeking to either protect in-state producers from out-of-state produc-
ers or to protect in-state and out-of-state producers from foreign pro-
4381ducers are caught prior to prong two of Japan Line. Instead of ask-
ing whether a state measure prevents the federal government from
speaking with one voice, which can never be the case, or attempting
to assess the effects on U.S. foreign policy, which it can never do
competently and independently, the Court could continue to give
heightened scrutiny to measures affecting foreign commerce by simp-
ly being extra careful in searching for a protectionist, or isolationist,
purpose vis-a-vis foreign states in cases involving foreign commerce.
If courts are not engaging in purpose review but are in fact balancing,
then courts could give extra weight to the effects on foreign com-
merce in balancing those effects against the state's legitimate local
purpose.
What does this understanding of Japan Line prong two tell us
about the dormant foreign affairs doctrine? All of the above leads,
once again, to the conclusion that the threshold-effects test is a tough
task that courts are not particularly competent at undertaking. The
trouble the Supreme Court has encountered in Japan Line prong two
analysis indicates that purpose review is in fact the most appropriate
standard under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. One could ar-
gue, however, that courts could give greater weight to amicus briefs in
dormant foreign affairs doctrine cases because Congress's special role
436 See id. at 312.
. See, e.g., NCR Corp. v. S.C. Tax Comm'n, 402 S.E.2d 666, 667 (S.C. 1991); NCR
Corp. v. Comm'r of Revenue, 438 N.W.2d 86,95 (Minn. 1989).
' SeeJapan Line, Ltd. v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 452 (1979).
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in regulating foreign commerce is not at issue. In the field of foreign
affairs generally, the President and Congress share powers, whereas
in the foreign commerce area Congress has control.439 But if courts
are searching for purpose rather than effects, the executive branch
has no greater, or perhaps lesser, competence in assessing the pur-
pose behind a particular state action, and thus, the courts should not
give any particular weight to executive branch amicus briefs. The
dormant foreign affairs doctrine should only capture those state
measures enacted with a foreign policy purpose. If a state measure
has an effect on foreign relations despite not having a foreign policy
purpose, the federal political branches may always preempt the state
measure.
Could prong two of Japan Line still be saved if the Court turned
to purpose review under that prong? If the Court did so, it would be
looking for one of two purposes: either a protectionist purpose or the
purpose of changing or criticizing the trade, tax, or other policy of a
foreign government. The Court, however, will already have searched
for a protectionist or singling out purpose prior to reaching Japan
Line's prong two, at least if those scholars promoting purpose review
under the dormant Commerce Clause are correct.o If the Court in-
stead searches for whether the purpose of the state law is to change
the trade, tax, or other policy of a foreign government, then Japan
Line prong two becomes repetitive of, or a subset of, the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine. Thus, if the Court readdressed the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine and clarified that purpose review is the ap-
propriate standard under that doctrine, the Court could additionally
dispense with Japan Line prong two-which it appears only to give lip-
service to as time has passed'-and relieve itself of the complications
it has faced in applying it. Accordingly, the market-participant excep-
tion would apply to the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, thus re-
duced to facial discrimination and balancing tests, and not apply to
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, which would subsume the old
prong two ofjapan Line.
* Compare U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2, with U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
440 SeeJapan Line, 441 U.S at 452; see also Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and
State Protectionism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091
(1986) (arguing that the Court should be concerned with "preventing purposeful
protectionism").
"' See supra Part VIA.
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VII. CAN FEDERAL ACTORS (AND IF SO WHICH ONES) AUTHORIZE STATE
ACTIONS THAT WOULD OTHERWISE RUN AFOUL OF THE DORMANT
FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE?
The last distinction to draw between the dormant Commerce
Clause generally, and Japan Line prong two specifically, on the one
hand and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine on the other is wheth-
er federal actors can authorize state actions that otherwise run afoul
of these doctrines. It is well-established that Congress can authorize
actions that would otherwise run afoul of the dormant Commerce
Clause, but the Supreme Court has never addressed whether federal
actors, or which federal actors, can authorize state action that violate
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. The Court has stated that con-
gressional intent to permit state activity that would otherwise run
afoul of the dormant Commerce Clause "must be 'unmistakably
clear. Yet, it appears with prong two of Japan Line that the unmis-
takably clear intent can come from a particularly strong negative in-
ference rather than affirmative authorization. As seen in Wardair,
Itel, and Barclays, with respect to Japan Line's prong two, the courts
have been willing to infer authorization for the state taxes at issue
when the federal government has failed to preempt those state taxes
on numerous occasions despite an awareness of them. In essence,
the Court has refused to declare that uniformity is essential in an area
when the federal government has considered the state actions on
numerous occasions-and not been prevented from doing so be-
cause of a busy legislative calendar, more pressing priorities, and the
like-and declined to preempt. Again, if the state action runs against
the central value sought to be protected by the Commerce Clause
(e.g., protectionism, broadly defined as either protecting purely local
industry or even the broader U.S. industry), it will not be necessary to
examine it under these additional prongs. It is only where state ac-
tions clear this first hurdle that the additional consideration of un-
iformity comes into play.
442 C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 408 (1994) (holding
that "Congress must be 'unmistakably clear' before we will conclude that it intended
to permit state regulation which would otherwise violate the dormant Commerce
Clause") (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984)
(plurality opinion)).
4 See japan Line, 441 U.S. at 452 (explaining how the need for federal uniformity
is no less paramount in ascertaining the negative implications of Congress's power to
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations" under the Commerce Clause).
44 See Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 324-25 (1994); Itel
Container Int'l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 75 (1993); Wairdair Can., Inc. v.
Fla. Dep't of Rev., 477 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).
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It is important to keep in mind that the bar for permission by
negative inference is incredibly high, given that Wardair involved in-
ferences from seventy agreements failing to preempt, and that Bar-
clays involved numerous, specific attempts over a period longer than a
decade in which Congress turned its attention to preemption but ul-
445
timately declined to do so. Should Congress's failure to preempt,
even when it actively considered doing so, be given the same cre-
dence under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine as Japan Line's
prong two? Or should we demand unmistakably clear and explicit
authorization as with the dormant Commerce Clause generally? Ei-
ther way, it is apparent, given Wardair and Barclays, that a simple fail-
ure in one federal sanctions enactment to preempt prior state sanc-
tions legislation against the same country should not be sufficient.
Moreover, several arguments caution against such an approach and
indicate that the Court should require the federal government to be
either explicit in its authorization or at a minimum require an ex-
446tremely high bar for negative implication authorization. If the
Court truly moves to a pure purpose-based test for the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine, then one might argue that explicit authoriza-
tion should be required, thus eliminating any possibility for a high-
bar negative inference authorization. The reason for this is that if ef-
fects are the standard, the federal political branches are in the best
position to assess the effects of a state action on foreign relations, and
if the political branches have turned their attention to possible
preemption of a state law multiple times and rejected doing so, then
the Court might understandably wish to infer authorization in such
instances. If purpose review is the standard, however, a court is in a
better position than the political branches to assess the purpose. In
this instance, the federal political branches' failure to preempt means
little in terms of inferring authorization, since they may very well be
rejecting preemption because they believe the state action to already
be barred due to its illicit purpose. Hence, the Court could, and in-
deed should, require the same unmistakably clear level of authoriza-
tion to permit a state to take action otherwise running afoul of the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine as that which it requires under the
dormant interstate Commerce Clause.
The next question is what federal body should give the states
permission to take actions otherwise running afoul of the dormant
foreign affairs doctrine-Congress, the President or both? The an-
swer to this question depends on whether the state action is intruding
'4 See Barclays, 512 U.S. at 324-27; Wairdair, 477 U.S. at 10-12.
446 See supra Part IVD.
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on a largely presidential area of foreign relations (e.g., power to rec-
ognize foreign governments and new nations), a largely congression-
al area of foreign relations (e.g., foreign commerce), or a shared
area. The Supreme Court has established a framework for analyzing
if a presidential action in foreign affairs is constitutional 7. The
framework was first enunciated by Justice Jackson in a concurring
opinion in the Steel Seizure case and was subsequently adopted by the
entire Court in the Iranian Hostages case.44 Specifically, where the
President acts with the express or implied approval of Congress, his
power is at a maximum, and his action will only be invalidated where
the federal government as a whole lacks the requisite power (e.g., a
Bill of Rights violation). Where the President acts with the express
or implied disapproval of Congress, his power is at its "lowest ebb,"
and his action can only be upheld by disabling the Congress.5 o
Where the President acts in the face of congressional silence or ac-
quiescence, he can only rely on his own constitutional powers, but
congressional inertia can, as a practical matter, invite presidential ac-
451
tion in the area.
The analytical framework in the Jackson concurrence can be
useful for analyzing authorizations or permissions of state actions that
would otherwise violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
Where the President and Congress both authorized the state activity,
the authorization would be considered valid except where it violated
an explicit constitutional prohibition (e.g. an Article I, Section 10
prohibition that does not allow for the possibility of congressional
approval or a Bill of Rights provision) or if the power was an exclusive
but non-delegable power of one of the federal political branches, a
topic discussed shortly below.4 53 The Barclays case makes clear that
congressional authorization is the key in matters core to the Foreign
454Commerce Clause. Thus, if Congress attempted to approve state
actions that would run afoul of the dormant Foreign Commerce
Clause, and the President vetoed the legislation, but Congress over-
"m See generally Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579
(1952).
" Id. at 637-39 (JacksonJ., concurring); Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
668-69 (1981).
4" Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson,J., concurring).
40 Id.
41id.
'5 Cf Sapna Desai, Note, Genocide Funding: The Constitutionality of State Divestment
Statutes, 94 CORNELL L. REv. 669, 701-02 (2009).
4 See Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson,J., concurring).
a Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. at 336.
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rode the veto to pass the law, it would seemingly be unproblematic
that the President did not agree in the authorization. Additionally, if
Congress overcomes a Presidential veto to passes an authorization of
any of the actions specifically listed in Article I, Section 10, Clauses 2
and 3, the authorization would certainly be sufficient to authorize the
state action. In matters touching upon core Presidential powers,
however, such as the recognition of a foreign state or foreign gov-
ernment, or diplomatic approaches or outreach to particular coun-
tries in times of crisis, presidential permission would be necessary.
Moreover, in the vast shared area, approval by both Congress and the
President would be necessary. Thus, in a shared area, even if Con-
gress was able to override a presidential veto, this might well be insuf-
ficient because the President would not have joined in the authoriza-
tion. Indeed, for simplicity's sake, one might wish to eschew utilizing
the Jackson concurrence analysis and create a fixed rule that under
the dormant foreign affairs doctrine authorizations must come from
both the President and the Congress. Perhaps as a middle road, a
presumption could be created in this regard.
State procurement sanctions and divestment requirements seem
to fall most closely in the foreign commerce realm, but because they
target specific nations and seek changes in the non-commerce related
behavior or policies of a foreign nation, they also implicate the Presi-
dent's communication and diplomatic powers with foreign govern-
ments. Thus, state sanctions legislation that would otherwise run
afoul of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine must receive permission
from both the Congress and the President under this framework.
This could happen through congressional legislation authorizing
state procurement sanctions or divestment requirements signed by
the President and perhaps further buttressed by a presidential sign-
ing statement supporting state measures of this kind. In practice,
Congress has only attempted once to explicitly authorize or permit
state divestment requirements targeting a particular foreign country.
A federal district court struck down an Illinois banking and divest-
ment sanctions law targeting the Sudan in 2007. Congress re-
sponded within months by authorizing the state divestment sanctions
456
in a federal act that ratcheted up sanctions against Sudan. The
President signed the bill into law, but in a signing statement, he ques-
' NFTC v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 749 (N.D. Ill. 2007).
' Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-174, 121
Stat. 2516.
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tioned the constitutionality of the congressional authorization. 7
Should the authorization be considered as coming from both
branches since the President signed the legislation? Or should the
President's signing statement objecting to the authorization be given
weight? Recently, many have debated whether and what level of
weight can be given to presidential signing statements in determining
458
the scope of legislation. But Presidents have long declared a power
459
to refuse to enforce unconstitutional elements of legislation. If we
believe presidential as well as congressional authorization is needed
for the state action, then the signing statement should be accorded
weight under this rationale but not under the rationale that the Pres-
ident can limit the scope of the legislation or the interpretation of
460
the legislation.
As a prudential matter, it is also advisable to allow the federal
government to authorize state actions, such as sanctions legislation,
that would otherwise violate the dormant foreign affairs doctrine and
the dormant Commerce Clause because the federal government's
sanctions regime will potentially have a greater impact if it involves
state procurement markets and divestment requirements which will
give the federal government more bargaining leverage. Often sanc-
tions are ineffective unless enforced on a multilateral basis.4 Multi-
leveled sanctions within the United States can make up for some of
the unwillingness of foreign nations to join sanctions regimes, partic-
ularly when one realizes the market size and power of many U.S.
states in comparison to many foreign nations.
4 Statement on Signing the Sudan Accountability and Divestment Act of 2007,
43 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1645 (Dec. 31, 2007).
' See, e.g., Ronald A. Cass & Peter L. Strauss, Symposium, The Last Word? The Con-
stitutional Implications of Presidential Signing Statements: The Presidential Signing State-
ments Controversy, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 11 (2007) (arguing that the concerns
over the use of presidential signing statements is exaggerated).
' See, e.g., Memorandum from Walter Dellinger on Presidential Authority to De-
cline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes to the Honorable Abner Mikva, Counsel
to the President (November 2, 1994), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/olc/
nonexcut.htm.
. See Marc N. Gurber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as Interpre-
tation of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON LEGIS.
363, 378-81 (1987); A.B.A., TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND
SEPARATION OF PowERs DOCTRINE RECOMMENDATION (2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba-final-signing-statements-recom
mendation-report_7-24-06.pdf.
' See, e.g., Jeffrey A. Meyer, Second Thoughts on Secondary Sanctions, 30 U. PA. J.
INT'L L. 905, 917-18 (2009); Sean D. Murphy, International Law, the United States, and
the Non-Military 'War'Against Terrorism, 14 EUROPEANJ. INT'L L. 347, 349 (2003).
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The above discussion leads to the conclusion that certain foreign
affairs powers are not only exclusive but sometimes delegable in the
sense that the federal government can authorize the states to engage
in them. Other foreign affairs powers should be considered exclusive
but non-delegable, such as the Commander-in-Chief power, although
it is highly unlikely that federal actors would seek to delegate these
powers in any event.
VIII. SUPREME COURT OPINIONS THIS CENTURY:
CROSBY, GARAMENDI, THEIR PROGENY, AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF
RELYING ON PREEMPTION
The above analysis indicates that limits on state-level foreign pol-
462icy are justified as a policy matter, that the existence of a dormant
foreign affairs doctrine is fully justified under a multi-modal interpre-
tation of the U.S. Constitution,463 that a purpose-based test under the
doctrine would better suit the capacity of courts and state-level offi-
464
cials, that no market participant exception should be available un-
der the dormant foreign affairs doctrine,4 6 5 that the dormant Foreign
Commerce Clause's additional "one voice" prong should be sub-
sumed within the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, and that the
federal government can in many instances authorize state actions
467
otherwise violating the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. If state-
level foreign policy is not wise as a matter of policy, however, the
question remains as to whether a dormant foreign affairs doctrine is
necessary as a practical matter because the federal government always
has a readily available constraint through the enactment of preemp-
tive federal legislation or executive branch regulation (perhaps in
part relying on congressional delegation) if a state-level foreign policy
468is judged to be unwise from the national perspective. The Supreme
Court has seemingly shown a preference in its two state foreign affairs
related cases this past decade, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Counci66
and American Insurance Assoc. v. Garamendi,47o to rely on preemption
4.2 See supra Part II.A.
' See supra Part III.A-C.
4 See supra Part IV.D-E.
4" See supra Part V.
' See supra Part VI.A.
4 See supra Part VII.
46. See Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1682-88.
4 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
470 539 U.S. 396 (2003).
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rather than the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. But it should be
noted that the Court approvingly cited to Zschernig in its Garamendi
opinion.7 The Court's choice of preemption has had negative im-
plications for restricting state-level foreign policies. Moreover, the
Court's choice to rely on preemption grounds to the exclusion of
dormant foreign affairs grounds is not required by the court-created
rules of judicial restraint, the rules imploring the Court to determine
cases on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds,
since the preemption doctrine resolves a constitutional question.
Further exacerbating the situation, the Court's analysis in Crosby and
Garamendi has unnecessarily confused preemption analysis with dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine analysis. Lower courts applying Crosby
and Garamendi reflect some of this confusion, but fortunately, in large
part, these courts do not read the opinions as undermining or elimi-
nating the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. Nevertheless, Supreme
Court clarification would certainly assist state officials in conscien-
tiously applying the doctrine to proposed actions in advance of litiga-
tion.
A. Preemption Overview
The Supreme Court has established the doctrine of preemption
based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which makes
federal law the "supreme Law of the Land." 7  In preemption analysis,
the intent or purpose of Congress is the "ultimate touchstone."475
Preemption analysis can be divided into three sub-types: express, con-
flict, and implied.476 The first type, express preemption, occurs if
Congress expressly declares that it intends to wholly occupy the field
(i.e., leave no room in the field for the state to operate) . Conflict
preemption occurs where state law conflicts with federal law, either
because it is impossible to comply with both ("direct conflict preemp-
tion") or the state law is an obstacle to achieving the full purposes
and objectives of the federal policy ("obstacles conflict preemp-
47 See infra notes 583-93 and accompanying text.
4 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 398.
. See infra notes 583-93 and accompanying text.
4 U.S. CONsT., art. VI, cl. 2.
4 Retail Clerk Int'l Ass'n v. Schermehorn, 375 U.S. 96, 103 (1963).
47I 1 have borrowed the preemption terminology in this paragraph from Eugene
D. Cross, Preemption of Member States Law in the European Economic Community: A Frame-
work for Analysis, 29 COMMoN MARKET L. REv. 447 (1992). The U.S. Supreme Court
uses identical or similar terminology. See, e.g., cases cited infra notes 477-482.
4 See, e.g., Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85. 95-100 (1983).
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tion") . The last type, implied or field preemption, occurs where
the federal occupation of the field is so thorough and extensive that
Congress's intent to wholly occupy the field can be inferred ("occu-
pation of the field preemption").4 The Court, until recently, gener-
ally applied two additional, and potentially competing, factors in its
analysis: first, preemption can also be implied where the federal in-
terest in the field is clearly dominant or superior ("dominant interest
preemption"),'8 and second, the Court is generally reluctant to infer
preemption, particularly in fields that the states have traditionally oc-
cupied.4 Thus, the Court insists that Congress's intent to preempt
must be "clear and manifest." 4 2 Crosby and Garamendi left murky the
strength of these potentially conflicting presumptions in foreign af-
fairs related cases.
B. Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council
Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Councilinvolved a challenge to a
Massachusetts law that imposed a negative ten percent preference
against companies active in Burma.8 In other words, companies that
found themselves on the restricted list of companies trading with or
investing in Burma had ten percent added to their bids for state con-
tracts prior to the state determining the lowest bidder. The Massa-
chusetts law was passed three months before a comprehensive federal
sanctions law.8 The federal law imposed several sanctions against
Burma.4 The federal law eliminated certain bilateral assistance, re-
quired the U.S. Treasury Secretary to instruct the U.S. Executive Di-
rector of each international financial institution to vote against loans
to Burma, and denied entry visas to the U.S. for Burmese government
officials except as required by treaty obligations or to staff the Bur-
mese mission, until the President certified to Congress that Burma is
making measurable and substantial progress in improving human
"8 See, e.g., Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 141-43
(1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
" See, e.g., Fidelity Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. De is Cuesta, 485 U.S. 141, 153
(1982).
4 See, e.g., North Dakota v. United States, 460 U.S. 300, 309 (1983); Hines v. Da-
vidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941).
48' See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
482 Id.; see, e.g., Metro. Life Ins., Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985).
483 Crosby v. Nat'l. Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 366-88 (2000).
484 id.
415 Omnibus Appropriations Act of 1997, Pub. L No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, § 570
(1996) (also called the Cohen-Feinstein Amendment (Burma)).
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rights practice and implementing democratic reforms. The bill also
required the President to prohibit U.S. persons from making new in-
vestments in Burma "if the President determines and certifies to
Congress, that after the date of the enactment of this act, the Gov-
ernment of Burma has physically harmed, rearrested for political acts,
or exiled Daw Aung Suu Kyi [the head of the pro-democracy move-
ment] or has committed large-scale repression of or violence against
the Democratic opposition.",48 7 President Clinton issued an Executive
Order on May 20, 1997 making such findings and prohibiting new in-
vestments in Burma.488 The statute also granted broad waiver authori-
ty to the President to waive sanctions if he found it in the national in-
terest, and also directed the President to develop a comprehensive
multilateral strategy with other nations to address the human rights
problems within Burma.
The Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion, struck the Massa-
chusetts law down under obstacles conflict preemption finding the
state law an obstacle to achieving the full purposes of the federal act
in three ways.490 First, the state law changed the careful calibration of
4911
sanctions chosen by the federal government. Second, it interfered
with the presidential flexibility desired by Congress in granting broad
492
waiver authority to the President. The President might elect to les-
sen sanctions at the same time states were ramping up sanctions.
Third, it interfered with the direction to the President to establish a
comprehensive multilateral strategy because trading partners pre-
ferred to talk about the state law than conditions in Burma.493 The
Court pointed to a WTO dispute settlement case lodged against the
United States by the European Union and Japan concerning the Mas-
sachusetts law as well as diplomatic protests lodged by these govern-
ments as proof that developing such a strategy was made more diffi-
494
cult by the state law. Importantly, the Court expressly declined to
rule on the additional grounds of the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine and the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause, which the First
486 Id.
48 Id.
48 Exec. Order No. 13047, 62 Fed. Reg. 28,299 (May 21, 1997) (Executive Order
Prohibiting New Investment in Burma).
' Pub. L No. 104-208, § 570(c).
'o Crosbyv. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373-74 (2000).
4 Id. at 380.
1 Id. at 376.
. Id. at 390.
' Id. at 382.
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Circuit had relied upon.49 The Court also stated that they found it
496
unnecessary to rule on the field preemption claim. In refusing to
rule on these additional grounds, the Court relied on the principle,
497
expressed in Ashwander v. TVA, that the Court should decide a case
based on statutory interpretation rather than constitutional grounds
498if it had the option. As analyzed more fully in Part X of this Article,
however, the application of this principle to validate applying the
preemption doctrine rather than the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine can be criticized because the preemption doctrine is also a con-
stitutional doctrine based on the Supremacy Clause.
The Court's choice of preemption grounds had two negative
consequences. First, the opinion's failure to rely upon or approvingly
cite Zschernig lead some to conclude that maybe the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine was on insecure ground.soo Second, because the
Court relied on the narrowest grounds possible, some state officials
read the opinion as only preventing Burma sanctions or, at most,
preempting state sanctions where a specific federal law targeted the
same foreign country as the state law.50o Academics have criticized
reading the opinion in such narrow fashion:'o2 Additionally, the one
case decided by lower courts in the post-Crosby and pre-Garamendi
timeframe-not involving matters eventually resolved in Garamendi-
did in fact indicate that Zschernig was alive and well.5 03
C. American Insurance Association v. Garamendi
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi involved a challenge
by the American Life Insurance Association against the California
Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act (HVIRA) that required any in-
surer doing business in the state to disclose information about all pol-
" Id. at 374.
496 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 373-74.
1 297 U.S. 288, 341 (1936).
98 Crosby, 530 U.S. at 374.
* See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1266-68 (arguing that "the general ap-
proaches the Court employs to resolve preemption issues are more properly re-
garded as interpretations of the Supremacy Clause than as statutory interpretation");
see also infra Part X.
50 See supra Part IV.C.
"' See Brannon P. Denning & Jack H. McCall, Crosby v. National Foreign Trade
Council, 94 AM.J. INT'L L. 750, 754 (2000).
5 See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1323 ("Indeed, it is only a slight exaggeration to
say that Crosby is a dormant foreign affairs case in disguise."); see also Golove, supra
note 38, at 156.
"' See Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 710 (9th Cir. 2003).
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icies sold in Europe between 1920 and 1945.0 The HVIRA allegedly
conflicted with the German Foundation Agreement entered into be-
tween the United States and German governments under which
Germany agreed to establish a 10 billion dollar fund administered by
the Foundation to compensate all those who suffered at the hands of
German companies during the Nazi era.'as The Foundation agreed to
work with the International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance
Claims (ICHEIC) to determine outstanding insurance claims."' In its
agreement with Germany, and similar ones entered into with Austria
and France, the United States promised to urge its courts and state
and local governments to respect the foundations as the exclusive
507
means for resolving WWII-era claims against private companies.
The Supreme Court had previously ruled in the 1940's that presiden-
tial executive agreements could preempt state law if valid just as trea-
ties could. Defenders of the California law argued that the German
Foundation agreement was distinguishable from prior agreements
because it attempted to settle claims against private foreign compa-
508
nies rather than foreign governments The Court declared the dif-
509ference immaterial and held the agreement valid.
The Court, however, seemed troubled by the fact that the Ger-
man Foundation Agreement contained no express preemption
clause.1 o While this conclusion is contentious, given language in the
agreement that the executive branch considered the agreement to be
the "exclusive forum" for resolving Holocaust-era claims, both the pe-
titioners and the U.S. amicus brief acknowledged no express preemp-
tion. 5" Regardless, the Court did not immediately apply other strands
of preemption analysis (i.e., field and conflict preemption) or cite to
familiar cases in those areas. Interestingly, the Court also did not
consider whether the executive agreement was self-executing, al-
though it is clear from the Court's jurisprudence that only self-
executing provisions of treaties preempt state law because non-self-
512
executing provisions are not a part of the domestic legal system.
Instead, the Court said that the petitioners left "their claim of
a Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 401 (2003).
a Id. at 405.
so' Id.
5 Id.
Id. at 415-16.
Id. at 416-1 7 .
"0 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 416-17.
" See id. at 417, 422.
5 Id. at 413 n.7.
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preemption to rest on asserted interference with the foreign policy those
agreements embody. Reliance is placed on our decision in Zschernig."'1
While the Court acknowledged that both the majority opinion and
Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Zschernig spoke in terms of
federal exclusivity in foreign relations, and thus relied on the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine, the Court also gave considerable atten-
tion to Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Zschernig, which ex-
pressed concern with finding state regulation preempted in
514
traditional areas that had some modest impact on foreign relations.
Of course, Zschernig's dominant threshold-effects test cured Justice
Harlan's most significant concern, that field preemption or the dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine threatened state actions in traditional
areas that somehow had an incidental impact on foreign relations.
The Court then stated, "it is a fair question whether respect for the
executive foreign relations power require a categorical choice be-
tween contrasting theories of field and conflict preemption evident in
the Zschernig opinions. At this point, however, the Court seems to
have reduced Zschernig to a field preemption case, which is not the
truest, or, at a minimum, not the fairest way to read Justice Douglas'
opinion.5 1 ' Returning to Justice Harlan's concurrence, the Court
stated that "it would be reasonable to consider the strength of the
state interest, judged by standards of traditional practice, when decid-
ing how serious a conflict must be shown before declaring the state
law preempted."1 8 In short, the Court seems to have applied a pre-
sumption against preemption in areas of traditional legislation, thus
requiring a stronger showing of conflict in such cases.1 Moreover,
the Court mischaracterizes ischernig as a field preemption case, and
turns its threshold-effects test into a balancing test that balances the
strength of the state interest with the degree of conflict with federal
policy.5 20 On the other hand, the Court cited approvingly to Zschernig
5' Id. at 417 (emphasis added). Additionally, as Professors Denning and Ramsey
point out, the Executive Agreement did not cover certain countries whose insurers
might be harmed by the Act anyway. See Brannon P. Denning & Michael D. Ramsey,
American Insurance Association v. Garamendi and Executive Preemption in Foreign Af-
fairs, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 825, 908 (2004).
1 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 418-19.
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 457-58 (1968).
516 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419.
" Id. at 420.
1 Id.
51 Id.
' See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 925-26 ("We begin by describing, as
best we can, the new test articulated by the majority. It apparently balances the
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and, in footnote eleven of its opinion, the Court acknowledged-in
contrast to the analysis in its opinion-the presence of a dormant
foreign affairs doctrine, even though the Court mislabeled it field
preemption:
If a State were simply to take a position on a matter of foreign pol-
icy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state re-
sponsibility, field preemption might be the appropriate doctrine,
whether the National Government had acted and, if it had, with-
out reference to the degree of any conflict, the principle having
been established that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy ex-
5211
clusively to the National Government.
Ultimately, after mixing the two doctrines, the majority chose to
rely on conflict preemption, specifically obstacles conflict preemp-
tion, citing approvingly to Crosby. The Court even relied on several
factors from Crosby to find obstacles conflict. 2 3 Specifically, the Court
found that the California law was changing the calibration of sanc-
tions decided upon by the federal government, namely the U.S. Pres-
ident.m The Court was untroubled that, unlike in Crosby, the Presi-
dent acted without Congressional authority because the President
"possesses considerable independent constitutional authority to act
on behalf of the United States on international issues .. . and conflict
with the exercise of that authority is a comparably good reason to
find preemption of the state law." 2 5
Justice Ginsberg's dissent stated the following about Zschernig
We have not relied on Zschernig since it was decided and I would
not resurrect that decision here. The notion of "dormant foreign
affairs preemption" with which Zschernig is associated resonates
most audibly when a state action "reflects a state policy critical of
foreign governments and involves 'sitting in judgment' on
them." . . . The HVIRA entails no such state action or policy. It
takes no position on any contemporary foreign government and
requires no assessment of any existing foreign regime. It is di-
rected solely at private insurers doing business in California and it
requires them solely to disclose information in their or their affil-
strength of the state's interest against the degree of conflict with federal policy. Nei-
ther prong of the new test is adequately explained or easy to apply. .. ").
52 See Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 420, n.11.
5 Id. at 414.
523 Id. at 424.
524 Id. at 423.
5' Id. at 424 n.14.
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iates possession or control. I would not extend Zschemig into this
526dissimilar domain.
Thus, even the four justices subscribing to the dissent recognized the
continuing viability of Zschemig, though they did not believe it would
invalidate the HVIRA.5 The conclusion that the HVIRA does not
run afoul of Zschernig, when properly understood as a dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine case, is questionable. Although directly target-
ing private insurance companies, the disclosure law could be read as
seeking to criticize or change the behavior of the German govern-
ment and other European governments regarding their failure to
adequately compensate insurance beneficiaries or the failure of those
governments to require compensation be given by the private insur-
ers or both. Although the dissent refers to "dormant foreign affairs
preemption," and, thus, unnecessarily mixes the labels of the two
doctrines, the dissent appears to more accurately characterize Zscher-
nig as a dormant foreign affairs doctrine case rather than a field
528preemption case. The dissent's treatment of Zschemig also seems to
support a purpose-based standard under the doctrine, because it fo-
cuses on criticism of foreign governments and sitting in judgment of
529
them, rather than the threshold-effects test.
As to the obstacles conflict claim, which the majority ultimately
appears to rely upon, the dissent states that executive agreements
must expressly preempt state law. 3 0 It is not clear why other strands
of preemption would not be applicable to executive agreements if
they are valid. The dissent notes that some executive agreements in-
volved in prior decisions of the Court expressly preempted state law,
but the dissent does not show that all prior executive agreements did
so. The dissent also states that if HVIRA-type laws were a threat to
the operation of the mechanism created in the Executive Agree-
ments, then "one might expect to find some reference to laws like the
HVIRA in the later-in-time executive agreements."5 3 2 The same ar-
gument could be made, however, about any legislation enacted sub-
sequent to state sanctions legislation. Of course, the Court has never
required express preemption in cases in which the federal act occurs
subsequent to the state act. Moreover, an international agreement is
526 Id. at 439-40 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
527 Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439-40 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
521 Id. at 439-40.
529 Id.
5 Id. at 443-44.
Id. at 440.
5 Id. at 441.
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less likely to address domestic matters, such as preemption, than leg-
islation. The court dependably applies all strands of preemption
analysis to federal legislation, regardless of the timing, and Crosby is
533but one example of this. It is not clear why valid executive agree-
ments should be subject to a different analysis, assuming they are self-
executing and thus part of the U.S. domestic legal system.
Thus, Garamendi further muddled the situation. As the following
analysis of lower court cases indicates, the majority and dissenting
opinions in Garamendi are generally read by lower courts as confirm-
ing the continued vitality of Zschernig-perhaps even giving some ad-
ditional support for purpose review under Zschernig534 Yet, in light of
the majority's seeming mischaracterization of the Zschernig case as a
field preemption case, its positive comments towards Justice Harlan's
concurrence in Zschernig, and its ultimate reliance on obstacles con-
535flict preemption, the Court in Garamendi once again did not pro-
vide the degree of clarity desired by state and local actors and lower
courts. A few lower courts have suffered from this confusion.'3" In-
deed, we might summarize the pros and cons for Zschernig and the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine found in the Garamendi opinion as
follows:
Favorable Elements for Dormant Unfavorable Elements for the
Foreign Affairs Doctrine (DFAD) and Dormant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
Zschernig (DFAD) and Zschernig
The majority cites to Zschernig and The majority seems to characterize
placed emphasis on it early in its opi- Zschernigas field preemption case.5"
mion."
Footnote 11 of the opinion recognizes The majority cited approvingly tojus-
DFAD at least in concept, if not by la- tice Harlan's concurrence from
bel." Zschernig.s4 o
5 See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 372-74 (2000).
' Lower courts have generally read the case in this manner. See Hartford Enters.
v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 2d 95, 102-03 (D. Me. 2008) (applying both Garamendi and
Zschernig to review the Maine Workers' Compensation Act's effect on Canadian em-
ployees); Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 741 (N.D.
Ill. 2007) (applying Garamendi and Zschernig, along with explicit purpose-review, to
review the Illinois Sudan Act).
" See Curtis A. Bradley, The Federal judicial Power and the International Legal Order,
2006 Sup. CT. REv. 59, 79 (2006) (indicating that by choosing obstacles conflict, the
Court has "gone out of its way not to endorse Zschernig").
5 See, e.g., Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1188
(C.D. Cal. 2005).
. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 417-18.
* See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 877.
5' Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 n.11.
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Favorable Elements for Dormant For-
eign Affairs Doctrine (DFAD) and
Zschernig
The policy reflected in the executive
agreement was interfered with, not
the executive agreement itself, and
since the Court does not examine if
the executive agreement is self-
executing, our normal understanding
of preemption, requiring an affirma-
tive federal act with legal effect in the
U.S. domestic legal system, is not
541present.
[Vol. 41:201
Unfavorable Elements for the Dor-
mant Foreign Affairs Doctrine
(DFAD) and Zschernig
The majority ultimately seems to say
executive branch policy, as long as it
is consistent, can preempt state laws
even without an affirmative federal
act. The majority arguably creates a
new type of preemption or expands
what we normally consider necessary
for preemption to occur (i.e., an af-
firmative federal act with legal ef-
fect)."
Four justices in dissent seem to believe
that the majority relied on Zschernig
and that the doctrine exists, but that it
just should not be applied to these
facts .
5o Id. at 418-19.
5 See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Beyond Formalism in Foreign Affairs: A Functional Ap-
proach to the Alien Tort Statute, 2004 SUPREME CT. REv. 153, 208-09
The Garamendi Court did not reject Zschernig. On the other hand, it al-
so did not extend Zschernig 's endorsement of an independent federal
court power to supervise foreign relations....
Thus, the Garamendi Court neatly sidestepped the main criticism of
Zschernig, which attacked Zschernig's empowerment of federal courts to
preempt independently state laws in the complete absence of any input
from (or indeed in opposition to) the wishes of the President or Con-
gress. By relying on executive "statements" of national policy, the Ga-
ramendi Court avoided the problem of unchecked federal courts by
empowering the executive branch to settle future disputes over state
interference with foreign affairs by issuing statements of national poli-
cy.
Id.
* See Denning & Ramsey, supra note 513, at 830, 901-02
The Garamendi decision gives the President the power to decide which
state laws affecting foreign affairs survive and which do not. This ex-
ecutive preemption concentrates foreign affairs power in the President
in a way not countenanced by the Constitution's text nor contemplated
by its Framers, who emphasized the importance of separating executive
power from legislative power. Previously, if the executive branch
wished to pursue a foreign policy with which a state law interfered, the
President usually had to seek the support of Congress (or the Senate
via a treaty) to override the competing state law through Article VI of
the Constitution. This procedure assured that state laws would not
stand as obstacles to federal foreign policy, as they had under the Ar-
ticles of Confederation.
Id.; see also Todd Steigman, Lowering the Bar: Invalidation of State Laws Affecting Foreign
Affairs Under the Dormant Foreign Affairs Power After American Insurance Association v.
Garamendi, 19 CONN.J. INT'L L. 465, 477-79 (2004).
m Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 439-40 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
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Perhaps this merging or muddling of the two doctrines was in-
evitable. Scholars have increasingly expressed concerns as to the
"muddling" occurring in preemption cases generally.544 In Crosby, the
Court explicitly stated that the line between field and conflict
preemption was not a rigid one."4 The Court's threshold-effects test
under Zschernig, asking if there is more than some incidental or indi-
rect effect on U.S. foreign policy-perhaps even as only expressed in
an executive branch amicus brief-starts melding into a preemption
analysis by asking how substantial a conflict there is between the state
law and a U.S. policy, one that does not, according to Garamendi,
necessarily have to come in the form of a federal act with legal bind-
ing effect. For this reason, we have seen a lower court ruling post-
Crosby and post-Garamendi referring to "incidental effect in conflict"
546in its preemption analysis. This reference was apparently borrowed
from both Zschernig and Garamendi.4  If the Court had more clearly
adopted a purpose-based test for the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
in Zschernig, the muddling between it and preemption analysis would
likely never have occurred.
48
Finally, the Supreme Court's 2008 opinion in Medellin v. Texasm
may suggest that the Court is backtracking from the proposition that
preemption can occur through executive branch policy statements
alone.4 In Medellin, the Court found that the International Court of
Justice's judgment, requiring review and reconsideration of sentences
5 See Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REv. 225, 232 (2000).
1 Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 373, n.6 (2000).
We recognize, of course, that the categories of preemption are not "ri-
gidly distinct." Because a variety of state laws and regulations may con-
flict with a federal statute, whether because a private party cannot
comply with both sets of provisions or because the objectives of the
federal statute are frustrated, field pre-emption may be understood as a
species of conflict pre-emption.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
.46 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1188 (C.D. Cal.
2005).
54 Id. at 1185-87.
5 Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 532 (2008) ("The Executive's narrow and
strictly limited authority to settle international disputes pursuant to an executive
agreement cannot stretch so far as to support the current Presidential Memoran-
dum.").
5 See, e.g., RobertJ. Reinstein, The Limits of Executive Power, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 259,
333-34 (2009); Jeremy K. Schrag, A Federal Framework for Regulating the Growing Inter-
national Presence of the Several States, 48 WASHBURN L.J. 425, 452-57 (2009). Professor
Van Alstine argued that Garamendi should not be read in a manner that allows Ex-
ecutive Branch preemption through mere policy statements prior to the Supreme
Court issuing the Medellin opinion. See, e.g., Michael P. Van Alstine, Executive Aggran-
dizement in Foreign Affairs Lawmaking, 54 UCLA L. REv. 309, 350 (2006).
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and convictions by judicial bodies of foreign nationals not notified of
their rights to meet with a consular official at time of arrest, was not
self-executing and thus did not bind Texas state courts.5 5'0 The Court
in Medellin also found that the President's memorandum, which at-
tempted to implement the ruling into domestic law, and thus
preempt state procedural default doctrines, was invalid.
Medellin is welcome in that it helps recreate a solid distinction
between the dormant foreign affairs and preemption doctrines. Un-
der Medellin, the preemption doctrine would be based on legally
binding federal acts having effect in the U.S. domestic legal system,
and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, with the proper purpose-
based test, would not require courts to pay heed to policy suggestions
that do not have legal effect domestically. As discussed earlier, a
dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test not only
avoids the potential muddling of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine
with the preemption doctrine, but it also respects the non-self-
executing nature of certain international obligations that a threshold-
552
effects test potentially would not.
D. The Supreme Court's (Apparent) Reliance on Preemption Comes
with Many Drawbacks
The Court's apparent preference to rely on preemption rather
than the dormant foreign affairs doctrine has many downsides. First,
there are significant practical problems with relying exclusively on
the federal government's ability to preempt unconstructive state-level
foreign policy measures. The federal government may be overbur-
dened in serving this policing function. The legislative calendar is of-
ten too busy to allow Congress to actively police state-level foreign
policy. Therefore, a failure to preempt should not necessarily be
read as implied approval. At most, one could claim that the state
measure is not as important or as damaging to the national interests
as other legislative issues being addressed. Scholars have argued that
the executive branch is quite able to police state-level foreign policy
activities, and this should distinguish the policing problem that justi-
fies the dormant Commerce Clause. It is clear that the executive
branch has greater time and resources to police state measures than
Congress and that the President maintains greater constitutional
so Medellin, 552 U.S. at 531.
5' See id. at 532; see also Reinstein, supra note 549, at 333-34; Schrag, supra note
549, at 452-57; Van Alstine, supra note 549, at 350.
551 See discussion infra Part IV.D.1.
5 Goldsmith, supra note 12, at 1684.
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power over foreign affairs generally than interstate or foreign com-
merce. But Congress could delegate to the President the power to
preempt state laws that interfere with interstate and foreign com-
merce to eliminate any policing problem under the dormant Com-
merce Clause. Yet, the dormant Commerce Clause still persists.
Moreover, it is not clear that the President's foreign affairs powers,
combined with existing statutory delegations of power from Con-
gress, are sufficient authority for the President to preempt by execu-
tive order any and all state-level foreign policy activity. Thus, fur-
ther congressional legislation or delegations of power may be
necessary in particular instances. Lastly, even if the President can po-
lice any and all foreign policy actions of the states, politics, particular-
ly in the current environment, may prevent him from doing so. The
Constitution may not have left the "resolution of so fundamental a
constitutional issue" to "the shifting winds" within the executive
branch."'
Second, congressional intent, the crux or the "ultimate touch-
557
stone" of any preemption analysis, is not always so clear. For exam-
ple, in the case of Baltimore's divestment requirements targeting
businesses active in South Africa in the 1980s, Congress sent conflict-
ing signals on its intention regarding preemption. On the one hand,
the House of Representatives passed a resolution at the same time it
passed the law stating it had no intent to preempt state anti-apartheid
measures.5 5 8 Of course, the resolution did not have the force of law.
On the other hand, the so-called D'Amato Amendment, which was
incorporated into the statute, stated that the federal government
would not penalize a state by, for example, withdrawing federal funds
utilized in certain projects as a result of application of state anti-
apartheid procurement laws for ninety days after the entry into force
of the federal statute.5 59 The Maryland Court of Appeals, in examin-
ing the Baltimore ordinance, concluded that the provision would be
superfluous if state and local anti-apartheid procurement laws were
already preempted by the Act. The court agreed with a memoran-
a See discussion of Justice Jackson concurrence in Steel Seizure, supra, notes 448-
51.
555 Medellin, 552 U.S. at 530.
5 Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 443 (1968) (Stewartj., concurring).
- Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 516 (1992).
a Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.' Ret. Sys. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 562 A.2d 720, 743
(Md. 1989).
5 Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-440, § 5116 (1986).
5 Bd. of Trs. of the Emps.'Ret. Sys., 562 A.2d at 742.
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dum prepared by Professor Tribe that the D'Amato Amendment
"leaves the negative implication that investment decisions are not
preempted nor are disbursements not using federal funds.""' Yet the
amendment could be interpreted as providing an exception to the
preemption that would otherwise occur. Other parts of the legislative
history also lead to potentially conflicting views on the intent of Con-
gress with respect to preemption. For instance, an amendment that
would have expressly preempted states was withdrawn. Its suppor-
ters argued that the federal law would already preempt state law and
thus there was no need to go forward with the amendments. Other
Senators believed that the express preemption amendment was with-
564drawn due to its poor prospects for passage. In sum, it may be less
intellectually honest to find preemption of state laws in situations in
which there are such widely conflicting views of congressional intent.
Third, to the extent Garamendi suggests balancing, the degree of
the state law's conflict with the federal act or policy against the state's
interest, it encourages the very type of analysis state officials would
find difficult to engage in independently and dispassionately. State
actors are likely to underestimate the degree of conflict with federal
law and are also likely to overestimate the strength of their interest in
the matter.
Fourth, while it is true that a broad notion of field preemption
may be effective at curbing disruptive state foreign policy actions,
even such an approach has significant downsides. Courts could claim
that the federal government has occupied the entire field of foreign
policy or of foreign policy sanctions by citing to all the presidential
and congressional acts in the area, including broad delegations by
Congress to the President to sanction foreign governments in frame-
work statutes, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers
Act.565 But this may have adverse consequences for preemption analy-
sis generally. Courts are reticent to define fields so broadly in field
preemption cases. Purpose review under the dormant foreign af-
fairs doctrine will be more capable of providing guidance to state and
local officials and lower courts.
"' Id.
56 Id. at 741.
Id. at 742 n.44.
" Id. at 741.
s See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1292 (discussing a similar argument based on ob-
stacles conflict); see also Golove, supra note 38, at 153.
* See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 544, at 227; Cristina M. Rodriguez, The Significance
of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REv. 567, 623 (2008).
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Fifth, if state and local officials continue to read Supreme Court
opinions narrowly, as only preempting state laws when there is a spe-
cific federal law targeting the same country, and if they continue to
enact sanctions legislation, the federal government may be tempted
to expressly preempt. Yet attempting to preempt state action
567through express clauses has its dangers. In short, the inclusion of
an express clause can imply that matters beyond the express state-
ment are not preempted, although implied preemption is still possi-
ble even with an express clause.5 Thus, there is a significant risk that
Congress will mistakenly draft an under-inclusive express preemption
clause. Additionally, there is some indication that court interpreta-
565
tions of express clauses lead to unpredictable results.
E. Litigation in the Lower Federal and State Courts in the Post-Crosby
and Post-Garamendi Era
Since state sanctions legislation is the most prominent and prob-
lematic form of state and local foreign policy, it is appropriate to be-
gin an analysis of the impact of Crosby and Garamendi in lower court
litigation by focusing on that form of state and local foreign policy.
The third major wave of state and local sanctions legislation, this time
targeting Sudan, followed on the heels of Crosby and Garamendi and
numerous federal acts sanctioning Sudan.5 7 0 Thus, it appears that
numerous state and local governments read those opinions quite nar-
rowly, suggesting that the Supreme Court's choice to rely on preemp-
tion grounds did not curb the state and local appetite for targeting
countries other than Burma. Additionally, states shifted to divest-
ment and banking measures since Crosby only dealt with a procure-
ment measure.5 Part of this shift and reading of Crosby may have
been created by the executive branch's amicus brief in Crosby indicat-
567 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 530-31 (1992) (holding that
claims not explicitly contained in the express-preemption clause in the Public Health
Cigarette Smoke Act of 1969 were not preempted).
5 Id.; see also Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 289-90 (1993) (noting
that express clauses do not entirely foreclose any possibility of implied preemption).
. See, e.g., Greg J. Scandaglia & Therese L. Tully, Express Preemption and Pre-Market
Approval Under the Medical Device Amendments, 59 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 245, 254-57
(2004).
570 See Bush Signs into Law Sudan Investment Measure, REUTERS, Dec, 31, 2007,
http://in.reuters.com/article/idINN3156518420071231 ("Some 20 U.S. states have
initiated divestment efforts because of the conflict in Sudan's Darfur region" by the
end of 2007).
5 See, e.g., 15 ILL. COMP. STAT. 520/0.01 (West 2010); 40 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/1-
110.5 (West 2010).
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572
ing that divestment sanctions might be constitutional. The amicus
brief hedged on this, claiming it was unnecessary to decide the issue,
and it also indicated that divestment measures targeting other states
would be more problematic than those targeting foreign countries."
The latter statement, of course, conflicts with long-standing Supreme
Court precedent that those measures affecting foreign commerce are
subject to greater scrutiny than those affecting interstate com-
merce. 574 The occurrence of this third major wave of state and local
sanctions legislation might serve as some evidence that the Court's
choice of preemption as the grounds for its rulings, with confusing
references to Zschernig, was not the best choice.
Recently, however, businesses acting through the same trade as-
sociation as in the Crosby litigation, the National Foreign Trade
Council (NFTC), challenged an Illinois law sanctioning Sudan.575
The case is the most prominent post-Crosby and post-Garamendi case,
and serves as an example of the impact the Supreme Court's rulings
in Crosby and Garamendi have had on lower court analysis.
1. National Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulis
In 2007, the NFTC was one of several plaintiffs to file suit chal-
lenging the Illinois Act to End Atrocities and Terrorism in the Sudan
("Illinois Act") . The 2005 Illinois Act prohibited the state from de-
positing state funds in any financial institution that maintained cus-
tomers defined as forbidden entities.m Forbidden entities included
" [a] ny company who has failed to certify under oath that it does not
own or control any property or asset located in, have employees or
facilities located in, provide goods or services to ... or invest in i) the
Republic of Sudan; or ii) any company domiciled in the Republic of
Sudan. The Illinois Act also prohibited state and local government
pension funds from maintaining investments in businesses with Su-
danese ties or contacts.5 The federal government had imposed vari-
ous sanctions against Sudan pursuant to an Executive Order and leg-
" Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Affirmance at 28,
Crosby v. NFT7C, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
1 See id. at 29 n.24.
.. SeeJapan Line, Ltd. v. City of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449 (1979).
See Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d 731, 733 (N.D.
Ill. 2007).
5 See id.
'" Id. at 733.
' Id. at 734.
7 Id. at 733.
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islation beginning in 1997 and continuing through the time of the
litigation.580 These federal sanctions prohibited most transactions by
U.S. companies with Sudan, other than humanitarian and medical
efforts, and ultimately included travel restrictions on Sudanese offi-
cials involved in the genocide in Darfur.8 The federal laws also
granted the President broad waiver authority similar to the Burmese
sanction law.52
In Giannoulias, the federal district court struck down the Illinois
Act's banking provisions on preemption grounds, relying primarily
on Crosby. The court highlighted the fact that the Illinois Act con-
tained no exceptions and targeted foreign subsidiaries of U.S. com-
5814panies that were not covered under the federal act. Further, the Il-
linois Act applied to companies operating anywhere in the Sudan
even though the federal sanctions were loosened to exempt certain
geographic areas in the Sudan. 85 Thus, similar to Crosby, the Illinois
Act changed the calibration of sanctions determined to be appropri-
ate by the federal government. Illinois attempted to rely upon
Board of Trustees of the Employees Retirement System v. Mayor of Baltimore,
which upheld divestment legislation aimed at South Africa in the
mid-1980s, to support the law. But the court rejected the ap-
proach of Board of Trustees because the case was decided prior to Cros-
by, and it believed that Crosby had either strongly questioned or expli-
citly rejected two key elements of the Board of Trustees opinion.589 The
first element the Supreme Court strongly questioned in Crosby was the
presumption against preemption in areas of traditional state regula-
590
tion. Second, the Court explicitly rejected the validity of laws not
directly targeting a foreign government but merely private companies
trading with a foreign government.m Nonetheless, the district court
in Giannoulias ruled that the impact of the divestment provisions was
too attenuated to be considered an obstacle to achieving the full
.o Id. at 735.
" Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 735.
8 Id. at 740.
5 Id. at 738.
5 Id. at 738.
m Id.
5' Id. at 738-39.
s' 562 A.2d. 720 (Md. 1989).
5 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 740.
5s' Id.
5" Id.
"' Id. at 740.
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purposes of the federal act. 9  The court's analysis seems to be based
on conjecture or perhaps a lack of evidence of the impact of the di-
593
vestment measures.
The court reached similar conclusions under its dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine analysis. 59  Interestingly, the court cited both
Zschernig and Garamendi in this section of its analysis.m It also ulti-
mately adopted the traditional threshold-effects test (i.e., "more than
an incidental or indirect effect") as the appropriate test, after earlier
complaining that neither case clearly laid out what test to apply to de-
termine if a state or local law ran afoul of the federal government's
foreign relations powers. The court found the banking section of
the act ran afoul of the threshold-effects test because it singled out a
57
particular foreign country. The court also relied on evidence that
banks had lost $275 million in state deposits for failure to comply
with the Illinois Act's requirements, and this loss of business could ul-
timately cause the banks to cease doing business with prohibited enti-
ties.5 Thus, the Illinois Act impacted Sudan."9 In contrast, the court
found the divestment measures did not have more than some inci-
dental or indirect effect on Sudan or U.S.-Sudan relations.oo
Interestingly, much earlier in its opinion, the court found from
the Illinois Act's title, preamble, and legislative history that the pur-
pose of the state law was to criticize or change the behavior of the
government of Sudan.6or While the court did not tie this purpose-
finding back into its dormant foreign affairs doctrine analysis, the
court probably would have invalidated the banking and divestment
provisions of the law if it had exclusively employed this Article's pre-
ferred purpose-based test. Moreover, it seems likely the court's analy-
sis gave at least some weight to the Illinois Act's purpose, otherwise
592 Id.
" See id. at 742 ("The Court has been presented with no evidence suggesting that
these pension funds' inability to purchase the securities of such companies would be
in any way likely to affect their decision to do business in that country.").
Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 746.
" Id. at 742.
Id. at 745 (citing Nat'l Foreign Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52 (1st
Cir. 1999)).
59 Id. at 745.
59 Id.
5% Id.
6 Giannoulias, 523 F. Supp. 2d at 745.
' Id. at 734.
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there would have been little reason to delve into such analysis at the
start of the opinion
The Giannoulias case is an example of a lower federal court fol-
lowing the Crosby and Garamendi lead in relying first on obstacles con-
603flict preemption grounds. It is also an example of how a court can
find wiggle room to uphold, under preemption doctrine, portions of
state laws singling out a particular foreign nation for criticism, even
though such laws would not survive under the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine. Giannoulias also suggests that lower courts will read
Zschernig as still alive but that a threshold-effects test may also permit
states to take actions singling out particular foreign countries for crit-
icism. Importantly, and regrettably, the Giannoulias court did not
seek to hypothetically aggregate similar actions being enacted by oth-
er states and localities in deciding whether the threshold-effects test
was met. The fact that the court struck down the divestment provi-
sions under the dormant Foreign Commerce Clause does not minim-
ize the court's failures under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine,
given that the court came to its finding because the state was direct-
ing local pension funds to divest, and thus, under Seventh Circuit
case law, acting in a regulatory capacity, not a market participant ca-
pacity.o' If the state had merely required divestment of Sudanese
connected companies by state pension funds, the court might have
found that the market-participant exception protected the divest-
ment provision from challenge.
2. More Post-Crosby and Post-Garamendi Lower Court
Treatment of ZschernigBased Claims
The Giannoulias opinion provides an example of the types of
problems that can arise in a post-Garamendi examination of state
laws-Zschernig is alive, but not preferred, and a threshold-effects test
is employed more prominently than a purpose-based test. But are the
types of problems present in Giannoulias widespread among lower
courts?
Over a dozen other lower court cases, all but one of them feder-
al, have significantly addressed Zschernig claims since Crosby and Ga-
6 See id. at 745. (acknowledging that the very purpose of the Illinois Act was to
enact economic sanctions on Sudan).
" Id. at 738.
a See id. at 742.
' See id. at 748.
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ramendi. The bare majority of these cases (summarized in the chart
below) indicate that indeed Zschernig is alive, the doctrines of
preemption and the dormant foreign affairs doctrine can be kept dis-
tinct, and an act's purpose frequently plays a key role in analyzing
state measures under the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, even if
fealty is paid to the threshold-effects test. Nevertheless, many lower
court cases also indicate some confusion and mixing at times of
preemption and dormant foreign affairs doctrine claims in the post-
Crosby and post-Garamendi era.
Test Under Type of
Case Name Law DFAD & Order Preemption Result
of Analysis Analysis
Commissioner of city The court used the
Condon v. In- school district's spe- threshold-effects test
ter-Religious cial investigation but gave s m
Foundationfor into whether travel mentary on the act's None. No violation
Community fo to Cuba by students purpos as well. of DFAD.
6 chaperoned by This was the first and
Organization school employees only doctrine ana-
violated federal law. lyzed.
Addiiona boningThe court
Additional bonding The court used the used Crosby- Violation of
reqtirements on threshold-effects test styled ob- DFAD,
travel agencies ar- but with the act's stacles con- preempted,
ABC Charters, Cuba, which created purpose ("design flict preemp- and a viola-
Inc. v. Bron- two classes of travel and intent") consi- tion analysis, tion of the
son
6 08  
agencies, those that dekdahc. Tirsw Hines-styled dormant
do business with Cu- sub-factor. This was field preemp- Foreign
ha and other terror- the first doctrine ana- tion analysis, Commerce
ist states and those lyzed (prior to and did not Clause.
that do not. preemption). cite to Gara-
mendi
Faculty Senate Restricted state uni- The court used the The court
offRorida In- versities from spend- threshold effects test, used a Crosby- Violation of
ternationals ing both state and but the act's purpose styled ob- DFAD and
University v. "non-state" funds on was the first sub- stacles con- preempted.
WinnM activities related to fastr (and the court flict preemp- _1
0 Additional cases, other than those analyzed in the chart, cite to Zschernigin the
post-Garmamendi era, but the chart is limited to those cases that involve a significant
discussion and analysis of Zschernig.
m Condon v. Inter-Religious Found. for Cmty. Org., Inc., 850 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2008).
G ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2008).
a Faculty Senate of Fla. Intern. Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198 (S.D. Fla.
2007).
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Test Under Type of
Case Name Law or Action at DFAD & Order Preemption Result
Issueof Analysis Analysis
travel to a "terrorist almost seems to dec- tion analysis.
state," as designated lare the act unconsti-
by the U.S. Depart- tutional based on
ment of State as a purpose alone).
state sponsor of ter- This was the first doc-
ronsm. trine analyzed (prior
to preemption).
The court
stated that
Maine Workers' The court used the Garamendi
Compensation Act threshold-effects test stands for the No violation
Hartford Enter- applied to Canadian but the act's purpose proposition of DFAD
prises Inc., v. employees who came was the first sub- that tradi a
Coty into Maine for only factor. This was the tional field and no
restricted purposes second doctrine applied preemption preemption.
and limited times. (after preemption). requires
greater con-
flict.
The court
The court mixed mixed DFAD
Central Valley California green- DFAD and preemp- and preemp- Novlain
Chrysler-Jeep v. house gas (GHG) tion analysis (scher- tion r No violation.
Witherspoon limits. nig and Garamendi). and Garamen-
di).
The court used the sed aur-
"disruption and em- edi-styled
Green Moun- barrassmen" test analysis but No violation
tain Chrysler Vermont GHG lim- shold-effects, but required an of DFAD or
Plymouth Dodge its. hints at purpose express policy preemptionjeet v. Crom- (presumably doctinfi2rst do. This was the in legal meas- doctrine.
first doctrine analyzed ures such as(prior to preemp- an executive
tion). agreement).
The purpose-based
In re Nat'l Investigation by state test was applied first,
officials of telecom- but a threshold-
Telecommunicay munications compa- effects test was also NoneNo violation
tons tecords nies that turned over applied. This was ofDFAD.
t a records and informa- the first doctrine ana-
Litigation tion to the NSA. lyzed (prior to
preemption).
Suit tinder the FSIA The court seems to The court
Republic of lrac Act against the state mix Garamendi and used a Gara- No violation.
v. Beaty of Iraq by children Zscherniginto a mendi-styled
of Americans impri- - _| _
6"0 Hartford Enters., Inc. v. Coty, 529 F. Supp. 2d 95 (D. Me. 2008).
6.. Cent. Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (E.D. Cal.
2006).
6" Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F. Supp. 2d
295 (D. Vt. 2007).
.. In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892 (N.D.
Cal. 2007).
614 Republic of Iraq v. Beaty, 129 S.Ct. 2183 (2009).
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Test Under Type of
Case Name Law DFAD & Order Preemption Result
Issue of Analysis Analysis
soned and tortured preemption analysis analysis (not-
by the former re- (although it makes a ing that since
gime for intentional late reference to tort law is a
infliction of emo- there being no in- traditional
tional distress under tent to criticize the area of state
tort laws of Oklaho- foreign govern- law, the con-
ma and Florida. ment). flict with U.S.
foreign policy
would need to
be signifi-
cant).
The court
Columbian nationals usedi ta-
sued an oil company gave weight to
and a private security a State De-
firm under the Alien The court largely artent
Tort Statute and merged preemption partment
Mujica v. Occi- state law to recover and DFAD analysis statement of
dentalPetra- for their personal (late in the court's ther than in- DFAD.
615 hrtain FD
leum Corp. injuries and for opinion it speaks of sist on express
deaths of family incidental con- policy (fur-
members caused by flict"). ther indica-
the bombing of a tion of some
village by the Co- merging oflumbian military. DFAD with
preemption).
The court
Mexican nationals use aoGra
who orkd intheused a Gara-who worked in the The court applied mendi-styledUnited Ste uring Zschernig, describing analysis (find-
brog ation WWit as a field preemp- ing no
brought action tion case, although preemption
against Mexico, Mex- the test applied fo- based on ex-
Cruz v.6 United t tes, and cused on criticism of ecutive o DaD orn
States 616 nitAmerican hank for foreign government agreements preemption
(close to purpose with Mexico preemption.
failure to pay wages. based.te). The court since the
California enacted a analyzed Zschernig agreements
statute removing second (after preemp- seemed to
statute of limitations tion). envision pos-
for actions such as sibility of such
the one brought. suits).
The court cites The court
Application of state Zschernigfocusing on used a Gara-
In re Agent tort law concerngin minute inquiries and mendi-styled
Orange Product pds iaiit criticism concerns in analysis and of DFAi or
Liability Litiga- ATS by Vietnamese the case, and found found no preemption.
tion"'t non-profit and na- no such risk in ordi- preemption,
nary application of noting that
ufactures. New York tort law plaintiffs
615 Mujica v. Occidental Petroleum Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1164 (C.D. Cal. 2005).
6" Cruz v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 2d 1057 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
61 Nguyen Thang Loi v. Dow Chemical Co. (In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Li-
tig.), 373 F. Supp. 2d. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
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Test Under Type of
Case Name Issue DFAD & Order Preemption Result
of Analysis Analysis
were it applicable. domestic law
claims were
already
barred by the
government
contractor
defense.
The court
mixed its
analysis. It
relied on
Crosby and
Garamendi as
obstacles con-
The court gives little flict-type
attention to Zschernig pree m ptioApplication of state (only in a string cite preemption
Saleh v Titan tort law to claims by ith inar ite
Cop618 Iraqi nationals of tothcaesfr rep calibration of PemtdCorp. abuse by U.S. mili- tion cases for the sanctions), Preempted.
tary contractors in that states have no bter s no
Iraq. role in war time pol- affirative act
icy making). of the federal
government
that
preempts, the
case may be
considered a
DFAD case.
The court
finds Gara-
mendi allows
preemption
The ourtonlyonce by executive
California Statute te curt olon branch state-
extending statute of cited
Mousesian v. limitations for claims e proposition that
Victoria Versi- arising out of life curts lokspat affirmative Preempted.
cherugA~f insurance policies suefcalgiatvcrngd inuac oiis intent to ascertain legal act is
for Armenian geno- true legislative in- required).
cide victims."' tent"). The court
balanced the
degree of
conflict
against the
state interest.
... Saleh v. Titan Corp., 580 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
616 Indeed, this is what the dissent suspected. See id. at 17 (Garland,J., dissenting)
(arguing no precedent to strike down facially neutral generally applicable law under
dormant foreign affairs doctrine).
626 Movsesian v. Victoria Versicherung AG, 578 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
621 See id. at 1054 (internal quotations omitted).
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Test Under Type of
Case Name Law DFAD & Order Preemption Result
of Analysis Analysis
The court
initially kept
preemption
(citing Crosby
and Garamen-
di first) and Not
The court examined the dormant preempted
California statute the purpose (or aimn) foreign affairs but conflictsVon Ser v. extending statute of fthe law first and doctrine (cit- with DFAD
Norton Simon lmtatinstfortlaims then examined ef- ing Zschernig)
Museum ofArt limitations for claims fects. 
6 2 This was the distinct. Lat- (or more
622 seeking recovery of .. specifically
at Pasadena Holocaust-era art, second doctrine ana- er, in its opi- dormant
lyzed (after preemp- nion, Gara- War Powers
tion). mendi creeps 6 
into the doctrine).
DFAD analy-
sis, and there
was some mix-
ing of the
doctrines.
As displayed in the above chart, seven of the thirteen lower court
opinions analyzing Zschernigbased claims were able keep their dor-
mant foreign affairs doctrine analysis separate and distinct from a
preemption analysis.'" Of the seven cases that kept the doctrines dis-
tinct, six placed considerable emphasis on purpose in their dormant
626foreign affairs doctrine analysis. As also displayed in the above
chart, however, a large minority of lower courts did not escape the
62 Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir.
2010).
621 See id. at 965 ("California 'seeks to redress wrongs committed during the
second World War'-a motive that [is] fatal.") (citing Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324
F.3d 692, 712 (9th Cir. 2003)).
12 Id. at 965-66 ("The District Court held that [the California statute] intrudes on
the power to make and resolve war, a power reserved exclusively for the federal gov-
ernment under the Constitution. We agree.").
625 The seven cases are the following: Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art
at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954 (9th Cir. 2010); Hartford Enters., Inc. v. Coty, 529 F. Supp.
2d 95 (D. Me. 2008); ABC Charters, Inc. v. Bronson, 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272 (S.D. Fla.
2008); Condon v. Inter-Religious Found. for Cmty. Org., Inc., 850 N.Y.S.2d 841 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2008); In re Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892
(N.D. Cal. 2007); Faculty Senate of Fla. Intern. Univ. v. Winn, 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198
(S.D. Fla. 2007); Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Crombie, 508 F.
Supp. 2d 295 (D. Vt. 2007).
626 These cases include the following: Von Saher 592 F.3d 954; Hartford Enters., 529
F. Supp. 2d 95; ABC Charters, Inc., 591 F. Supp. 2d 1272; Condon, 850 N.Y.S.2d 841;
Nat'l Sec. Agency Telecomm. Records Litig., 633 F. Supp. 2d 892; Faculty Senate of Fla. In-
tern. Univ., 477 F. Supp. 2d 1198.
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potential confusion arising out of Garamendi. Thus, a need exists for
further clarification by the Supreme Court.
IX. THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS
OR IN STATE CAPITOLS?
U.S. courts cannot be relied upon as the sole, or perhaps not
even the primary, forum for applying the dormant foreign affairs
doctrine. Private parties affected by state-level foreign policy legisla-
tion must weigh the benefits of bringing a successful claim under a
doctrine with an uncertain test against the risks of bringing a suit, in-
621
cluding potential consumer boycotts from those supporting the
state's incursion into foreign policy. Therefore, because of the ambi-
guity of the doctrine, the uncertainty of success, and the risks to pri-
vate parties, the courts cannot serve as a comprehensive forum of
constraint.
Accordingly, self-imposed constraint by state legislators and gov-
628
ernors is necessary, at least to some degree. State legislators and
governors have a duty to impose constitutional constraints upon
themselves.'9 Both take oaths to uphold and support the U.S. Consti-
tution.1o The Constitution, in fact, requires such "oaths or affirma-
tions" by all state government representatives and officials."' Madi-
son opined in the Federalist Papers No. 44 that "the members and
officers of the State governments ... will have an essential agency in
giving effect to the federal Constitution." It is part of the "conscien-
tious" state official's duty to analyze the constitutionality of proposed
613legislation, executive orders, and other formal acts. Legislators and
governors, however, do not have complete independence in inter-
preting the U.S. Constitution for purposes of reviewing proposed
acts. Legislators and governors are bound to follow, or at least give
extreme deference to, the decisions of the highest court of the land,
the U.S. Supreme Court. 34 The Court has established a dormant for-
6 See Fenton, supra note 34, at 591.
626 Thus, while I agree with Professor Fenton that cases will rarely be brought, I
disagree that judicial invalidation is the only realistic option for correction of the
problem. See Fenton, supra note 34, at 592.
629 Paul Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to Constitutional Interpretation, 27
STAN. L. REv. 585, 587 (1975).
"6 See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
631 Id.
632 THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 133 (James Madison) (Roy Fairfield 2d ed., 1981).
63 See Brest, supra note 629, at 587.
6 In the context of federal legislators, see Brest, supra note 629, at 587. On the
debate as to whether nonjudicial officials must follow the Constitution as interpreted
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65
eign affairs doctrine. The better reading of Crosby and Garamendi,
as supported by a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution and
lower court opinions in the post-Crosby and post-Garamendi era, con-
firms the vitality of the doctrine and the importance of purpose in
analyzing state actions under the doctrine. Thus, state legislators and
governors should not interpret the Constitution so as to deny the ex-
istence of such a doctrine.6 3 ' Nevertheless, because the Court has not
addressed every issue related to the doctrine, for example, the exis-
tence of the market-participant exception, some independent inter-
pretation of the doctrine must occur. The Court could facilitate and
ease the difficult interpretational task state legislators and governors
currently face by clearly adopting a purpose-based doctrinal test and
rejecting a market-participant exception under the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine. Clarification by the Court would provide far greater
guidance to state officials than the current threshold-effects test.
Such action would also allow lower courts to serve a greater role as a
forum of constraint since private parties would be less hesitant to
challenge state measures without the ambiguity over the doctrinal
test. However, one might hope that in time the faithful application
of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine with a purpose-based test will
eliminate the need for even infrequent litigation.
X. MAY THE SUPREME COURT RELY ON
THE DORMANT FOREIGN AFFAIRS DOCTRINE WHEN
PREEMPTION COULD ALSO BE RELIED UPON?
In Crosby, the Court cited Ashwander v. TVA6 3' as a reason why it
chose not to address the First Circuit's additional grounds for invali-
dating the Massachusetts Burma law, including the dormant foreign
affairs doctrine. 8 Justice Brandeis' concurrence in Ashwander is fre-
quently cited to as laying out the rules on Supreme Court judicial re-
straint.'" The fourth principle in Ashwander relied upon by the Court
to rule exclusively on preemption grounds in Crosby states:
by the Supreme Court, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial
Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REv. 1359 (1997); see also Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
635 See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968).
63 See Matthew Schaefer, Conscientious State Legislators and the Cultures of Compliance
and Liberalization Relating to International Trade Agreements, 95 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC.
52, 54 (2001).
6 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
3 See Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 (2000).
r See Ashwander 297 U.S. at 341.
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The Court will not pass upon a constitutional question although
properly presented by the record, if there is also present some
other ground upon which the case may be disposed of. This rule
has found most varied application. Thus, if a case can be decided
on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional question,
the other a question of statutory construction or general law, the
Court will decide only the latter.
It is immediately apparent that if the application of preemption doc-
trine is considered to involve a constitutional question-as it rightful-
ly should be, given the doctrine involves interpretation of the Supre-
macy Clause as well as statutory construction to glean congressional
intent-then Ashwander is not a sufficient reason to chose preemp-
141
tion grounds over dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds. It ap-
pears the Court, prior to Crosby, never before relied on Ashwander to
rule on preemption grounds over a dormant doctrine (i.e., either
dormant foreign affairs doctrine or dormant Commerce Clause), so it
was a novel application of the rule rather than long-standing prac-
tice. In fact, while Justice Harlan's concurrence in Zschernig argued
that the Court should rule on preemption grounds in part based on
643
Ashwander the six Justices in the majority rejected the argument
644
and relied instead on the dormant foreign affairs doctrine. To be
fair, relying on preemption grounds would have required revisiting
the interpretation of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Con-
sular Rights between the United States and Germany established ear-
lier in Clark v. Allen, something the majority was unwilling to do.
Therefore, there was not an explicit rejection by the Zschernig majority
of the application of the fourth principle of Ashwander in their deci-
sion to rely on dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds rather than
preemption grounds.
The strength of Ashwanders fourth principle, however, as ap-
plied to situations involving a choice between preemption grounds or
dormant foreign affairs doctrine grounds is further lessened when its
64 Id. at 347.
*' See Vazquez, supra note 15, at 1265-68; see also Garrick Pursley, The Structure of
Preemption Decisions, 85 NEB. L. REv. 912, 957 (2007) ("Preemption issues should be
treated like any other constitutional issues for purposes of Pullman abstention and
the rule that courts, where possible, should decide issues in the order that avoids
constitutional questions.").
642 The court, however, chose preemption grounds over other constitutional doc-
trines, such as the Equal Protection Clause in certain cases. See Pursley, supra note
641, at 913.
* See Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 444 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
6 See Zschernig, 389 U.S. at 432; see also Schaefer, supra note 4, at 47.
5 See supra Part IV.B.
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origins are considered. In laying out the fourth principle, Justice
Brandeis cited to two cases: Siler v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co.646
647 648
and Light v. United States . Neither of these involved a decision to
rely on preemption grounds over a dormant doctrine. Indeed, the
cases involved a choice between local law and federal constitutional
doctrines to resolve the case at hand."" Moreover, neither Siler nor
Light speaks in terms of any obligation that a court must, or indeed
certainty that a court would prefer, to resolve questions on a local law
basis, rather than a federal constitutional question. In Siler, the Court
stated that it can "if it deem[s] it proper, decide the local questions
only, and omit to decide the Federal questions."6 0 In Light, the court,
citing to Siler, stated that "where [a] case in this court can be decided
without reference to questions arising under the Federal Constitution
that course is usually pursued, and is not departed from without im-
portant reasons. Thus, it appears that in certain situations, the
presumption against deciding on constitutional grounds can be over-
come. Eliminating unnecessary confusion and uncertainty over a
significant constitutional doctrine might be sufficient grounds to
overcome the normal rule of judicial restraint, even assuming that it
applies in the context of choosing between two constitutional doc-
trines: preemption and dormant foreign affairs doctrine.
XI. CONCLUSION
U.S. state involvement in foreign affairs continues. Sanctions
legislation for foreign-policy purposes, namely to change or criticize
the behavior of foreign governments, is perhaps the most significant
and problematic manifestation of this increased involvement. Yet the
existence of a dormant foreign affairs doctrine that invalidates cer-
tain state actions in foreign affairs, even when such actions have not
been preempted by federal enactments, is increasingly criticized and
questioned. The plenary preemptive powers of the federal gov-
ernment over foreign affairs, it is argued by many scholars, are suffi-
6 213 U.S. 175 (1909).
6 220 U.S. 523 (1911).
' Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (citing Siler v. Louisville & Nash-
ville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909); Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538
(1911)).
6 See Siler, 213 U.S. at 191; Light, 220 U.S. at 538.
6 Siler, 213 U.S. at 191.
0 Light, 220 U.S. at 538 (citing Siler, 213 U.S. at 193).
6 See supra note 12.
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cient to eliminate any negative effects of state-level foreign policies.6 5 3
Yet sole reliance on preemption analysis does not allow the federal
government to pursue quiet diplomacy with respect to a foreign-
policy matter. Moreover, there will always be questions of congres-
sional intent to preempt when uncertainty over the existence and
scope of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine persists. For example,
congressional representatives believing that such a doctrine exists
may not explicitly preempt state sanctions activity in a federal sanc-
tions law because they believe such state activity is already prohibited
by the Constitution.
The existence of the dormant foreign affairs doctrine is sup-
ported by a multi-modal interpretation of the Constitution. While
there are conflicting signals of the appropriate test to be utilized un-
der the doctrine in the Court's 1968 Zschernig opinion, purpose re-
view is the most appropriate standard. Specifically, the dormant for-
eign affairs doctrine should prohibit state actions that have a foreign
policy purpose. A foreign policy purpose is evident when the primary
purpose of the state action is to criticize or change a policy of a for-
eign government. Such a test best suits the competence of the courts,
can be more consistently applied by courts, prevents the executive
branch or-even worse-foreign governments from serving as the de
facto judges of the validity of state legislation, and provides the great-
est degree of guidance to state government officials.
Importantly, purpose review also respects traditional areas of
state regulation and federal government views on whether certain in-
ternational agreements are self-executing to a much greater degree
than a threshold-effects test. Such review also will not prevent many
activities states currently engage in that some broader definitions of
foreign policy may include. For instance, state trade missions and
overseas investment offices do not, as a general matter, violate the
dormant foreign affairs doctrine since their primary purpose is not to
change foreign government policies but rather to facilitate private
business contacts and private investment. Similarly, state activities
that create foreign controversies such as imposition of the death pe-
nalty will not violate a purpose-review-based dormant foreign affairs
doctrine. States do not take such actions with the primary purpose of
changing foreign government policies. A purpose-review test further
refined, such that it is both limited to measures with legal effect and
respectful of prior precedent, might be preferred. It would allow
state governments to voice their views on foreign policy matters to the
a' See discussion supra Part VIII.A.
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federal government, just as a state can on any other federal matter,
through non-binding resolutions and allow states to maintain reci-
procity-inspired legislation. Additionally, a market participant excep-
tion should not be available under the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine, and the additional "one voice" prong of analysis under the
dormant Foreign Commerce Clause should be eliminated because
the concerns that led to the creation of the "one voice" prong are
cured through faithful application of the dormant foreign affairs doc-
trine.
While the Court's decisions in the early 2000s in Crosby and Ga-
ramendi have arguably created some confusion over the status of, and
test to be used under, the dormant foreign affairs doctrine, a majori-
ty-bare as it may be-of lower courts continue to treat the doctrine
as alive and well, and place significant emphasis on purpose in their
analysis. Yet, because state officials must engage in a review of their
actions even in the absence of litigation, it would be preferable for
the Court to eliminate any confusion it has created. The Court ap-
pears to have the flexibility to do so in a future case, given its own
rules on judicial restraint do not absolutely require otherwise. Even if
the Court elects not to do so, state officials have plenty of reasons to
independently apply a dormant foreign affairs doctrine with purpose
review playing a key role as they assess the constitutionality of their
own actions.
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